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**DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
DELHI-110007
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The Indian Journal of African Studies (IJAS) is a biannual official publication of the Department of African Studies, University of Delhi. The Department was established in December 1954 as the "School of African Studies" at the personal initiative of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and inaugurated by him on 6 August 1955.

The IJAS aims at critical analysis and wider understanding of the issues, goals and aspirations of the African people and countries. Contributions and book reviews, editorial and business correspondence may be sent to the Department of African Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Delhi, Delhi - 110007 (India).

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CONTENTS

Message from the Vice Chancellor	vii
Message from the Registrar	viii
Chief Editor's Note	ix
Editorial Note	x
1. The Impact of Military Strategies during the Maji Maji War on Non Combatants: Women and Children in Songea District <i>Edward F. Eliya1, Gajendra Singh, Eginald P. Mihanjo</i>	1
2. What ails Africa? Re-Investigation of Colonial Legacies <i>A.S. Yaruvingam & Prem Kumar Bharti</i>	22
3. Role and Challenges of Primary Sector in the Structural Transformation in Africa <i>Vibha Gupta & Suresh Kumar</i>	43
4. Cooperation and Challenges in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Ethiopia <i>Solomon Tesfaye Telila, Rashmi Kapoor & Tribhuwan Prasad</i>	63
5. India-Nigeria Oil Partnership <i>Sandipani Dash</i>	84
6. Poor Leadership and Underdevelopment in the African Subcontinent: An Evaluation of Selected Factors <i>Aditya Narayan Misra & Abhishek K. Singh</i>	102
7. Civil Society in Egypt: A Critical Analysis <i>Manila Narzary & Dharitri Narzary Chakravartty</i>	118

8. Siddis of Patthar Kuan (Ahmedabad): A Diasporic Connect from Africa <i>Manish Karmwar</i>	136
Contributors	149
Former Faculty Members	151



प्रो० योगेश सिंह
कुलपति

Prof. Yogesh Singh
Vice-Chancellor

दिल्ली विश्वविद्यालय
University of Delhi



No. DU/VC/2023/217
1st April 2023



MESSAGE FROM THE VICE CHANCELLOR

MESSAGE

I am pleased to extend my compliments to you and your Department on the occasion of publication of the 30th issue of the Indian Journal of African Studies. The dedication to promoting research and knowledge exchange on various aspects of the continent of Africa through this Journal is commendable and has undoubtedly made a significant impact in the academic community by enhancing the understanding of Africa and its people.

Over the years, the Journal has provided a platform for scholars, researchers, and experts from all over the world to share their insights and perspectives on the various socio-economic, political, and cultural issues affecting Africa, thus contributing to the development of academic discourse in this field.

On behalf of the University fraternity, I congratulate you all again for the publication of the Journal and extend my best wishes for continued success.

Yogesh Singh

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MESSAGE FROM THE REGISTRAR



MESSAGE

It gives me immense to pleasure to know that the Department of African Studies of the University is bringing out the Commemorative issue of the Indian Journal of African Studies, first published three decade back in the year 1992, at a time when the University is celebrating its Centenary year, the Country is celebrating 75 years of the Independence through Azadi ka Amrit Mohatsav followed by Amrit Kaal and is also holding the Presidency of G-20 Nations.

The Journal, over the years, has given an opportunity to the scholars, both at the National and International level, to express their academic thoughts appropriately through this platform. The Journal has remained prominent due to its superior academic standard as well as research orientation while discussing issues concerning Africa as a continent and more importantly the evolving Indo-African relationship.

On this historic occasion I would like to congratulate the Head, Department of African Studies, faculty members, administrative and support staff of the Department for their relentless effort in making the department successful in its academic endeavours and research prowess. I hope the Department of African Studies will continue to observe steady academic progression in future as well and add to the already rich academic repository of the University, prominently.

Vikas Gupta

(DR. VIKAS GUPTA)

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CHIEF EDITOR'S NOTE



MESSAGE

It gives me immense pleasure to inform that the publication of the Department of African Studies with the new title *Indian journal of African Studies* has completed **thirty years of publication with ISSN**. The first issue of the Journal was published in 1992. This Journal has given Indian and international scholars an opportunity to write and discuss African issues and evolution of India-Africa relations for the last thirty years. The Journal has strived continuously to maintain the academic standards and adopt scientific methods of research. This special issue is published to commemorate the centenary celebration of the foundation of University of Delhi, India's G-20 Presidency, Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav to observe the 75th year of the Indian Independence along with the thirty years of the publication of the prestigious Journal. The co-occurrence of such historic events is an extraordinary occasion for us to celebrate. This special issue is dedicated to all the scholars who have been contributing original research and strengthening the academic discourse on Africa and India.

Prof. Gajendra Singh
Chief Editor

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Department of African Studies has always strived to undertake multi-disciplinary research on Africa and areas related to India-Africa relations. The different courses taught at the Department of African Studies always had multidisciplinary orientation. The scholars are encouraged to investigate the African and Indian issues from several different facets that helps them to have well-rounded and holistic understanding of the African affairs and African issues. The persistent effort of the editorial team of the *IJAS* has been to bring the collection of articles dealing with wide variety of issues maintaining the scientific temper and academic credibility. The present *Special Centenary* issue of the *Indian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1&2 2022 has collection of eight articles.

The article *Impact of Military Strategies on Non-Combatants in Maji Maji War: Women and Children in Songea District* examines the military strategies designed during the Maji Maji War and how they impacted especially women and children in Songeadistrict. It also analyses the survival strategies adopted by the Non-Combatants during and soon after the war. Songeadistrict was chosen as it had a long history of violent conflict. The findings exposed a number of problems with both German and Ngoni military tactics.

The article *What ails Africa? Re-Investigation of Colonial Legacies* outlines and contextualizes the theoretical construct of the evolution of the African states. An attempt is made to unveil the protracted spatial, socio-cultural and economic disparities that still persist across the continent among the various demographic groupings. The authors try to identify the hinderances faced in the building of state in Africa. The paper also highlights the colonial policy directives and other factors that hindered the African statefrom achieving its developmental goals.

The article *Role and Challenges of Primary Sector in the Structural Transformation in Africa* attempts to examine the primary sector's performance, preferment, and challenges in structural transformation in the African economy. The authors discuss in detail the complex

mix of multifaceted developmental problems within the primary sector in Africa. A few of the challenges that are discussed in detail include crawling technological adaptations and dependency on traditional harvesting & irrigation methods; less cost-effective agricultural techniques of the contemporary era with respect to inexpensive & unskilled farmers; etc. The authors address the challenges and their concomitant trade-offs to improve the prospects for sustained growth and development.

The article *Cooperation and Challenges in the comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Ethiopia* attempts to analyze Ethiopia's commitment in creating local community awareness and raising ownership towards alleviating the refugee's livelihood, providing education, job, and free movement. The study has been guided by the conceptual and practical framework of community-based cross-sectional assessment design. The present study concludes that although refugees' protection is under-resourced and faces crucial challenges, but the intention of the Ethiopia and the cooperation among the stakeholder to mitigate the challenges is strong and sustaining.

The article *India-Nigeria Oil Partnership* deals with the India-Nigeria partnership in recent years and articulates how Nigeria has become one of the main and reliable sources of crude for India. Nigeria is also the largest market in Africa for Indian exports. The author also highlights that a large number of Indian companies have footprints in Nigeria, which have made substantial investments in Nigeria. He argues that the economic complementarity and mutuality of interests have consequently created immense scope for the India and African countries to build upon their historic friendships for undertaking a holistic partnership on the oil sector.

The article *Poor Leadership and Underdevelopment in the African Subcontinent: An Evaluation of Selected Factors* discusses the reasons behind faulty leadership based on the available literature. According to the authors the consequence of the faulty leadership is poverty and economic backwardness in Africa. The article not only evaluated the factors responsible for poor leadership but the challenges related to it. The study deliberates on the importance of democracy and attempts to find a linkage between healthy democracies, strong leadership and African development crises. The study is qualitatively oriented and primarily based on the secondary data for analysis.

The article *Civil Society in Egypt: A critical analysis* critically analyses the role of civil society in the post-colonial Egypt. The authors find that despite being a Republic, President of Egypt has absolute power to take decisions with regards to administering and running the state. This extends to undermine the provisions created by the constitution for citizens' rights. Accordingly, the authors argue that there is little room for any public discourse and civil society activities. After in-depth analysis of the growth of civil society and their prospects under successive regimes in post-colonial Egypt and conclude that Egyptian society is largely shaped by the state centric political culture.

The article *Siddis of Patthar Kuan (Ahmedabad): a diasporic connect from Africa* deals with how Siddis attained numerous roles in society and polity including rulers, generals, administrators, soldiers and architects. They are now living in many different parts of India. Siddis are the progeny of Africans who migrated to India and have been living here for several centuries. They have now become integral part of the Indian cultural mosaic. The author discusses the society, polity and culture of those who are living as a small minority in Patthar Kuan, Gujarat. The history of migration traditions, rituals, cultural practices and economic goals of Siddis have been elaborated upon. The author argues that Indian culture has been enriched by the African diaspora and they are playing a pivotal role in India.

Rashmi Kapoor
Sandipani Dash
Editors

The Impact of Military Strategies during the Maji Maji War on Non Combatants: Women and Children in Songea District

Edward F. Eliya, Gajendra Singh, Eginald P. Mihanjo

ABSTRACT

Throughout human history, war and military tactics have been a constant. The establishment of the colonial rule in Africa produced a number of wars that impacted on both combatants and noncombatants. This study examines the military strategies during the Maji Maji War and its impacts on non-combatants especially women and children in Songea District. It also examines the survival strategies during and soon after the war. Three theories served as the foundation for the study: the just war theory, the just and unjust war theory, and the empathic war fighting theory. Both primary and secondary sources were employed in the investigation. Oral accounts and archive sources served as the primary data sources while secondary sources were obtained from books and journal articles. The triangulation of several sources of data collection is aimed to decrease the subjectivity and exaggerations. Songea District was chosen for the study because it had a long history of violent conflict. The results exposed a number of problems with both German and Ngoni military tactics. At first, the Germans sought vengeance in the mistaken belief that they could quickly suppress the opposition. The Ngoni used their conventional military tactics to contain the Germans. Finally, the Germans employed the most devastating military tactic "scorched earth policy", by setting villages on fire. Burning of shelters and food supplies led to starvation and numerous fatalities. In order to maintain their food, health, and security, women and children gathered food and conventional medicine covertly at night out of dread of the German militias.

Keywords: Maji Maji War, Military Strategy, Combatants, Non Combatants, Women, Children.

Introduction

A robust military approach was used to impose colonial rule on Africa, and Tanganyika in particular. Africans were not simply passive victims, despite what colonial rulers and historians said. To protect their rank and authority from colonial rule, they put up a lot of resistance. One of these African endeavours was the Maji Maji War, which took place between 1905 and 1907 in the southern region of Tanganyika, now Tanzania. The African uprising against colonial rule during the Maji Maji War caught the German colonial government off guard in the first decade of the 20th century. Iliffe (1979) asserted that, Men in Nandete organized to uproot cotton trees in June 1905 in order to declare war on the Germans. The *Maji* “water” treatment that Kinjikitile Ngwale provided greatly helped the Africans’ confidence in battle. Everyone who drank water would not be wounded by German bullets, according to the war’s guiding doctrine. Similar to this, it was stressed that the Germans’ bullets would turn to water during the intense conflict. One month after it began, the fighting from Nandete had expanded to Ungoni (Songea District). When Omari Kinjala delivered the *Maji* medication to the area, this took place. Although it was difficult to be accepted, Kinjala convinced Mkomani female *Nduna* (sub-chief) of the Ngoni and finally he managed to introduce the medicine (*Ibid*). Although its validation cannot be easily acknowledged, water played a critical role towards organization of the fighters as it provided moral support.

Throughout human history, military tactics and combat conduct have posed a menace. Elshtain (1992), Allhoff et al., (2013), Orend, (2013), Lango, (2014), Farrell, (2013) and Sjoberg, (2006) noted that, in order to prevent genocides, particularly against civilians, the use of restrictive military tactics has been promoted. Non-combatants participate in conflicts to aid in winning. Blahuta(2013) made the hypothesis that during times of war, civilians engage in economic activity. As an illustration, non-soldiers engage in agricultural work to feed combatants. Non-combatants are impacted either directly or circuitously as conflicts escalate. The goal of this study is to evaluate how non-combatants, such as women and children, were impacted by the Maji Maji War.

Dinstein, (2022), Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, (2005), Tienfenbrun, (2010), Falk, (2015), Hutler, (2015), and Arai, (2009) postulated that globally, diverse tactics used in conflict have been primarily associated with violent obliterations. Scorched earth policy was utilized as a military tactic to defeat the opponents. Even while international law and the ethics of war discourage the deployment of such war tactics that harm non-combatants, there have been instances where such defenseless victims have been impacted. For instance, Hulter(2015) has pointed out that the scorched earth policy has been employed as a military tactic to win the conflict, particularly for the protection of national territory against invasion.

In a similar vein, Mwakikagile (2000) and Fitzpatrick (2010) investigated how non-combatants were impacted by the Germans' scorched earth tactics during the Maji Maji War. In areas where rebel tribes lived, Mwakikagile noted that "the Germans initiated an arson campaign and burned down the entire communities and destroyed harvests. The majority of their livestock was also lost." Fitzpatrick further claimed that Germans employed the "scorched earth" policy, which involved setting grain silos and fields on fire in numerous villages. The social structures that were founded on the community system and heavily dependent on the production of grain crops were impacted by this kind of damage.

Gwasa, (2005), Iliffe, (2007), Koponeni, (1994), and Stollowsky and East, (1988) have focused on its general causes and structure of the Maji Maji war, from Matumbiland expanding to other regions of southern Tanganyika to *Ungoni*. The *maji* ideology that governed the war from its inception till its eruption has received attention from other academics. However, some researchers have focused on the general effects of the War, such as starvation and population decline. Few academics have explored Mkomani, a female *Nduna* of Mshope who weds Kinjala, a significant War figure. Mapunda, (2010) noted that Namabengo is a female leader of the Ngoni, according to a small number of scholars. Little research has been done on the military tactics used by the Germans and the Ngoni during the War, as well as how these tactics affected civilians.

Statement of the Research Problem

The reasons, conduct, and outcomes of the Maji Maji War have drawn the attention of numerous academics. The study of military tactics used during battle and their effects on non-combatants has received little attention. Additionally, only a small number of academics have examined the War from a local perspective, particularly its effects on women and children who were among the most vulnerable. There is obviously a lack of knowledge regarding the military tactics used throughout the conflict and how they affected Songea District's non-combatants. The purpose of this study was to fill this gap. It evaluated military tactics used during the Maji Maji War and their effects on civilians, particularly women and children. Additionally, it evaluated how the war had an effect on local human security.

The Ngoni Military Strategies during the Maji Maji War.

The Ngoni employed traditional military strategies throughout the Maji Maji War. Since there was no modern army, the chief and *Anduna* served as the military commandants, and they were founded on the chieftom system. According to Adam (2007), the immediately trained soldiers employed tried-and-true combat techniques like ambushes, raids, camouflage, and field craft. The chiefs were in charge of preparing those subjects for the fight. The benefit of Ngoni ethnic group was that they lived in a way that was reminiscent of conquest-related warfare. They were terrible to the Songean people because of the war discipline they upheld throughout their lives.

The Ngoni soldiers adopted guerilla and ambush tactics as their main methods of attack once they arrived in Songea. When they found it difficult to prevail in a pitched fight, they opted to use ambush and guerilla tactics. It should be kept in mind that although the *maji* medicine offered emotional support, the combatants were actually wounded by the gunshots. Highlands and stones that were employed as hiding places after they lost the pitched fight assisted the ambush strategy. The Maji Maji fighters did not have regular camps for military formations, in contrast to the current military defense forces. As a result, administrative leaders rather than trained military commanders issued the instructions or commands for the wars. There were a few places that were temporarily

designated as camping hubs, including *Lumecha*, *Chandamali*, *Mleta*, and *Namabengo*.

Other highly technical tactics employed by Maji Maji militants included customary signs that were difficult for Germans to decipher. For instance, they organized the fighters using the traditional song called *ligiu*. Other indications included the usage of regional terms like *gwazai*, which means “fire,” to synchronize the fighters and start the war. The Maji Maji fighters upheld discipline towards their leaders, who served as military commanders, in accordance with current military doctrine. Despite using conventional weaponry, the Germans had trouble suppressing the fighters because they were so compliant.

The bull-and-horns formation was another military tactic the Ngoni utilized to assault the German troops. This arrangement was made up of one troop on each side acting as the horns and several troops crowded closely together in the center, or head. The horns were highly developed, enclosing the enemy and trapping everyone inside. When the Germans tried to capture Chief Songea, he repeatedly employed this tactic to trap their soldiers. His mountaintop home provided him the primary ability to spot threats. The leader arranged his forces in a bull-and-horns configuration to trap them before they invaded him. The Germans had been disturbed by this military tactic for a long time. Germans’ rage over the incident increased, and they began formulating new, disastrous military plans as a result. According to Lesesne, (2014), Beck, (2000), Kamulu, (2007) and Mazrui, (1977) this military tactic was also known as the “V” formation approach when attacking the adversaries.

The Ngoni did not readily embrace the concept’s feasibility when it arrived in the Songea district. Omari Kinjala decided to persuade Mkomani, a female *Nduna* of Mshope, after sending the medication to the area. It was done with the purpose to win support and sway a powerful figure who could persuade the chief and other *Anduna*. Despite some resistance from Chabruma and Mputa himself, Kinjala was successful in his methods. Chabruma and Mputa pushed for studies to back up the efficacy of the drug. When the medication was originally tested on a dog, it was unsuccessful. As directed by Kinjala, this was

done as a means of understanding the power of water. For the purpose of good organization, most of the Ngoni drank the water.

The Ngoni warriors would gather at night after consuming the drug and would typically engage in guerilla warfare and ambushes. For instance, *Nduna* Songea planned the day's activities for his group during the evening at his camp in the Chandamali Hills. After ingesting the *maji* medication, the Maji Maji warriors acquired the morality of battle. Anyone who refused to take the *maji* medicine was viewed as a traitor and refused to work with the group. Those who chose not to take the medication and instead enlisted in the military frequently displayed specific military inconsistencies. Ebner (2009), for instance, has discussed the case of Putire Gama, who refused to take the medication because he was engaged in a military fight with Mharure. In a same vein, Yao leader Mataka resisted joining the Ngoni because of his previous military clashes with *Nduna* Songea. It should be kept in mind that many other ethnic groups were attacked by and fought with the Ngoni throughout their time of migration in Songea. They overcame and raided the Yao, among others, and chief Mataka fled and made his home beside the Ruvuma River in the southern section of Songea. The Yao then took the decision to work as reliable porters in the Arabs' trade. *Nduna* Songea penned a letter during the war asking for his assistance. Due to their earlier contradictions, Mataka did not consent to join, though.

The Germans' Military Strategy during the Maji Maji War in Songea District

War was a factor in the establishment of German rule, particularly in Tanganyika and Songea. This was because the new rule, which altered nearly all traditional patterns of life, was not welcomed by Africans. Since they initially set up shop along German East Africa's coast, the Germans had encountered fierce resistance. For instance, Abushir bin Salim of Pangani reacted aggressively on the battlefield beginning in 1888 against the Germans' rule. Abushir and other Arabs started the conflict, which was later expanded to include many Africans, particularly those living in Tanganyika's coastline regions. Briggs, (2006) emphasized that when Abushir's men broke into the German mission in Dar es Salaam in November 1888 and murdered three priests, things got worse. When Kaiser's troops assaulted Abushir's army in April of the following

year, they exacted revenge for this military tactic by compelling him to submit. After the Germans overpowered Abushir's army, they chose to hang him in Pangani. German military tactics were limited and focused on fighters, particularly their leaders.

The strength of the Hehe under the able leadership of Mkwawa, who fought their regime in September 1891, also astounded the Germans. The Germans were worried by the conflict since it was challenging to simply subdue the African warriors. The conflict continued until 1894, when the Germans finally subdued the African rebels and took control of Kalenga *Boma*, the capital of Mkwawa. According to Lowry (2015), guerilla movements persisted up to 1898. Both sides' warriors lost a number of lives. Peers (2012), for instance, asserted that up to 1894, around 250 German *Askaris*, 100 porters and 260 Hehe warriors perished. The Germans fought valiantly the entire time of the conflict to seize Mkwawa. Jonassohn, (1998) evidenced that due to the fact that Mkwawa already had Arab-made weapons at the time, its struggle against the Germans was successful. During the battle, civilians were not substantially targeted. The limited approach, the just war doctrine, continued to be the cornerstone of German military policy.

Isike organized the Nyamwezi to battle the Germans in the central plateau. (Peers, 2012) affirmed that when the Germans were able to subdue the Nyamwezi warriors and arrest their leader, the fighting became serious between 1892 and 1893. Likewise, between 1891 and 1893, Mangi Meli organized the Chaga to fight against the German colonial government in Tanganyika's northern region. The Germans also put an end to the conflict by capturing its instigator. The capture of African leaders as a means of putting a stop to the hostilities has been explained by many researchers who have dealt with African primary initiatives against German colonial rule.

The Germans employed their common military strategy, which comprised capturing and hanging war leaders during the Maji Maji War. When the Matumbiland War broke out, the German colonial power focused on putting an end to it by exclusively capturing African commanders and warriors. They did not consider injuring non-combatants because they were confident they would quickly put an end to the war, which they referred to as a rebellion. They mentioned how they had been

able to subdue, capture, and ultimately hang the leaders of earlier uprisings. Because Abushir bin Salim of Pangani and Mkwawa of Iringa were arrested and executed, the German colonial government found it very easy to utilize the same military tactic to defeat the Maji Maji soldiers.

The Germans fought valiantly early on in the Maji Maji War to put down and execute those who were thought to be plotting uprisings. For instance, the Germans subdued the individuals who had destroyed the cotton trees at Nandete by capturing their commanders. Similar to this, they captured and killed the accused attackers of Bishop Kassian Spiss, such as Abdallah Chiami, in an effort to put an end to the war. Roupp, (2015) and Lipschutz and Rasmussen, (1986) revealed that, just one month after men in Nandete declared war on the Germans, Kinjikitile Ngwale was attacked and killed on August 4th, 1905. This might be seen as the Germans' initial military plan to assure the continuation of their rule in Africa. After killing the leaders, they reasoned that African soldiers wouldn't band together on their own to start fighting.

Similar to this military tactic, the Germans believed in taking revenge and engaging African warriors directly in combat. The Germans killed several Africans on the battlefields through such retaliations. However, due to the nature of the combat weaponry they employed, the retaliations were more destructive. They would not treat the guns they used in the same manner as traditional weapons like *chinjenje*, *chibonga*, bows, and arrows. The Germans murdered numerous African soldiers who were attempting to reclaim their lost strength as an act of vengeance. For instance, according to Asante (2018), the Germans murdered almost 75,000 people as retaliation for African Maji Maji fighters. As a result, the majority found the Germans' military tactics—including the capture and execution of leaders—to be traumatizing.

In the Songea district, the Germans began by making efforts to force the Ngoni to submit at the outset of the war. To prevent the majority from joining the conflict, they imposed onerous conditions on them. According to Adam, (2007), the inciters and witchdoctors were obliged to stop engaging in war-related matters by German colonial administration. At the outset of the conflict, the German colonial power compelled the Ngoni to surrender all of their military traditional

weaponry, including bows and arrows. This was part of an ideologically motivated campaign to terrorize the Ngoni. The Germans claimed that Africans' use of military weaponry was too archaic to compete with modern armaments (fire arms). However, the Songea district Maji Maji fighters did not surrender, which gave the war more momentum. The situation deteriorated when the Ngoni who surrendered and turned in their combat weapons were penalized. They were required to pay three rupees, which made them feel compelled to perform low-wage labour in exchange for payment. The Ngoni were made to perform labor-intensive fort building tasks. The cruel deeds fueled the Ngoni's already-raging rage. The Ngoni organized to conduct a full-scale war against the Germans in response to such horrific events.

The next German military plan was to capture and exact retribution on the Ngoni commanders, particularly those who had been in the forefront during the War's early stages and later stages. Richter, the German District Commissioner (DC), initially made an effort to persuade Chabruma not to join the conflict. Chabruma refused, therefore the DC took vengeance and led a conflict with Chabruma that was meant to put an end to the conflict. Ebner, (2009) said that in that incident, 200 or so warriors perished. Because of the chief Songea's repeated invasion attempts, the Boma's defense was also strengthened.

Songea experienced worse conditions than other locations, even when compared to earlier resistance wars. This was partially a result of the Ngoni's military prowess and confidence during the conflict. In order to lessen the tension, the Germans asked Iringa and the western region of German East Africa for more *Askaris*. Due to their effective military organization, the Ngoni resisted such German military intentions and instead remained steadfast. The Germans established a makeshift jail close to the Songea *Boma* to detain the leaders of the Maji Maji in order to carry out their military plan. The Maji Maji commanders were jailed and hanged as part of the plan's serious implementation in late 1905 and early 1906.

According to both recorded and oral accounts, the Maji Maji War continued even after the leaders were hanged. The Ngoni were still engaging in guerilla warfare, which astonished the Germans. They came to the conclusion that the fighting would not end since the civilians

were still giving the Maji Maji soldiers food. By burning crops that would produce harvest and setting villages on fire, they implemented the scorched earth doctrine. Zita Mapunda claims that the Germans attacked Maposeni hamlet and burned down crops in order to persuade the Maji Maji fighters to submit and stop the conflict. The scorched earth policy affected non-combatants directly and indirectly, and it heightened animosity between Germans and Africans. Numerous non-combatants perished as a result of the region's fragile starvation caused by the scorched earth strategy. From there, the conflict was fought using both fair and unjust philosophies of war in a disastrous manner. This paints a picture of how a conflict may begin just and finish unjust for no other reason than the desire to win the game. Based on the type and strength of the adversaries, military strategy would alter during the course of the conflict

Impacts of the Germans' War and Military Strategy on Non-combatants

Any war's effects on warriors who fight on the front lines may be easily and clearly seen. The combatants are engaged in direct conflict with their opponents, they die and suffer injuries right away. When attempting to evaluate how conflicts affect people who do not take part in the fighting directly, things turn out differently. Non-combatants are actually the most at risk in wars in a number of ways. One, war tactics like the "scorched earth" doctrine directly affect non-combatants. Burning villages, crops, and even cattle as part of the scorched earth doctrine has a negative impact on both fighters and non-combatants due to the ensuing starvation and horrible burns. The second is that non-combatants are impacted by the act of capturing and hanging military leaders because and as they lose their allies they are subjected to psychological suffering.

A severe famine was caused by the Germans' scorched-earth strategy during the Maji Maji War. Makong'o & Muchanga, (2006) revealed that this cruel military tactic resulted in a food crisis in the Songea district because it involved burning livestock and crops. German colonial rulers designed this cruel war plan with the intention of severing the support chain between soldiers and non-combatants. Boemeke et al., (1999) provided explanations for how hunger caused deaths from

malnutrition and other causes. For instance, Gwasa (2005) asserted that approximately 300,000 people who died during the war from famine was a result of the Germans' scorched earth tactics. Because they were unable to find food for themselves, women and children suffered the most as a result of the war. At this point, battle became unfair and was unable to uphold the rights of noncombatants.

To acquire food for their children and elders, many women were forced to relocate to the Umatengo and Nyasa areas. Paul Fusi Ngerengere claimed that the Nyasa were skilled at producing crops and fish that could fetch high prices. This process of going to Umatengo and Nyasa to get food presented two concerns that can be viewed as major obstacles. The distance between Songea and Umatengo and Nyasa was the first problem, as there was no modern transportation options. Can we fill the experience of ladies who travelled for a week carrying food on their heads? What about kids who stayed at home? According to Sophia Hemisa Haule, the Songea district experienced hunger for more than two years as a result of the scorched earth strategy. Women, children, and the elderly died from malnutrition. Ebner (2009) argued that Umatengo and Nyasa's successful harvest in 1906 was extremely fortunate.

The second problem with purchasing food from Umatengo and Nyasa that requires careful consideration is related to costs. The fathers who had provided the families with financial assistance had already passed away. How would single-parent families get the money needed to buy food? Due to the severe food crisis, Ebner (2009) noted that the Matengo and Nyasa sold their food for a high price. He stated, for example, that a load of mtama that was sold for half a rupee prior to the war was now sold for six rupees. Instead, relying on their spouses, women suddenly became responsible for finding money to buy meals. According to Sophia HemisaHaule, women assumed the role of men in order to provide sustenance for their children and elderly relatives.

Another calamity brought about by the Germans' military tactics was the development of illness. Diseases spread more quickly in Songea area as a result of mass killings committed during clashes and mass fatalities brought on by starvation. For instance, according to Sadock (2010) smallpox, dysentery, and jiggers all broke out in south-eastern

Tanganyika both during and immediately after the conflict. He underlined that the presence of unburied bodies produced an environment that was conducive to sickness. Non-combatants who had been starved, particularly women and children, were unable to bury the dead. In actuality, non-combatants who fought to defend their survival ship were afflicted by these ailments. According to Joyce Njovu, (2016) ailments that were made easier by the war caused mothers and children to suffer and pass away from them. With such justifications, the genocides brought on by the conflict were not the result of face-to-face battle but rather of diseases that afflicted non-combatants.

Another impact of the war was that, noncombatants were distressed by both the scorched earth strategy and the execution of Maji Maji leaders. It has been highlighted that during the battle, all forms of torture, including the hanging of Maji Maji leaders, were carried out in full view of women, children, and elders. That was done on purpose by the Germans to repress Africans. The psychological effects of seeing their husbands and fathers hanged before them devastated were felt by the women and children. The little son of *Nduna* Songea Mbano, as reported by Yasini Yusuph Mbano, was upset when he saw his father, and his brother, Tamatama Mbano, being hanged in front of him. He even found it impossible to stay in Songea and made the decision to go to Matimila, where the majority of Ngoni were residing. The new heads of households, women and children, were concerned by the scorched earth policy that destroyed food since there was a severe food shortage. The families would have experienced it slightly differently if it had been brought on by natural disasters.

People were seriously displaced as a result of the Germans' military and combat methods during the War, particularly women and children. The populace was uprooted both within and between the borders. The Songea Mbano generation was relocated to Matimila, 33 kilometres away from the present-day Songea town. There are still quite a few Songea Mbano descendants in the area today. According to the traditional history, Ali Songea Mbano, the *Nduna's* little son, was freed when *Nduna* Songea Mbano bin Luwafu and his son Tamatama Mbano were hanged. Observing the Germans nearby made it difficult for the little kid to stay in the area. To avoid having to deal with the Germans frequently, he made the decision to build a new town at Matimila.

Other Ngoni ancestors were uprooted and relocated to various parts of the Ruvuma region. Some settled in Umatengo, while others chose to live along Lake Nyasa. Some women and children lingered in Umatengo and Nyasa throughout the food search to address the starvation issue brought on by the Germans' scorched earth strategy because they found it challenging to travel back to Songea. Some of them blended with the local ethnic communities. It should be remembered that the Ngoni were forced to flee and their culture dispersed as a result of the Germans' military tactics during the Maji Maji War. The Ngoni did not have this inclination prior to the war, which is why they mingled with other ethnic groups. The Ngoni preferred to rule over some areas and subjugate other ethnic groups.

Some Ngoni were uprooted even outside of the Ruvuma region. German colonial rule drove some Ngoni to leave Songea as retribution for aiding the Maji Maji warriors. For example, the Maji Maji leaders' sons who were perceived to be supporting the warriors were bound with a rope and transported to distant Bagamoyo and Tanga to work in sisal plantations. The moved Ngoni groups suffered humiliation and bad treatment along the way. The *Askaris* who accompanied such routes allegedly committed acts of violence against the civilians according to oral accounts. Women and children who were now in charge of their families at the new location lost their position of authority and were rendered defenseless against other ethnic groups.

In a similar vein, several Ngoni children were forcibly transferred across the border and relocated far away. This emigration was combined with that of the Maji Maji leaders, including Chabruma, who is rumoured to have fled to Mozambique. The Germans made an effort to track him down, but they were unsuccessful. Sangwene Songea Mbanu, the son of Songea Mbanu bin Luwafu, who fled to Mozambique, is the subject of interest in this study. The son never returned to Songea; instead, he fell ill and passed away in Mozambique. About the family of Songea Mbanu's exiled son, nothing else is known. Other descendants created chiefdoms in Nyasaland (Malawi). The displaced Ngoni in Malawi, according to chief Mutali, have banded together and adhered to Ngoni customs. However, they recall significant things that their forefathers accomplished in Songea during the Maji Maji War. Chief Mutali and Nkosi ya Makosi (*Nduna*) Mberwa, from Malawi, attended

the Maji Maji remembrances in Songea on February 27, 2016, as evidence.

Survival Strategies of Women and Children during and after the War

The community structure practiced by African societies was impacted by the arrival of capitalism, which was based on a cash economy. African societies fought back against the imposed capitalism form of government and business in a number of different locations. The capitalist economy overtook other economic systems in African nations using both ideological and repressive instruments. The Germans altered the communally based administrative and economic structures, particularly in the Songea district. The Germans' destruction of farms and communities during the Maji Maji War caused hardship for the populace, particularly for women and children. The communally oriented communities underwent a radically new way of life after the leaders of the Maji Maji were hanged. Women and kids had a hard time coming up with answers or coping mechanisms.

Some of the crops that were still in the farms when the war started were gathered by women and children. Sophia Hemisa Haule claimed that while their fathers and husbands were at battle, women and little children surreptitiously harvested food in the farms. She went on to say that women and children were subjected to torture during the war because they occasionally gathered such food during the night out of dread of the ruthless Germans. Women and children were under great strain due to German's deadly and advanced weapons, making it impossible for them to harvest products from the farms throughout the day. For instance, women and children sheltered in the *Livanganjai* caverns when the Maji Maji War broke out at Peramiho. They went into the farms covertly in the late afternoon and occasionally into the early hours of the morning to gather food that would keep them alive in caverns.

How food was maintained in the caves is a crucial subject. Since there were few opportunities to gather food throughout the conflict, food preservation was crucial. Additionally, they stored food that would keep adults and children alive for a few days until they had another

chance to gather food. According to the oral history, food preservation was done locally and technically, and this practice was passed down from their local leaders. Food was kept fresh for a long time in conventional clay soil pots that were then sealed beneath. They preserved food underground not because they were good at it, but because it was the only practical way for them to stockpile food. They stored their food underground for two main reasons: one, so that it would be secure from the conflicts zones; and second, so that the German *Askaris* wouldn't steal it. Due to these conditions, African communal societies—particularly those of the women—became more inventive with regard to food preservation.

They inherited this method of food preservation from their regional authorities. For a long time, the Ngoni relied heavily on traditional food preservation to combat potential food shortages. According to information at the Maji Maji museum in Songea, chief Mputa preserved his food using a conventional pot. The pot was found around his house in Maposeni on December 7, 1978. The pot contained seven groundnuts when it was discovered, and it is believed that the chief stored them using a traditional underground food preservation mechanism. Both fighters and civilians survived the battles due to Africans' and Ngoni's in particular for traditional skills of food storage. The battle would have been considerably more devastating for non-combatants, especially women and children, if they had not had access to such a traditional means of food preservation.

The ability of women and children to manage agricultural tasks and food preservation during and immediately after the war helped them to survive. Both non-combatants and combatants were able to survive because of the food that had been gathered and preserved. The fact that the Maji Maji fighters were receiving food in secret gave them the courage to continue battling the Germans. Women and children continued to preserve food in order to survive, despite the Germans' use of the scorched earth policy to scare people. Women and children contributed significantly to both fighters' and non-combatants' survival during and immediately after the war.

The pre-colonial social formation struggled to sustain health security for both fighters and non-combatants. Women treated a variety of health

conditions with traditional medicine basically from trees. For instance, women treated snake bites using *mitumbitumbi* throughout the conflict. They placed chewed-up leaves on the damaged area. The wound would be entirely treated in a short period of time. In order to prevent the spread of snake poison throughout the body, a rope from the tree was occasionally attached above the afflicted area. It was thought that by using this technique, diseased blood wouldn't travel through blood vessels to other parts of the body. The fact that there were no hospitals where most people used to hide to save their lives suggests that traditional healing practice were widely prevalent. Similarly, The Ngoni employed traditional medicine such as *mlungulungwana* as a preventative measure to drive snakes away in the new settlements during the war. The Ngoni employed traditional wisdom to protect themselves from harmful animals, particularly snakes, throughout the duration of the battle. Silvanus Mbanu claims that *mlungulungwana* is still employed for the same function in the Ngoni communities.

During and after the conflict, traditional medicines made from trees were also employed to treat other illnesses. Patients were treated or cured with traditional remedies derived from trees when they suffered from headache and malaria-related issues. For the families living in the caverns and woodlands, women had a significant impact in preserving the family's health security. *Mtilikanja*, for instance, was a tree employed as a headache remedy. In order to prevent the German forces from seeing the preparation of curative medicine for any patient, it was done in a very secretive manner. It was extremely difficult and risky for women to provide for the families' health security. This is due to the fact that they had to make the medicine at night to avoid being detained by Germans

Conclusion

This analysis leads to the conclusion that both combatants and non-combatants were impacted by the military strategies employed by the Germans and Africans in Songea District during the Maji Maji war. The research has shown that many women and children died from starvation as a result of the German military strategy. More harm was done to civilians (women and children) as a result of damaging military strategy, in particular the scorched earth campaign. A large number of

people perished from starvation and malnutrition as a result of the burning of villages and crops. Even after the war, up until 1910, sickness and hunger still claimed lives. According to reports, the displacement of families during and after the battle was a severe problem brought on by both fear and psychological suffering. Children and women found themselves in completely foreign environments both inside and outside of borders, particularly in Malawi and Mozambique. Some of the children came to realize that they were capable of assuming new roles, such as that of family heads. Mother and children could adjust well to such novel settings. Non-combatants, including women, children, and infants, actively fought to protect the lives of surviving family members and troops throughout the battle. While the Ngoni were engaged in the fight, the food, health, and security of their families were maintained by women and children. Women and children, for instance, gathered food from farms to feed the families. In the caves and forests where they established temporary dwellings, women were also involved in the quest for traditional medicines to treat a variety of illnesses and snake bites.

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What ails Africa? Re-Investigation of Colonial Legacies

A.S. Yaruvingam & Prem Kumar Bharti

ABSTRACT

The study outlines and contextualizes the theoretical construct of the African state evolution. An attempt is made to unveil the protracted spatial, socio-cultural and economic disparities that still persist across the continent among the various demographic groupings. The central objective is to identify the roadblocks encountered in the building of state in Africa. Moreover, the paper also reflects the colonial rule's trajectory and policy directives as well as the extenuating factors that have stymied the African state system from attaining its developmental goals. However, the findings of the study reveals that, despite a slew of policies, laws and tactics adopted by the African government, policy objectives were not fully realized owing to the myriad of structural and socio-cultural disparities as a result of colonial legacy. The fact is that Africa not only lacks an operational model for governance but also has remained mired in a colonial paradigm that by its paternalistic character undermines its development prospects. So, what the African states required is a strong willed and capable leadership who can set priorities in streamlining the existing states that resonate with the indigenous traditional state and make it compatible with modern nation states.

Keywords: State, Culture, Development, Society, Ethnicity, Kinship.

Introduction

The state is neither an outcome of any single movement nor is it an invention or creation. It does not arise by coincidence or historical accident rather it is the ramification of recurring cultural development. Hassan (2006) articulates that the modern state has emerged out of 'Treaty of Westphalia (1648). At that time there was no relevance of

state in Africa. The idea of the modern state in Africa occurred when the ‘*Scramble for Africa*’ was initiated by the competing European powers at the Berlin conference of 1884-85. It was the time when administrative boundaries metamorphosed into political periphery. The dominant euro-centric proposition enchained African people into non-viable entities called states, without regard for their cultural ethos and values. In this regard Iheduru (2001) posits that “the African state system reflects the ambition and capabilities of European powers which is stalled by the enforcement of the “*White Man’s Burden*” theory”.

In the same vein Eargas (1987) argued that in the name of ‘*civilizing mission*’, colonialism sustained in Africa for more than three centuries albeit that, it only inflicted agony and misery to the colonized people. It has been exposed largely as a hoax, a pretext to exploit African resources for the advantage of the metropolises. Moreover, it has rationalized the master-servant relationship which is well elaborated in Frantz Fanon (1961) work “*The Wretched of the Earth*”, where he fairly points out that “to illustrate the totalitarian nature of colonial exploitation, the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of quintessence evil. Further, the native is declared impervious to ethics, representing not only the absence of values but also the negation of values”. But in reality, it was done to promote colonial’s own self-esteem and respectability and this nature of euro-centric power reflects the anarchical order which determines the cumulative process of domination, subjugation and violence in the continent.

Paulson (2020) notes that the idea of mutual existence and collaborative advancement was derived from the humanist principle of Ubuntu (I am because we are), can be seen as the defining characteristic of primordial African societies. They had a mosaic of dynamic political institutions and systems across the continent, which possess a startling level of functioning, including participatory democracy, customary law and accountability. Their administration system was so transparent and advanced that even today’s many modern states do not have one. In this regard, Herskovits & Harwitz (1964) considered 19th century Ashanti to be more advanced than the European feudal state. They notice that, the former possess a wider range of land-tenure system, more advanced technique of land use and labour utilization as well as more sophisticated modes of production, than the latter.

Africa's once rich and diverse culture has been abandoned completely over the time because of the exogenous imposition of the western model of state system. Strategic suppression of African voices and marginalization of their interests systemically permeates the ideational framework of the dominant west. Due to this, the channels of African culture merely remained as moribund and decadent. The creative spirit of fine arts, literature, science, philosophy and religion had been replaced by the western model of cultural practices. The African language and literature was at all-time low ebb. Indigenous practices had just become formal, ritualistic and mechanical. The continent had entered into the zone of uncreative habits and decadent traditions. The western tradition had provided a violent shock and a rude challenge to the state of affairs of Africa. The influence of western culture spread far and wide among all classes of people and affected all scenarios of life whether political, economic, cultural and social.

A diagnosis of Africa's woes usually sparks plenty of heated debates. The colonial barbarian rule has brought irreversible changes and left Africa with indelible marks. During this phase, a profound upheaval of African people took place. It was a painful tragedy from which African people have not been liberated yet. Violence and moral decay has become daily routine. Slavery and colonialism has altered the fabrics of African societies and has set a stage for economic backwardness and stagnation. Centuries of oppression has resulted in poverty, chaos, and barbarism. Sharpening social division, growing distributional disparities, ethno-religious primacy and cultural degradation are manifestations of social pain.

Research Question

The objective of the present paper is to examine the influence of European imperialism on the African state system. The research paper will also analyze to what extent the artificial borders have affected the overall development of the African state system.

Theoretical Perspective

Numerous definitions have been offered by the scholars of various sub-fields to the question 'What is state'? Ante (2014) in the words of

Weber finds state to be “the locus of physical force which exercises monopoly of legitimate force over a fixed territory” whereas Oppenheimer (1914) views state as a form of political cohesion. In such an entity human beings engage with one another in order to fulfill their needs (Ookeshott, 1975). Moreover, Runciman (2005) finds state to be an identifiable & distinct, systemizing concept rather than a timeless idea which is different from all the possible schemes through which people united with each other. He refers to it as “the idea par excellence” which is constitutive of political activity and derives its power from law and order.

Scholars like Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (1940) while describing the primitive African societies categorized them into two groups. One comprises those which have centralized authority as well as administrative and judicial institutions. In this system cleavages of wealth, privilege and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority. The Zulu, Ngwato, Bemba, Banyankole and Kede lie in this group. On the other hand the other group consists of those which lack the centralized form of government and their division is not based upon rank, status and wealth. The Logoli, Tallensi and Nuer are the examples of such groups. However, Ayittey (2006) also categorized the traditional African political organizations into two types. He points out that different tribal culture had their own peculiarities, but the architecture and foundations were fundamentally the same. According to him, first group existed as autonomous political unit and follows self-governing mechanisms whereas in the second group people were subjected to others’ hegemony, either via conquest or by willingness.

It was found that distinct regions of Africa have different names for their political organizations. They were regarded as the city-states, kingdoms, chiefdoms, dynasties, pastoral societies, confederations, autocracies, war-lords, sub-kingdoms, tributary states, semi-autonomous vassal states and stateless societies (Davidson, 1966; Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Ayittey, 2006; Boahen, 1990). In this regard Warner (2001) argues that although Africa had a varied organizational structure and operational principles in the pre-colonial period it doesn’t follow the westphalian model. Hence, the usage of the term state in African setting seems to be inappropriate and problematic. In contrast to this,

Potholm's (1979) says that enormous structural variety and continent wide diversity shows its pluralistic nature of statesystem. These narratives clearly indicate that the state system is not a new endeavour in Africa, and that what is new is the imposition of the Westphalian model of state system under the colonial project. The alien nature of the state system imposed by the colonial powers had a disastrous effect and wreaked havoc on Africa's state building efforts.

While Tilly (1985) claims that 'war makes states' but in the case of Africa, wars, particular intra-state, have resulted to state collapse, implosion and dissolution. Contradicting Tilly, Sorensen (2001) believes that war in the third world usually led to breakdown of state, which can be clearly witnessed in the case of Africa. The only successful secessionist war which led to the formation of state is that between Ethiopia & Eritrea and Sudan & South Sudan.

Anter (2014) identified African states to be *Patrimonial*. These states are autocratic and often oligarchic in nature. Rothchild called it the '*Networks of reciprocities*' whereas Marenin has defined it as '*webs of interaction*'. Such states are characterized by ethnicity, clan and extended family types of loyalties hence there is lack of autonomy which leads to formation of weak states. However, Ergas (1987) depicted African states as repressive, fragile, feeble, collapsing, kleptocratic and predatory whereas, Hyden (1983) described African state as "a foreign structure which is imported from the outside and placed over an alien society like a balloon suspended in mid-air". Contrast to this, Boahen (2000) believes that "one of the positive aspects of European rule was the creation of new states without clearly defined boundaries in place of the existing innumerable lineage and clan groups, city-states, kingdoms and empires without any fixed boundaries". It is noticed that the states of Africa were carved without regard for their local culture and tradition which causes a serious error; as the government cannot impose unity among the people. The loyalty of people towards the state in Africa is weak. They value more the socio-cultural ideologies which consist of ethnicity, religion, race consciousness, tribes and their particular clans and this gap epitomizes the process of political decay.

Political Structure of Indigenous African State

The early history of mankind indicates that kinship was the articulating principles of social organization and the basis of social integration in Africa. It can be well explained as a feeling of ‘*consciousness of kind*’. Morag (1987) notes that kinship posse’sjuro-political and ritual connection whereas Murdock (1949) in his work “*Social Structure*” explains kinship as “a structured system of relationships in which individuals are bound one to another by complex interlocking and ramifying ties”. He further argues that it is culturally constructed and based on consanguine relation (blood relation), affinal relation (through marriage) and fictive relation (adoption). These relations can be extended either vertically and horizontally. In the vertical case successive generations are bonded together whereas in the horizontal case people are tied together through marriage across a single generation. Moreover, political structure in most of the indigenous societies began at the lineage whose further diversification leads to kinship or the extended family. Williams (1987) illustrates that lineage was the most effective tool for bringing stability and unity in the society. The head of the lineage is chosen on the basis of age, maturity and relation to ancestors whereas in some communities wealth is also regarded as a criterion for their selection.

Vaughan(1986) explains that African kinship observes two types of descent systems i.e. Patrilineal and matrilineal descent. The patrilineal descent relation is reckoned through males and matrilineal through females. 88 percent of African societies reckon its descent unilineally, among them 74 percent marked a preference for patrilineal descent, for example Nuer & Baganda people. Matrilineal descent occurs in only 14 percent of African families. For example – the Suku, the Tonga and the Bemba group, who are found along a belt running across South Central Africa. Of the remaining societies of Africa around 7 percent reckon their descent bilaterally (equally through males and females) and 5 percent combine both forms of unilineal descent into a form called double unilineal descent. Most of the hunting societies such as the San and the Pygmies tend to have bilateral descent.

Africa developed its own kind of civilization, society, science, arts, trade system and states long before the intrusion of the colonizers and

they did not fall into the stereotypical understanding of Europe. There are various debates regarding the development of the pre-colonial African state system. In general, Ayittey (2006) has identified two types of political organizations in Africa. The Mossi of Burkina Faso, the Fanti of Ghana, the Yoruba of Nigeria, the Zulu in South Africa, Oyo & Ashanti in West, Buganda in East and the Swazi had centralized form of ruling. They have well developed judicial institutions as well as administrative machinery. In such a type of organization, political rights and duties are territorially defined. Chief is said to be the judicial and administrative head vested with the power of economic authority over the territory under his jurisdiction. On the other hand, some tribal groups that had no chiefs or rulers are said to be stateless or acephalous societies. For instance - the Mbeere of Kenya, Igbo, Tiv & Fulani of Nigeria, the Konkomba of Togoland, the Jie of Uganda, the Kru of Liberia, the Somali, the Dagaaba of Ghana & Burkina Faso and Tallensi of Ghana are among them.

Ayittey (2006) says that, in terms of structure, the African chiefdom consisted of four fundamental government units i.e. the chief, council of ministers, council of elders and the village assembly. However, for some tribal groups like Bemba and Igbo, the village societies are said to be the largest political units. It is a group of several contiguous villages which are linked through common custom, ancestry and shrine. Further, these village societies are also divided into several units. For instance, Igbo village societies are classified into five social units i.e. Village group (Mba), Village (Mbam), Lineage (onumara), Family group (Umunna) and nuclear family (Umunne) (Ayittey). On the other hand, Bemba group village has average 30-50 huts and its leadership consists of territorial rulers, administrative officers and counselors, priests and army leaders.

Ayittey (2006) further mentions that several levels of stratification on the basis of age and gender are also found in the African indigenous state system. For example, Annang tribes are classified into children, youth, middle-aged and elders whereas Afikpo Igbo are categorized into young men, junior, middle and senior. Melbaa (1988) identified that these classifications are separated by age-regiments. For instance Oromo society is structured into 11 sets of age-grade at the interval of

8 years whereas Nuer society is organized into six sets. Specific duties are assigned to each age grade person. For example, in Oromo society 16 years old are required to perform heavy works and travel long distances in order to hunt whereas rulers are drawn from the age group of 40-48 years.

Talking about the system of governance, Ayittey (2006) notes that different tribal groups have different forms of ruling. For example, the governing body of Oromo comprises nine members and each member is specified with certain roles and functions. They have one president and two vice-presidents (Abbaa Bokku), Chairman of assembly (Abbaa Chaffe), Speaker who presents the decision of the presidium of the assembly (Abbaa Dubbi), Memorizer of law (Abbaa Seera), Judge who executes the decision (Abbaa Alanga), Army commandant (Abbaa Duula) and Economy supervisor (Abbaasaa) whereas Ergas (1987) asserts that in Oyo tribe “power was shared among the king (Alafin) and his court, the senate (Oyo Messi) led by its president (the Boshorun) and the assembly of local chiefs (the Ogboni)”. Such a well-off system of governance prevents the rulers from abusive use of power and at the same time it also helps in counter balancing the institution. Moreover, in Oromo according to Ayittey (2006) a rotational system of succession was practiced. A few other tribal groups which have such a type of rotated kinship practice were Gikuyu of Kenya, Yoruba of Nigeria and Lunda. This process could also be seen as the one of most effective ways of coping with destructive rivalry for the throne. However, According to Fortes & Evans-Pritchard (1940), the structure of indigenous African state implies that kings and chiefs govern by consensus and there power was counterbalanced by institutions like king’s council, selected Officials who have a decisive voice in king’s investiture, queen mother’s court and so forth.

Ayittey (2006) finds that Indigenous African state system had a hierarchy of courts to deal with disputes or offenses. Based upon the nature of the offenses it comprises of five types of legal system i.e. the moot, the family, the ward, the chief’s and the king’s court. For instance, the issue of disagreements between siblings may be addressed in the family court whereas clan related disputes are settled in the chief’s court. Moreover, the preservation of peace follows mainly four principles in Africa. These are settlement by deliberation and discussion, compensation,

adjudication and assessment by elders and fairness. Different tribal units have their own peculiar types of dispute resolution system chaired by chiefs or clan heads. For example, Igbo have five types of dispute solving mechanisms i.e. through family head, Umuada, village tribunal, age grade and Vodou priest whereas Liberia's Kpelle tribe follows the informal dispute-resolving tactics called 'house of palaveri' or moot. This similar system is also followed by the San of the Kalahari, the Somali and the Bukusu of Kenya.

While it is true that Africans are imbued with a greater sense of community and its ruling process was fundamentally based upon gerontocracies. Respect for elders was not a kind of servility. Young populations were free to express their ideas and participate in the decision making process by attending village assemblies or the council sessions. The idea of democracy was not alien to Africa; it could be observed in city-states, chiefdoms and village groups. People gather at the market-place or under some tree to express their opinions by raising their hands or doing something similar to reach a consensus. Though there were no administrative persons to scrupulously record the proceedings, the institution existed long before the colonists arrived. These democratic essences of Africa's indigenous institutions have been undermined by repressive colonial rules and regulations that disturbed the organic development of African society.

The destruction of Africa's Heritage

The goal of colonial rulers was not to uplift African nation-states; rather they had more modest objectives, to foster in Africans obedience and loyalty to the colonial authorities and develop in a way that would be compatible with the interests of the European metropolitan powers.

Olson's (1993) compare the colonial powers to bandits. His idea of "roving bandits" and "stationary bandits" conjures up the picture of a colonial state. He argued that like colonial conquests "roving bandits" roam the countryside and loot and steal the resources. Then, they realize that they can do better by setting themselves as ruler and protecting the interests of the tribal, farmers and villagers and then taxing their production and in that manner they can enjoy the benefits for generations instead of roving and stealing for a single time. This is the case of

“stationary bandits” and referred to the colonial state when European forces legalized and rationalized the process of theft while monopolizing the African subjects. On the other hand, Mudimbe (1988) points out that the process of colonization in Africa can be understood through “three complementary hypotheses and actions i.e., the domination of physical space, the reformulation of native’s minds and the integration of local economic histories into the western perspective”.

The Plight of African Chief

Ayittey (2005), notes that the imposition of White rule has severely limited and abridged the chief’s authority in the continent. They were barred from utilizing the organized force at their command at their own free will and were forced to submit to the colonial authority. As a result, the chief authority has been weakened, while his subordinates’ influence and independence grow. The customary law lost its legitimacy and all unoccupied land was captured by the colonial powers. Chiefs no longer reigned as a sovereign, rather were acting as a representative of the colonial authority. The pattern of rights and obligations that binds him to his subjects was completely shattered and was merely acting as a stooge of the colonial administration. The defenders and custodians of African culture, customs and institutions were seen to be the most persecuted. The pyramidal form of state machinery was maintained which makes the colonial powers paramount. The only way left for the chief to survive was the collaboration with the colonists.

British doctrine of “indirect Rule” enabled the chiefs to have a substantial role in government but was subject to government control. They were expected to take care of unpopular tasks like collection of taxes, recruitment of labourers and construction work. They were not given full authority to make policies or represent African people’s interests’ rather were tasked to only execute the will of the colony’s rulers.

Besides this chief’s judicial authority was further curtailed. Fortes & Evans-Pritchard (1940) finds that from 1919, the court was held jointly by the chief and European local district commissioner for hearing any type of civil or criminal case. Further, district commissioner courts were also given the jurisdiction of divorce proceedings between native married couples according to European civil law in 1926. In 1927

after the practice of witchcraft was deemed a criminal offence, the trial of suspected sorcerers was also removed from the tribal courts. Thus, it can be stated that the Europeans altered the structure of African courts and established their own governmental structure.

The Indigenous Culture and Systems

The colonial powers did not bring any new institutions to Africa. They just imposed an alien system on the already existing institutions, largely to the detriment of Africans and to their own good. The introduction of various forms of the similar institutions does not imply that the colonists created them. Ayittey (2005) finds that indigenous Africans use spears, bows and arrows as weapons. Europeans were the first to pioneer firearms, which were more effective in killing and hunting. However, it is erroneous to claim that colonists introduced the institutions of war and weaponry in Africa. Further, Ayittey (2005) argued that in pre-colonial Africa, locals congregated under a tree or in the village market square to discuss an issue to reach a consensus. Colonialists built a structure and named it parliament (a place for discussion), did not imply that the African institution of public discussion and free speech were a colonial prelude.

Ayltey (2005) also mentions the monetary institution. Money, in general, is a medium of exchange that facilitates production and commerce. An economy will move in a snail's pace in the absence of it. A variety of commodity currencies such as cowrie shells, iron bars, salt and gold dust were used by the Africans. Later, the coin and paper monies were mooted by the Europeans, not mean they have invented the institution of money in Africa. Moreover, Africa had a regular rural village market prior to the introduction of the urban mega market by the Europeans. Goods and people were transported throughout Africa by foot, horses, canoes and caravans. Europeans brought more efficient forms of transportation: steamers, roads, automobiles and railways. Thus, it could be argued that the colonialists did not invent these institutions; they only introduced different forms of these institutions.

Europeans have destroyed the African self-sufficiency production system and consumer market. More efforts were put into cash-crops production which was the demand of the European market. Cultivation of basic

food for African livelihood was completely neglected as that would have defeated the purpose of European colonies. The transport systems in Africa were also built only with the view to ease the export of the continent's wealth to Europe. It stands totally inadequate for the continent's internal development of trade and commerce. Telecommunications networks too were the same.

European colonial rule was a curse from which the continent found difficult to exonerate itself. The aim of the European powers' was not only to dominate and exploit the material and social space but to colonize the minds of Africans and then rule over them. In the words of Mazrui (2001), colonial authority left a void between the state and the society which further resulted in the weakening of Africans traditional cultural values. However, it clearly indicated that the seeds of Africa's recurring issues were weaved during colonial rule itself.

African States: A Colonial Imposition

Different European powers have colonized African territory with varying degrees of colonial penetration and influence. Ayoob (1995) points out that "the colonial masters have created administrative units in the continent without regard for their pre-colonial affinities and loyalties. Artificial and arbitrary division of colonial borders cut apart tribal, linguistic, religious and ethnic ties, fragmented the existing political system; and lumped varied tribal and political entities into an unstable unit". The impact of such a type of border divide can be seen in frequent wars and conflicts across the continent.

Alesina (2006) points out that "Eighty percent of African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines and scholars believe that such unnatural division of borders will create ethnically fragmented countries or conversely, separate into bordering countries the same people, are the roots of Africa's economic tragedy, violence and conflicts". Anebo (2006) found that the artificial border has divided around 177 ethnic groups from their kith and kin in Africa. In the words of Chazan (1999) the border line drawn by the colonial power has triggered the local identities and underlined the differences between major groups i.e. Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi; the Sara and the Toubou in Chad, the Yoruba, the Igbo and the Hausa Fulani in Nigeria, Shona and

Ndebele in Zimbabwe, as well as Zulu & Xhosa in South Africa. This has resulted in intra- and inter-state conflict.

Since their independence, several African countries had been engulfed in violent civil wars which claimed the lives of millions. Moreover, the imposition of such arbitrary boundaries has splitted the African communities, tribes, ethnic groups and families and divided them into at least 4 to 6 countries. For instance, Afar group is divided among three countries i.e. Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti whereas Nuer were distributed between Ethiopia and South Sudan. Another ethnic group named Luo is residing in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, South-Africa and Uganda. Similarly, Maasai group was divided into Kenya and Tanzania. In a homogeneous society like Europe, division of territory could be done on the geographical basis whereas in a heterogeneous and diverse society like Africa if borders are divided geographically then separation of members of same group and similar culture is obvious.

Ali Mazuri (1986) is of the view that “the colonial political authority exacerbated the difficulties of creating a modern nation-state following independence. Different sections of the population perceived each other as strangers and aliens, increasingly as rivals and ominously as potential enemies”. However, Herbst (1966) calls that the idea of sovereignty which tended to be shared in pre-colonial states was also changed during the colonial era. Europeans allegedly exercised power over people rather than land or territory which is clearly different from that of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty. Herbst (1966) goes on to say that “the imposition of territorial states by colonial authorities was a severe disruption of African political practices”. Similarly Clapham (1966) notes that the faulty state system placed on Africa is to some extent can be blamed for its underdevelopment. In addition, colonialism also parted Africa into Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries. The enormous disparities in their administration have further hampered the idea of African unification, as the majority of its citizens and rulers were inspired by the principles of their former colonial rulers.

Continental Crisis of Institutions

The political instability and cultural degradation may appear to be a discrete phenomenon. This is frequently the by-product of lingering

effects of slave trade, dependence, imperialist infiltration, western neo-colonialism, naked exploitation and brutal repression. In addition to this Zahar (1974) calls primordiality a trauma which manifests in the colonial survival of semi-feudal, ethnic and religious relationships. Moreover, the arbitrariness with which colonial boundaries grouped different nationalities within and across national borders, divide and rule strategy of encouraging rural reactions in the form of traditional oligarchies as local support for imperial power and regionalism based on ethno-religious divisions which has sown the seeds of parochialism in Africa.

Onimode (1988) argued that these primordialities further during the post-colonial era were compounded by the governing groups in a bid to retain power. As a result, there have been ethno-religious animosities, cultural irredentism and even civil wars. The deadliest manifestation of this societal trauma was apartheid in Southern Africa. Gutheridge (1976) points out that Africa's economic challenges and deepening social divides have led to widespread political instability and persecution. More often the frequent waves of military coups and counter-coups across the continent are arguably the most egregious illustration of this. However, more than half of the African states are affected from the menace of civil war. It has resulted in considerable harm to the people and development of the state. The worst's civil wars have occurred in Nigeria – the Biafra war (1967-70), Somali (1991), Sudan (1955, 1962-72, 1983-2011) and Rwanda (1990-1994).

Most of the African countries had achieved their independence by the 1960s. All possessed great hope for rapid growth and aimed to find out the solution to economic and social degradation of the colonial times as well as mitigate the effects of inequality and exploitations. But the development target was not achieved because the successor government had virtually replicated the tenets of colonial rule which lapsed and legalized the process of exploitation, domination and subjugation once again but this time by their own rulers. However, the practice of establishing democracy from a top-down coercive model while ignoring the indigenous institutions had further deprived people of their full rights.

Chazan (1999) mentions that during the initial year of independence in 1960s, most African countries have mainly witnessed the single party dominant government with authoritarian and populist patterns of rule. By the late 1960s it saw the inception of military rule in many countries of the continent which is no more different from the colonial rule. The development of authoritarian rule with primordial types of governance marked the beginning of the 1970s. Ethnic and religious based political parties were formed. Later, this phase also saw the revival of the pluralist initiatives. Moreover, the growth rate of African countries began to fall and by the end of 1970s, it lagged behind many third-world countries. The shift from the 1970s to the 1980s was undeniably the most tumultuous. Many states have witnessed a series of serious conflicts and civil wars. This phase faced the problem of high population growth, low levels of investment, misuse of natural resources, weak political landscape and low standard of living.

In the 1990s, post-Cold War era, many authoritarian regimes came to an end and several countries of Africa took a democratic turn. It saw the emergence of multi-party governance in Africa and regarded it as the second wave of liberalization. The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) which was introduced during the 1980s remained operational till the end of the 1990s. It had negligible effect in the whole of Africa except Ghana. The experiment of multi-party politics also took a disastrous turn and many states came on the verge of collapse and break down before the genesis of the 21st century. This happened because the state as an entity failed to encapsulate the coherent and incoherent forces in the absence of binding catalyst which probably resulted in the formation of weak and fragile states in the continent.

Further, Chazan (1999) argued that the African states since its independence have undergone a number of political landscapes. These are Administrative-hegemonic (Kenya, Zaire, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Zambia, and Malawi), Pluralist (Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, Namibia, Ghana, and South Africa), Party-mobilizing (Mali, Algeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe), Party-centralist (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau and Benin), Personal-coercive (Uganda, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea), Populist (Libya, Burkina Faso, Uganda, DRC and Zambia), Regime breakdown (Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad and Uganda) and Dictatorship (Cameroon, Uganda,

Eritrea and Republic of Congo). None of these regimes were able to provide stability to the African states. All the regimes of Africa whether rightist, leftist, socialist or populist are in a state of deep crisis. Thus, the question is how they all can suffer from the same type of crisis? Why are the African states experiencing persistent instability, insecurity as well as political and economic turmoil even after the sixty years of its independence? Whether it is Somalia or Sudan in the East, Algeria in North, Nigeria in the West, South Africa in the South or Rwanda in the Central, the circumstances are almost similar. As a consequence of this, the continent is falling behind in today's age of globalization. This worrying situation clearly illustrates that there is something profoundly wrong and the answer may lie in the authoritarian colonial rule, forced alien state and artificial border. The ideological dependence and under-development of political culture along with the imposition of the western models while ignoring the African indigenous culture and traditional values further resulted in the frequent breakdown of regimes and formation of precarious and collapsed states in Africa.

Major Findings

The organizational structure and operating principles found in indigenous Africa was diverse. To avoid the abuses of power, the rulers were surrounded by a variety of council bodies and institutions. They were also held liable for their conduct. There was also the clause for them to be removed at any time if they failed to govern as per the will of their subjects. Moreover, consensus on crucial subjects was made only after the discussions and consultations.

The artificial border division created at the whim of European powers with no regard for the people, who are living there, forced people of distinct ethnic groups to cobble together. This has triggered unrest in the continent after independence. People from various ethnic groups, who got separated from their kith and kin, waged war against the government and demanded for their reunion which caused serious threat to the national unity of many states in the continent. However, African people are united in their anti-colonial sentiments but they were yet to think of themselves as part of a created nation. Even today African people are more loyal to their ethnic and tribal loyalties. For instance, Nigerian people are divided among the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa loyalties

whereas Kenya among Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba & Maasai. Rwanda is divided among Hutu and Tutsi, Ethiopia among Amhara and Oromo and South Africans among Khoisan and Zulu and so on.

Most of the newly independent states of Africa were plagued to a greater extent by ethnicity and regionalism, which posed a challenge to the political stability of the state. Political instability occurs when there is no legitimate and orderly transfer of power from one regime to the next or from one leader to the other. It is very similar to the colonial rulers transferring power to new African rulers. This type of transfer of power led to a wave of cynicism and pessimism among the citizens which further caused societal disintegration, civic unrests, intergroup conflicts, economic regression.

In the post-independence era nepotism, ethnic intolerance and corruption have posed a grave impediment to good governance in Africa. African people tend to choose or vote their political representatives on the basis of their ethnic belongings rather than on their merit. Winners reward their ethnic community via giving jobs and building infrastructure. This has resulted in issues such as job ineptitude, leadership incompetence, development concentrated in a particular area as well as single group's dominance over state power. Those ethnic groups who were not favoured waged war against the government which resulted in political conflict within the governing echelon and ultimately added to a nation's political instability.

Tendency to form one-party dominant government brings another challenge to the states of Africa. It has been observed that until the 1980s, with an exception of Botswana, rest of the countries had shifted towards the single-party dominant administration. This type of system eventually led to abuse of power and gave the ruling party dictatorial powers that suppressed any opposition or worthy criticism of the government, which is necessary to maintain the healthy and decent governance. The African state system has neither been completely transformed to the European model of state nor can it return back to the African model of state system. African states have never been sufficiently emancipated from the intensity of community and ethnic bonds.

Way Forward

The continent's predicament is exacerbated due to the deterioration of its cultural aspects. The cultural penetration or cultural imperialism connected with the post-colonial survival of 'colonial mentality' has led to persistent problems in the continent. Ideas and theories can be regarded as the foundation for any sustained social action including policies and programs to address any problems, the rising cultural infiltration seems to be the most severe threat in this regard. What it requires is a radical overhaul of inherited colonial structures and imported models which create and sustain the obstacles to change.

The enterprising reform for transformation to which African nations have pledged under Agenda 2063 is a statement of political goodwill. This should be assured through the right to development paradigm, which entails the restructuring of political structures as well as socio-economic and cultural scenarios, which in effect can only be accomplished through the liberation and empowerment of people. As Africa has abundant untapped natural resources and the highest number of human resources, what it requires is a politically strong willed leader who can reinvent and reengineer good governance and bring sustainable change. Besides this, all African countries and its regional organization need to unite and move ahead as one Africa i.e. as the United States of Africa, with one army, one central bank, one market, one currency and one nation then and then only, it will be able to achieve its ambition of 2063 i.e. "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens" (AU, 2063).

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Role and Challenges of Primary Sector in the Structural Transformation in Africa

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the primary sector's performance, preferment, and challenges in structural transformation in the African economy. A systematic research has been done with the help of secondary data by using United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), EXIM Bank and World Bank reports. Being either under-developed or developing nations, the primary sector mostly dominates the majority of African countries, which indeed is vital for embarking on its autonomous growth. The empirical evidence suggests that other developing countries with a large reliance on the primary sector show a positive effect on the nation's economic efficiency within the context of sustainable development, but a fundamental challenge in Africa's sustainable development is reducing its rampant poverty. Most under-developed African economies aren't able to devote the required skilled resources to their primary production. Africa faces a complex mix of developmental problems within the primary sector, which are vast and multifaceted. A few of these include- the challenge of lesser devotion towards resources to the primary production; challenges of crawling technological adaptations and dependency on traditional harvesting & irrigation methods; less cost-effective agricultural techniques of the contemporary era with respect to inexpensive & unskilled farmers, etc. These challenges as well as their concomitant trade-offs have to be strategically addressed to improve the prospects for sustained growth and development.

Keywords: Primary Sector, Africa, Structural Transformation, Natural Resource, Production.

Introduction

The economy of any geography can be classified into several sectors to define the percentage of people involved in each of such activity

sector. This classification is viewed as a scale of separation from the natural surroundings. This scale begins with the primary sector that is acquitted with the usage of Earth's natural resources such as mining, energy and agriculture. The distance from the earth's natural resources grows from there. Natural resources are described as including all products of agricultural, mineral, and hydrocarbon origin to encompass the full range of Africa's endowment. Agriculture and extractive sectors are both considered within the umbrella terminology - primary sector.

Agricultural includes agricultural non-food products, fisheries, food commodities, and industrial crops. Fruits & vegetables, cereals such as wheat, maize and rice, and plantation crops for the production of beverages like coffee, tea and cocoa are all examples of agricultural food products. All fishery goods & products and livestock like cows, sheep, goats and pigs are also included in this classification. Industrial crops like cotton and wood, as well as locally produced natural goods like the cut flower industry, are examples of non-food products.

Minerals and metals, sometimes known as "hard commodities," include ferrous (iron) and non-ferrous base metals, the most common types of which are copper, zinc, lead, and aluminium, as well as precious metals and minerals like gold, silver, platinum, and diamonds. This group category includes minerals like phosphosphate, sulphate, etc, as well as the rare metals of molybdenum, cobalt, etc.

All resources used for the generation of electricity are classified under hydrocarbons, often termed as energy commodity. In addition to coal and petroleum products (such as oil and natural gas), this also refers to uranium and plutonium that will be utilised as raw materials in the manufacture of nuclear energy.

These three groups give clear indication of how wealthy and abundant in natural resources Africa is. The addition of agricultural products broadens the definition of "natural resources," which is frequently considered to refer primarily to resources with a mineral or hydrocarbon origin. Although, it is more straight forward to analyse agricultural products separately and it makes sense for many problems relating to the high-rent character of specific extractive resources, doing so does not do credit to Africa's natural wealth. In addition, despite their clear

contrasts, all three resource categories share very similar potentials and difficulties. One thing is that labour and capital are used as input to extract all-natural resources from the earth.

Both the cultivation of wheat and the extraction of copper require human innovation, labour, and resources. Second, they serve as the foundation of most product value chains when combined. Third, prices for all three resource categories have increased significantly over the past ten years, practically in harmony, creating opportunities as well as risks from inflation, volatility, and dependency building.

In primary sector harvest or extracts of the products from the earth are considered. It includes the production of basic foods and raw materials. The sector of the economy that directly utilises natural resources is known as the primary sector. Agriculture (both commercial and subsistence), forestry, farming, grazing, fishing, hunting and gathering, quarrying, mining, petroleum, and oil and gas extraction are all activities related to the primary sector. The processing and packaging of the raw material linked with this sector are considered part of this sector. To put it another way, this sector also includes the manufacturing industries that gather, pack, package, purify, or process raw materials near to the primary producers, particularly if the raw material is inappropriate for sale or challenging to transport over great distances. The primary sector is typically more significant in less developed nations, such as those in Africa, and less significant in industrialised nations.

In developing nations, primary industry makes up a larger portion of the economy. For example, animal husbandry is more prevalent in Africa than it is in Japan. A smaller and less percentage of workers are employed in the primary sector in both developed and developing nations. While more than two-thirds of the labour force worked in the primary sector in the middle of the nineteenth century, just about 3% of Americans today are employed in this area.

Most of the African countries get FDI in natural resource-based sectors, because they are rich in oil, minerals, and natural gas. According to both empirical and theoretical research, the requirement for secure access to nature's resources is, in fact, one of the primary factors attracting MNCs to Africa, highlighting one of the most important

features of African countries when it comes of natural resource abundance. In contrast to the global trend, FDI in Africa fluctuated between 30 and 85% between 2001 and 2004, moving from Greenfield and some other types of investment and more on the way to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As, or Brownfield investment). Even while Greenfield investments is preferred in the primary sector, where FDI is important, M&As still predominate in services and manufacturing.

Primary Sector's Role in Africa's Structural Transformation

High-skill services and advanced manufacturing, while promising in the long run and viable strategic options for some of Africa's middle-income countries, provide few chances to accelerate structural transformation in the near future for the majority of Africa's low-income countries. Building a strong primary sector may be the quickest path to structural transformation, according to the importance of learning processes, competences, and factor endowments. Four different avenues can be used by the primary sector to drive structural change:

- i) Connections and diversification into related industries;
- ii) Serving as a major employer of low-skilled labourers and, as a result, a source of demand for possible new products from related businesses;
- iii) as a major source of tax revenue for the government, primarily from the extractive industries, though industrial agriculture can also be significant, which can then be used to fund the establishment of favourable conditions and the promotion of structural transformation; and
- iv) Bringing Capital and know-how, by attracting foreign Investment.

The level of foreign investment is another sign of the potential of various activities and sectors. Trade data demonstrate the tight relationship between a diversified primary sector and a diversified industrial sector. The relationship is made up of shared capabilities and favourable framework conditions. The correct environment is necessary for the primary sector because it shares many requirements with the manufacturing sector. Governments should concentrate on the unique requirements that go along with resource-based businesses, such as

energy for mining, transportation links to rural areas, legislation that create the correct incentives, and a robust land management system. In the absence of them, only resources with extremely high rents can be used profitably, but they present fewer chances for structural change.

Four requirements must be met for a new programme to hasten structural change in African nations' activities:

- a) Unskilled labour must be employed on a wide scale;
- b) Have higher productivity than current activities;
- c) Be held accountable for performance; and
- d) Be sufficiently close to a nation's comparative advantage and capabilities.

First, employment opportunities should be provided to the vast majority of individuals who currently work with no or few skills in low productivity occupations which lack employment opportunities. Even though an upward trend can be seen in educational attainment but the majority of Africa has poor educational attainment compared to other regions- The second need is that new activities must be more productive than existing ones or at least have the potential to be so. Expansion of current low productivity activities is insufficient to drive structural transformation. Third, pressure to perform must be applied to new activities. Such pressure is brought on by competition. Few capable administrations have tried to create such pressure in the absence of competition but could not succeed. New activities are prone to become ineffective without pressure, and eventually result in unfavorable structural change.

Last but not least, new activities should not stray too far from the current comparative advantage. A nation's capacity, is reflected by its endowment with production factors (land, labour, capital, and natural resources) and capabilities which is comprised of its human capital, technology, institutions and regulations, infrastructure, government capacity, and public services- Comparative advantage is simply defined as the products that a nation produces comparatively more of. Hausmann et al. (2011) in their analysis studied that the proximity of new activities to current activities, as determined by factor intensities and capabilities,

is strongly correlated with the amount of spillovers and learning opportunities that they provide. Activities that demand a set of characteristics and competencies that are extremely different from those found in a country are unlikely to result in learning and spillovers.

Lin (2012) writes that the potential for structural transformation of such operations will be minimal at best, remaining islands or areas; at worst, they will waste a lot of resources before failing completely. These four criteria point to challenges and possibilities for structural transformation in Africa

Challenges and Possibilities for African Structural Transformation

Aiming for high-skilled services as a vehicle of structural transformation too quickly may not be successful given the abundance of low-skilled employees in Africa. It is occasionally asserted that Africa may simply adopt the “Indian” model and focus its efforts on providing services. This is deceptive for a number of reasons. The services sector is the first and foremost sector that comes to mind when most people consider India’s success. But since high levels of education are pre-requisite in service sector business, in which comparatively human capital of African countries lack. Additionally, this industry only directly employs a relatively small portion of India’s work force, roughly 2%.

So even in India it has not been a force for the kind of employment growth that would allow for large numbers of people to move from the agricultural sector into more productive sectors and higher-paying jobs, thereby eradicating poverty. Achieving broad-based growth on the basis of business services sectors in Africa therefore seems unrealistic, except, potentially, for small countries with a well-educated labor force such as Mauritius or Botswana.

Low-skilled services have more potential, yet many of their activities are inefficient. The majority of informal activities like personal services and trade make up Africa’s low-skilled service industry. With a few exceptions, such as large-scale retail trade (supermarkets) and tourism, these activities hold little potential for productivity advances even though they are crucial for the creation of jobs. Despite the fact that these

two fields have seen and will continue to experience significant growth rates, their employment potential in most nations is still constrained.

Manufacturing has the ability to bring about a lot of low-skilled employment opportunities and new skills. Although productivity has increased in the past, employment has not increased proportionately. Because they display unconditional convergence of productivity growth, Rodrik (2011a) has demonstrated that manufacturing industries can behave as escalator activities. In other words, productivity levels in that business will start to increase towards the global technology frontier regardless of the country once it successfully joins that sector. Rodrik (2011b) opines that the promise of manufacturing is that it will “provide millions of jobs for unskilled workers, generally, women, who were previously working in traditional agriculture or minor services”. After all, industrialisation was the primary driver of rapid expansion in East and Southeast Asia beginning in the 1960s, as well as southern Europe throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, as the examination of structural change that came before has demonstrated, the productivity gains that were made in Africa’s manufacturing sector did not result in a sufficient increase in employment. Because of the loss of workers, the overall impact of structural change during the 1990s was even negative. Although this has improved in the 2000s, the manufacturing sector’s rate of employment growth is still far too modest.

In the past, it has been challenging to move quickly to advance manufacturing since the value of current capabilities and learning processes had been undervalued. In the decades between 1960 and 1990, many African nations pursued rapid industrialization. These strategies were largely driven by misconceptions about the connections between natural resources and structural transformation. In attempts to industrialise, the potential for value-adding was frequently overvalued, while, the complexity of technology, learning processes, complementary inputs and the importance of the general business environment were undervalued. Little industrialisation has emerged as a result of the efforts made.

Africa must put its attention on developing capabilities if structural reform is to succeed. To succeed, businesses require the correct climate. Despite prior failures, Rodrik’s (2011a) conclusion of unconditional

production merging in manufacturing testifies to the sector's potential for structural change.

The businesses operating in this sector require a setting that permits them to extend their operations and welcomes other entrepreneurs to enter the market with innovations, increasing employment, in order to boost productivity while also creating jobs. The capabilities of an economy determines its ability to manufacture and export new goods at a price that is competitive. Hausmann et al. (2011) finds that the best way to understand capabilities is as a combination of specialised technical knowledge and skills with environmental elements like the standard of financial services, public service (education, health, infrastructure, etc), institutions and regulations, as well as the overall level of human capital and government capacity. Additionally, financial stability and political stability, as well as the size of the market are significant environmental elements that may be served.

African businesses are currently constrained by their surroundings. The key barriers that result in greater external costs include a small market, inadequate public services and financial access, and the role of government. It is commonly known that institutions and the general business environment negatively affect the development and effectiveness of manufacturing enterprises in Africa. When the business environment is taken into account, African businesses actually outperform businesses in comparable nations in other areas in terms of productivity and sales growth. However, given the current situation, African businesses lag behind those in other areas. Geographical constraints in the form of small market size are the main obstacles to the expansion of African businesses. When compared to non-African enterprises, it reduces the GDP of African firms by roughly 100%. The other primary explanations for African disadvantages are connected to the fundamental market-supporting functions of the government, specifically the infrastructure, protection of property rights, and financial accessibility. Harrison et al. (2013) find that party monopolies appear to be responsible for 81% of the overall factor productivity disadvantage of African enterprises relative to non-African firms. Gelb et al. (2007) demonstrated that in African countries compared to other places, external costs (transport, power, rent, communications, security, business services, and bribery)

comprise a bigger part of the costs of enterprises. Eifert et al. (2005) explained by taking example of Kenya's average gross total factor productivity (TFP) is almost 70% of China's (at the factory level). Kenya's net TFP, however, is only approximately 40% of China's on the global market.

Additionally, labour costs in low-income African nations are higher than elsewhere, indicating that low-wage workers may not actually give Africa a competitive advantage. Comparing average enterprises in other regions at the same GDP level to African firms, the labour premium is typically 80%. The labour cost curve for businesses in Africa is steeper than it is for businesses elsewhere, despite the fact that African businesses are more productive. African businesses that are labor-intensive and productive—exactly the kind of business that is ideal for structural transformation—have exceptionally high labour costs. Various reasons may be to blame for Africa's higher labour costs. High prices are probably going to have a big.

African low-income countries have an average PPP price level that is nearly 20% higher than the mean of the four poorest countries (comparators), according to the decomposition of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. In other words, a worker in a developing Asian nation may purchase more for the same amount of money than a worker in a developing African one.

World Bank (2013 b) states that the availability of abundance of land in Africa makes it difficult to create a better infrastructure environment. Africa is fairly underpopulated in proportion to availability of abundant land. Africa's population density is 36 per square kilometre, which is lower than that of Europe (120 in the European Union [EU]), South Asia (342) and East Asia (also 120), and more comparable to that of the Americas: United States has 33 inhabitants per square kilometre while Latin America has 29.

Some of the public services required for structural transformation will consequently have substantially higher costs. Wood (2002) states that in comparison to low-income Asia, it predicts that Africa will need to invest at least twice as much of its GDP in infrastructure and will incur higher ongoing costs for operation and maintenance. The factor

endowments of Africa also indicate that, in comparison to Asia or Europe, the primary sector will continue to play a larger role in Africa and manufacturing a smaller one. According to the aforementioned paragraphs, Africa is relatively land-rich and skill-poor compared to other continents. Consequently, Africa has a high ratio of land-to-skill ratio. Wood and Mayer (2001) demonstrate that countries with high land-to-skills ratios typically export primarily primary goods when comparing regions through time. The export mix shifts towards simpler, then more complicated manufacturers as the land-skill ratio declines. Africa will probably never match the land-skill ratio of Asia or Europe due to the massive population density disparity. Wood (2002) opines that Africa's sectoral and spatial structure will resemble that of America, which historically relied more on the primary sector, which is comprised of agriculture and extractive industries than on manufacturing due to the abundance of land, as opposed to that of Asia or Europe, where manufacturing has a more significant role due to the scarcity of land.

The opportunity for new structural transformation-enhancing activities that build on already-existing factor endowments and capabilities exists in the primary sector. Eighty per cent of Africa's exports consist of raw materials and semi-processed products derived from its natural resources, including agricultural commodities, metals, timber, minerals, and hydrocarbons. The majority of employment is in agriculture, as was seen in the previous section, but a sizeable number of highly productive positions are also found in the extractive industry. Production in commodity accounts for 50 percentage to 60 percentage of jobs on average, and sometimes even 80% in some nations. The majority of the capabilities associated to commerce and employment are found inside or closely related to the primary sector, despite the fact that Africa has a number of rising capabilities in other sectors, particularly services.

Four avenues or possibilities are available in the primary sector to promote structural change:

First, by establishing connections with and diversifying into other natural resource activities, new activities, and talents can be encouraged. Hausmann et al. (2011); Hidalgo (2011); Neffke et al. (2009); Lin (2012) have supported that the proximity to current capabilities is the

most sustainable route to new capabilities that can support new activities. As a result, the primary sector's current strengths must be used to diversify into new activities that could have an impact on structural transformation in a short amount of time. Two mechanisms are available.

- i) linkages between the production of natural resources and associated activity. For instance, providing the agricultural and extractive sectors with goods and services, or turning local produce food commodities into products with higher value added; and
- ii) Diversification into nearby natural resource industries that take advantage of available resources and geographic circumstances.

Second, being the greatest employer of low-skilled workers, the primary sector, particularly agriculture, is the key to wide - ranging structural transformation. In reality, evidence from other locations implies that industrial development requires widespread agricultural transformation. Johnston and Mellor (1961:580); Henley (2012) have concluded that this (a) offers cheap food for local consumption, letting a low-cost industrial worker force to exist, (b) raises farmer incomes, which in turn encourages them to purchase industrial goods, and (c) liberates workers for industrial and urban occupations, and saves money for investments. Another possibility for job creation that has low technical and scale barriers is the expansion of domestic supply networks into soft, hard, and energy resources.

Third, the primary sector—and extractive industries in particular—may generate substantial revenues that the state can use to finance structural change. For most African nations to undergo fundamental change, significant investment is required. In most nations, the biggest issues are those relating to gaps in infrastructure and education. But in order to speed up structural transition, specific constraints that each nation encounters must be addressed. The potential cash from the extractive industries can be utilised to make targeted investments to deal with these obstacles. Thus, it is possible to boost the framework conditions for both enhanced structural reform and the growth of dynamic resource sectors.

Fourth, a robust natural resource industry may draw international investment, which brings with it capital and expertise that would otherwise be hard to come by. Foreign investment is a crucial determinant of which industries have potential.

It is mentioned in FDI markets (2013) that natural resources continue to draw the majority of greenfield foreign direct investment, at over 60%. Foreign investment in natural resource-related projects is a crucial source of funding for many low-income African nations. It also includes crucial know-how. Resource-producing nations can learn a great deal about the market through their interactions with foreign investors, and by compelling them to transfer technology, they can foster the growth of domestic capabilities. FDI can be a useful tool for assessing the competitive potential that a certain industry has to offer. Making a mistake in this evaluation was one of the causes of previous industrial programmes failing. Governments should instead concentrate on luring FDI and make investments in regions where such investments are likely to occur. In this regard, the recent increase in greenfield FDI in Africa for resource processing and energy generation, which has been predominantly fueled by projects involving liquefied natural gas, fossil fuel electricity generation, and petroleum refineries, is highly positive.

Exploration and exploitation investments are a reliable indicator of a country's resource economy's strength and the standard of the business climate. Recognized as an important potential does not necessarily mean that it will be used. A nice illustration is gold in the water. The world's oceans are thought to hold billions of tonnes of gold. Nevertheless, because there is no workable technology, this is not being utilised. Economic incentives are one influence, while technology is another: Egypt has large deposits of oil and gas, but is unable to meet its own internal demand due to industry laws that discourage additional foreign investment in exploration.

Balassa (1986) observes that The examination of relative comparative advantage shows the close connection between a robust manufacturing sector and a robust resource sector. According to its definition, a nation's revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is the quantity of goods it exports that are comparatively more than the global average. The RCAs of countries in both categories can be observed to be closely related when


this notion is applied independently to raw commodities and goods with higher value added (Figure 2.1). A wide variety of higher value-added products are often more advantageous for countries that have comparative advantages in a wide range of raw materials. Therefore, having a robust and diverse primary sector is crucial for developing a diverse economy that generates high-quality jobs, as instead of pushing a country back.

However, a robust primary sector is not always the result of geologically abundant resources. The exports of natural resources from Africa are less diverse than those from other continents. Although raw materials make up a large portion of African exports, the variety of these materials in which Africa has a comparative advantage is constrained when compared to other areas (Figure 2). Only 13 African nations export more goods using RCA than the average country worldwide. With RCA, South Africa leads the way in 46 commodities products, followed by Tanzania (34) and Morocco (36).

The correct circumstances are required for the natural resource sectors to generate structural transformation. Stronger natural resource sectors are hindered by a large portion of what is preventing structural transformation into manufacturing. While the geological allocation of resources like land, minerals, and hydrocarbon deposits is decided by nature, the economic abundance of resources is mostly influenced by the challenges faced by both investors and farmers during the exploration and exploitation process.

The section before has demonstrated the connection between good governance, as determined by the Mo Ibrahim index, and elementary school graduation and leads to optimistic structural transformation. The same relationship holds for performance of the hard resource and soft resource sectors. The correlation between a nation's gross per capita production of hard and soft resources and the Mo Ibrahim index is depicted in Figure 3. In the same way, public services such as land management, infrastructure, and a reasonable amount of property rights are as significant for production of natural-resource as for other different economic sectors.


Figure 1: Relative comparative advantage (RCA) in unprocessed commodities and manufactured products: Africa



Note: To exclude reverse causality effects data for raw products are from 2005, data for manufactured products from 2010. Selected countries are highlighted for illustratory purposes: Angola (AGO), Botswana (BWA), Cameroon (CMR), Egypt (EGY), Ethiopia (ETH), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Mozambique (MOZ), Nigeria (NGA), Rwanda (RWA), Tanzania (TZA), Tunisia (TUN), South Africa (ZAF), Zimbabwe (ZWE).


Source: Calculations based on UN (2013), UN ComTrade, (database), via wits.worldbank.org/wits

Figure 2: Africa’s Natural Resource Exports are Less Diversified than those of other Regions



Source: Calculations based on UN (2013), UN ComTrade, (database), via wits.worldbank.org/wits

Figure 3: Agricultural and Mining Commodities Need a Good Business Environment to Thrive




Note: Selected countries are highlighted for illustratory purposes: Angola (AGO), Botswana (BWA), Cote d'Ivoire (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Gabon (GAB), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Mauritius (MUS), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Nigeria (NGA), Seychelles (SYC), Tanzania (TZA), Tunisia (TUN), South Africa (ZAF).

Source: Calculations based on data from Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Data Report, www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/2012-IIAG-data-report.pdf

Additionally, in order for agriculture and extractive sectors to fully realise their structural transformation potential, certain conditions must be satisfied. The availability of the necessary skills, the infrastructure for transportation and energy, sector-specific legislation and land management stand out. The lack of research and skill development that may have increased productivity as it has in nations that have undergone “green revolutions” has been one of the main barriers to the revolution of agriculture in Africa. The extractive industries are the same. African countries miss out on the possibilities to develop new capacities afforded by these industries since the native skill base is poorly fitted to the sectors’ requirements, despite the fact that international investors can import competent employees from overseas. Infrastructure-wise, mining frequently requires huge amounts of electricity that significantly exceed what is offered and is required by other sectors. Agriculture also requires more effective transportation facilities from rural to urban areas.

Since natural resource production requires a lot of land, effective land management is essential for success and one of the main barriers to this industry in Africa. Finally, it is clear that sector-specific regulations, such as those governing ownership, concessions and licenses for exploration and exploitation, and taxes on certain resources, are crucial. A rise in global demand encouraged an increase in the output of natural resources. According to Table 1, there is significant increase in all the resource category in Africa during the period between 2000 and 2010. True production of soft and energy resources increased by roughly a third, while mining output increased by approximately a quarter. However, there were considerable differences between the various metals and hydrocarbons (Figure 4).

Figure 4: % Growth in Natural Resource Production in Africa in 2000-2010



Source: Data on mining production provided for this report, FAO (2012), FAOSTAT, (database), faostat.fao.org, (data on soft resources), EIA (2012), "International Energy Statistics", World Bank (2013b), World Development Indicators.

Table 1: Africa's Natural Resource Production 2000, 2010 and Future Potential

Natural Resources	2000			2010			Comparison		
	Africa's share of global production in %	Value of Africa's Production (USD million)	Number of countries 2000	Africa's share of global production in %	Value of Africa's Production (USD million)	Number of countries 2010	Real output growth 2000-2010 in %	Difference in countries	Future Potential Output Increases by 2017 (in %)
PGMs	55	10,588	2	74	14,191	4	34	2	33%
Cobalt	43	490	6	62	1,775	8	262	2	87%
Diamonds	45	4,265	16	54	4,967	17	16	1	14%
Chromite	51	1,578	4	42	2,442	4	55	0	
Manganese	32	493	4	30	3,131	8	535	4	
Phosphates	28	4,607	10	26	5,662	10	23	0	
Gold	24	25,568	36	19	19,947	39	-22	3	53%
Uranium	17	111	3	19	1,013	4	813	1	
Copper	3	2,871	11	8	7,806	12	172	1	86%
Nickel	5	1,225	5	5	1,535	5	25	0	
Iron Ore	5	4,637	10	4	6,404	9	38	-1	466%
Mining Total	14	59,592	44	12	73,286	44	23	0	
Oil	10	216,001	18	11	284,875	19	32	1	
Gas	5	39,036	14	7	68,423	18	75	4	
Coal	6	21,266	15	4	23,759	13	12	-2	
Energy Total	10	276,303		11	377,056		36		
Food	8	195,082	54	9	260,910	54	34	0	
Non-Food	8	5,618	54	6	5,729	54	2	0	
Agriculture Total	8	200,675	54	9	266,605	54	33	0	

Source: Calculations based on BGR (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe) (n.d.), Data on mining production provided for this report, FAO (2012), FAOSTAT, (database), faostat.fao.org, (data on soft resources), EIA (2012), “International Energy Statistics”, www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm (data on energy), World Bank (2013b), World Development Indicators, data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (data on GDP and population).

Note: Agriculture total does not include timber.

Conclusion

The developed nations dominate trade in agricultural products in Africa. African trade that meets the needs of the average person, and resources should be mobilised from local, regional to global markets. Due to increase in population growth, in Africa, there is requirement to increase the usage of Science and Technology(S&T) applications and agricultural land. To achieve the goal of structural transformation in Africa, the African agricultural system will be helped by science and technology approach such as better seeds, dwarf plantations, crop rotation patterns,

demands for less water crop, minimal periods of crop production, and priority for the use of natural insecticides. Last but not least, the government should implement initiatives like the “food for work” and “cash for work” programmes in the agricultural and associated industries. The linked industries include those that build roads, build dams, drill wells, construct minor channels from rivers for irrigation, install power projects, etc. The agriculture sector will be given the appropriate direction through the relationship between the governments, farmers, markets, and consumers, which will meet the needs of the African society and encourage today’s investments and true prosperity tomorrow.

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
Cooperation and Challenges in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in Ethiopia

Solomon Tesfaye Telila, Rashmi Kapoor & Tribhuwan Prasad

ABSTRACT

Our world is in a serious crisis that emanates from different social, political, and economic interests. The greater vulnerability due to these crises occurs in the global south, of which the sub-Saharan region is most affected. The natural and manmade crises have further aggravated the situation. The region is notable not for its progressive nature but one that's hit continually with catastrophes and disaster that has displaced millions of refugees. Ethiopia has taken the initiative to provide aid and assistance to settle the refugees and their integration. It is due to its hospitable culture towards foreigners and its Government's pledge to achieve the New York declaration. Ethiopia has attempted to apply the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) with the participation of UN agencies and donors to reduce the risks for the refugees compared to the refugees in other countries of the region. It is creditable to get effective outcomes from a developing country with many internal problems to address. Yet many challenges remain to achieving the New York declaration. The research paper aims to analyze Ethiopia's commitment to creating local community awareness and raising ownership towards alleviating the refugee's livelihood, providing education, job, and free movement. The conceptual and practical framework of community-based cross-sectional assessment design has guided the study. The present study concludes that although refugees' protection is under-resourced and faces crucial challenges, cooperation to mitigate the challenges is strong and sustaining.

Keywords: Refugee, Refugee Crisis, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), the New York Declaration, Administration of Refugees and Returnees Agency (ARRA), Global Compact on Refugees.



Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Ethiopia-showing-EDHS-sampled-clusters-and-refugee-camps-together-with-neighboring_fig1_304776142

Limitations of the Research

This research paper has limitations in collecting facts from refugee camps across Ethiopia. The sample size is limited to interviewing ARRA's acting director and using documents from other sources. It is due to the unavailability of resources and depends on the writer's knowledge (served as chairperson of the CRRF from December 2017 to May 2018).

Research Questions

Though several research questions can be identified, the present paper analyses the role of CRRF in resolving the refugee problem and the challenges faced in its sustainability. The paper also discusses whether international cooperation is satisfactory in supporting the CRRF in achieving its goals.

Introduction

Ethiopia, located in the volatile region of east Africa, has been a home for thousands of refugees and asylum seekers for centuries. It is known that the country has a long history of hosting refugees and maintains

an open-door asylum policy by giving humanitarian access and protection to those seeking refuge, which traces its history back to the 7th century. The country is now home to 844,589 (UNHCR,2022), which makes the country the 2nd largest refugee-hosting nation in Africa and the 9th largest in the world. These refugees came mainly from South Sudan, followed by Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and other countries like Yemen and Kenya. The country keeps its doors open for new arrivals. The Administration of Refugees and Returnees Agency (ARRA), a government refugee overrunning body, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), including the World Food Program (WFP), work in collaboration with NGOs, local and international organizations to alleviate the problems and respond effectively for the needs and concerns of the beneficiaries. The Government of Ethiopia officially launched the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). For its commencement and in its effort to provide protection and assistance to refugees, the UNHCR, donors, humanitarian and development actors, the private sector, and others have provided enormous support to the Government of Ethiopia. Forced displacement has reached an unprecedented level, with over 65 million people worldwide uprooted by rising violence, insecurity, and persecution. The African region faces immense challenges of forced displacement. The Horn of Africa is one region that continues to produce and host large numbers of refugees. The major assistance and responses provided for the Person of Concern (POC) are essential services, including food, water, shelter, health services, education, and protection. Others are incorporation, empowerment, capacity building, and livelihood programs.

Literature Review

History exhibits different kinds of interventions in the name of safeguarding humanity. In most cases, powerful states used humanitarian interventions to ensure their dominance. The real purpose of humanitarian intervention is still debatable, whether to follow legality or moral ideals; the ethical or legal justifications for interventions elaborated in the liberal and realistic perspectives.

With over 89.3 million people displaced (UNHCR, 2022), displacement is at an all-time high. The whole world is dealing with a refugee crisis of unparalleled proportions. According to *Morrison & Ruaudel* (2017),

unrest, demographic change, and increased political attention have resulted from forced relocation and population migrations. International Crisis Group (2016) states that failure to respond to the refugee crisis risks escalating hostilities and increasing refugee flows.

In recent years, press coverage of refugees has not been adequate despite the fact that the global refugee crisis is spiraling. According to World Vision(2022),”thirty years have passed since Somalia’s refugee crisis began. Extreme weather conditions, such as the north’s drought; and the south and center’s unusually heavy rainfall, have greatly influenced Somalis’ capacity to maintain their way of life. Famine outbreaks and continued violence have made the problem worse. A severe famine killed over 260,000 individuals between 2010 and 2012; 133,000 were children under five”.

The World Vision (2022) further notes that

the drought emergency in the country has also intensified, causing about 572,000 people to be displaced internally between October 2021 and February 2022. It adds to the 650,000 Somalis displaced by serious flash floods in 2020. Currently, more than 750,000 refugees are living in neighboring countries (Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia), and over 2.9 million people are internally displaced in the country. (World Vision, 2022)

Meanwhile, at the 2016 leaders’ summit in New York, UNHCR was tasked to develop a Global Compact on refugees in the UN General Assembly as part of the New York declaration. The Compact hopes to bring in a broader array of stakeholders to help host countries manage the refugee response, including the private sector, development agencies, and multi-lateral finance institutions. The draft document of the Global Compact (third formal consultation) in April 2018 set four major goals for the success of the CRRF enumerated as follows:

(1) an improved system of burden-and responsibility-sharing, measured in terms of the distribution of contributions among states and, where relevant, Other stakeholders- including through the hosting of refugees, making financial contributions, and providing solutions; (2) strengthened national protection systems and response capacities worldwide that safeguard the rights of refugees; (3) enhanced socioeconomic conditions

for refugees and host communities, notably women and girls, measured against the 2030 agenda for sustainable development ('the 2030 Agenda'); 7 and (4) greater efforts to resolve protracted situations, the measure by a reduction in the number of refugees who live in such situations through the achievement of durable solutions. (Global Compact draft doc. 2018 P.2)

The Global Compact moves from past practices where refugees lived in camps receiving similar services to investing in national health and education systems to receiving community benefits alongside refugees. It aimed at doing it gradually through simultaneous actions to build on the recognition that the refugees who can continue to learn, develop skills, and provide for their families while in exile are better placed to rebuild their lives elsewhere or return home when conditions have improved. The Global Compact draft document further states:

Although the Global Compact is not legally binding, it provides a framework for cooperation to ensure that the international community engages more robustly and predictably in support of refugees, their host countries and communities, and in countries of origin where appropriate. It will be operationalized through voluntary but mutually reinforcing and dedicated contributions towards achieving the goals of the global compact set out in paragraph 5. Each state and stakeholder will determine these contributions according to their resources, capacity, and expertise. (Global Compact draft document, 2018p. 2)

The Global Compact on refugees comprises two complementary parts: the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and the action program. The April 2018 third formal consultations on the Global Compact in Geneva were the last step in developing the Compact. During April 2018, the third consultation on the general agreement in the context of large movements of refugees and the increasing strain on host countries and resettlement remained a vital tool for protection and finding solutions. It is, therefore, essential to reverse the dwindling options for resettlement. The Global Compact focuses on resettlement planning at the early stages of the refugee influx. It expands the pool of resettlement countries as it is important in ensuring equitable burden and responsibility sharing among member countries. But Hathaway (2019: 593) finds that "rather than proposing, for example, an optional binding protocol to remedy

the operational deficiencies of the Refugee Convention, the refugee agency has instead drafted a highly partial Compact, applying to undefined ‘large’ movements of refugees.” Some scholars are skeptical that it may not address the gaps in the draft and implementation as Hathaway (2019, 593) considers “the Compact as only guideposts for a never-ending series of discussions.”

Although humanitarian intervention and its practicality have been debatable, different international organizations accept serving humanitarian issues as a legal and moral issue. In this regard, the UN is a pioneer in getting and being the vanguard to apply it. The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) affirms that,

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. In the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. (UN Charter, P.1).

Respecting and defending human rights and refugee protections is not only the sole responsibility of the UN organizations, specifically the UNHCR. Individual countries do have frameworks and legal provisions to protect refugees and their rights. Abebe (2019) observes that though Ethiopia began to apply the CRRF in 2017, for the last twenty years, she has been proactive in promoting sustainable solutions for the self-reliance and economic integration of refugees in protracted situations. On the national level, the Ethiopian constitution of 1995 enshrines:

Civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and people’s rights: The formulae employed by the human rights provisions of the FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) constitution converge with those of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The themes of human rights and liberty emphasized in the constitution suggest an insistence on democratic legitimacy. (Ethiopian Human Rights handbook, 2013, p.20)

As UN member states abide by the laws and rules of the regulations, it is obligatory to safeguard the rights of refugees. It is both a legal and moral duty of member states to do it properly and seek support elsewhere for its achievement. The major types of refugee rights to be assured by member states are the following:

The convention establishes the juridical status of refugees and sets the minimum standards of treatment of refugees, including an enumeration of the basic rights to which they are entitled. These include the rights to gainful employment and welfare, identifying papers and travel documents, the applicability of finance charges, and the rights of refugees to transfer their assets to another county where they have been admitted for resettlement. The convention facilitates the naturalization and assimilation of refugees, access to courts, education, social security, housing, and freedom of movement. It also prohibits refugees' expulsion or forcible return unless exceptional circumstances warrant such measures. (Human rights and Refugee Protection Self-study, 2015, p. 21)

Related to this, the predecessor of the AU, viz., the OAU member states, agreed on tackling the unprecedented refugee issue that arose due to the mass displacement of the people because of liberation struggles in the 1960s. The rising numbers of refugees and unrecognized internal displacement became a serious challenge to be addressed and explained as follows:

The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspect of Refugees Problems in Africa' was adopted in 1969 by member states of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU, now the African Union). It complements the 1951 Convention in that it contains a broader definition of a refugee (Article I), an obligation to make the best efforts to grant asylum (Article II), provision for durable solutions (Article V), and provisions on prohibiting subversive activities by refugees (Article III). (UNHCR, Human Rights and Refugee Protections, 2015, p. 21)

According to this Convention, the term refugee "shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or

the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (UNHCR, Human Rights and Refugee Protections, 2015,p. 21).” Above all, the humane treatment of refugees is practiced, and it is an obligation in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Respecting the IHL and practicing it has paramount importance. It has the following benefits:

Human rights instruments usually provide the same treatment for nationals and non-nationals, including refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons. While the 1951 convention contains different criteria for entitlement and, in most cases, the rights are granted based on the most favorable treatment accorded to aliens, under human rights instruments, asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to the same enjoyment of rights as nationals.(UNHCR, Human Rights and refugee protection, p. 23)

Ethiopia is a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol, as well as to the 1969 OAU convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. In 2004, the country notably enacted a national refugee proclamation based on these international and regional refugee conventions. This proclamation is now amended to strengthen the legal components and ultimately create a conducive legal environment for the applications of the CRRF in the country. The Ethiopian Government believes in its very generous commitment to secure the inclusion of refugees in the national development systems. Its plans align with the New York Declaration and the “leave no one behind” promise of the Agenda 2030.

For ordinary citizens in Ethiopia and an official alike, the common acceptable attitude toward refugees is that it is a national obligation to accept refugees. Ethiopians are extending their welcoming arms to those who flee persecution and conflicts based on three basic principles from which the nation’s general refugee policy also springs. First, it is to maintain the country’s longstanding history of hospitality in hosting refugees; second, it is to meet the international obligations expressed in the regional and international refugee-related declarations to which the country is a party; and third, it is to materialize its foreign and

national security policy goal of building sustainable peace with all of its neighbors through strengthening people to people relations. (ARRA report, 2017). [is the whole para a quote ???? where is the second point]

Successes in Cooperation

Ethiopia's success is notable and achieved with full-fledged cooperation from international donors and UN agencies. This relative success can be evaluated by the frequency of internal conflicts in Ethiopia that need government attention. Ethiopia faced ethnic-based conflicts that put the nation's economy in bad shape and needed donors' support for its recovery; the Government continues to commit itself through its pledge of 2016 of supporting the rising number of refugees.

Ethiopia has extended its solidarity towards those who are forcibly displaced. Ethiopia, throughout its history, has been compassionate and concerned for those who fled their homes due to natural and manmade calamities. The refugee operation in Ethiopia currently hosts one of the largest numbers of refugees in the world, with close to a million-refugee population. When the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was unanimously adopted on September 19, 2016, by the 193 member states of the United Nations at its General Assembly, Ethiopia actively participated in the adoption of the New York Declaration and supported the application of the CRRF. Following meaningful consultations and coordination at all levels with UNHCR and the larger international community, Ethiopia kept its commitment of becoming one of the first countries to initiate the roll-out of the CRRF in February 2017.

On September 20, 2016, at the leaders' summit on refugees co-hosted by Ethiopia in New York, the Government of Ethiopia made groundbreaking policy commitments through the nine pledges, mainly aimed at ultimately creating productive and self-reliant global citizens among refugees and host communities. These policy commitments made at the leader's summit align with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), the second Growth and transformation plan of the Government, and the United Nations Development Assistance framework. For a better understanding, Ethiopia's nine pledges, as

mentioned in the CRRF Global Compact draft document, are listed as follows:

- To expand the “out-of-camp” policy to benefit 10% of the current total refugee population
- To provide work permits to refugees and those with permanent residence IDs
- To provide work permits to refugees in the areas permitted for foreign workers
- To increase enrolment of refugee children in preschool, primary, secondary, and tertiary education, without discrimination and within available resources
- To make 10,000 hectares of irrigable land available, to enable 20,000 refugees and host community households (100,000 people) to grow crops
- To allow local integration for refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for over 20 years
- To work with international partners to build industrial parks to employ up to 100,000 individuals, with 30% of the jobs reserved for refugees
- To expand and enhance basic and essential social services for refugees
- To provide other benefits, such as the issuance of birth certificates to refugee children born in Ethiopia and the possibility of opening bank accounts and obtaining driving licenses.

As a result of the policy shifts of the Government of Ethiopia towards refugees, in general, the current refugee response management in the country is based on a mix of three policies: Encampment, out-of-camp, and local integration policies. The Government of Ethiopia, while maintaining its doors open to refugees, envisages gradually putting an end to the encampment policy in the next ten years period and progressively advancing the other two approaches of the out-of-camp and local integration to provide an alternative to camps for the refugees and enhances their socioeconomic opportunities. Crawford & O’Callaghan

(2019) state that the new policies have provisioned freedom of movement for refugees. Still, this freedom is circumscribed by the fact that ARRA has to make provision for the areas for refugee settlements that almost amounts to continuity of Ethiopia's encampment policy which it claims to avoid. Carver (2020, 7) also assert that "Central to the CRRF is a set of ambitions around 'integration': enabling refugees to integrate better into their areas of residence, thereby making them less reliant on humanitarian assistance never designed for medium- to long-term support, and ensuring a higher degree of integration between service delivery and social support systems, improving efficiencies and strengthening local connections."

So far, the Government and the wide array of stakeholders identified in the CRRF have been undertaking preparatory and practical works to implement the nine pledges. Even before the official launch of the CRRF, the Government of Ethiopia and its partners were doing exceptionally well in showcasing to the rest of the world during the CRRF roll-out (ARRA report: 2017). The endeavors undertaken include but are not limited to:

“finalization of the roadmap, amendment of the refugee legislation, increase in enrolment rate at all levels of education with 70% gross enrolment of refugee children in the primary school, allocation of 10,000 hectares of irrigable and cultivable land and ongoing construction of irrigation infrastructure that enables both the refugees and host communities to start production of crops and benefit on an equal basis, continuing preparatory works for the jobs compact, mapping existing resources and services and identification of gaps to facilitate local integration, official commencement of civil registration of refugees, the establishment of clearly defined governance structure for the CRRF together with the steering committee.” (ARRA report: 2017).

Before the opening of the pioneer meeting of the steering committee, which was conducted in the first week of December 2017, reinforcement of the national CRRF coordination unit and successive workshops were formally organized to establish a range of technical committees focusing on the six thematic areas of the nine pledges that were among the key

next steps that helped in moving forward and to implement the promises and practically apply the CRRF.

To materialize its specific commitments and comprehensively strengthen its response to refugee situations, the Government of Ethiopia has supported its collaboration with a broader array of stakeholders within the context of the CRRF. In connection with this, therefore, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Government, through its refugee agency, the administration for refugee and returnee Affairs (ARRA) are, continuing and taking the key leading role in the collective responses to operationalize the nine pledges and practically apply the CRRF in the country. Ethiopia's continued commitment to the economic integration of refugees can be seen from her revision of the refugee laws and the revision of the nine pledges. Graham & Miller (2021, 87) note that Ethiopia promised to expand its out-of-camp policy, provide work permits to refugees, and facilitate local integration in instances of protracted displacement through the new laws and policies.

By and large, enacting the new Ethiopian refugee law, which included the views of many stakeholders and was ratified by the Parliament in April 2018. It laid a conducive environment for implementing the CRRF goals. The Government of Ethiopia continues to advance the implementation of the CRRF in Ethiopia; the Government remains committed to offering the pledges made at the leader's summit held in New York City in September 2016 and has already realized several achievements. However, it's a huge task that continues to pose challenges.

Carciotto & Ferraro (2020) conclude that some have criticized the NYD, GCR, and CRRF for being nonbinding and just a starting point for regional consultations, meetings, and conferences. Despite that, Carver (2020) insists that there "...will be greater clarity on overall resourcing requirements, and aligning these more closely with mainstream development programming in Ethiopia. CRRF has presented innovative possibilities for greater refugee integration, especially for self-reliance and the possibility of taking employment in the formal sector. Graham & Miller (2021, 6) observe that the deficient government structure and ill-coordination between different stakeholders, including NGOs, donors, and government agencies, has caused the focus to shift from the 'camp-based approach' to the refugee integration-oriented

approach. According to the authors, the strategic vision is missing to apply the CRRF as required. Social accommodation and social adjustment are deficient, which deters confidence-building mechanisms. Most interactions between the refugees and the hosts are predominantly of economic considerations, and social interactions remain negligible; as a result, Vemuru et al. (2020, 163) note that “there is a strong sense of otherness, revealing limited integration.”

• **Challenges to be addressed**

Ethiopia hosts and administers many refugees from different countries. Up to March 31, 2018, more than 844,589 (refugees are found in Ethiopia in 27 camps, including Addis Ababa (UNHCR, 2022)). From time to time, the number of refugees has been increasing. The ARRA and the UNHCR register these refugees for further administration and services. By implementing a mutual agreement, the ARRA, and the UNHCR are trying to shoulder responsibilities to improve the refugee situation and for the success of the CRRF. However, there are many challenges, and the major ones, as enumerated by the 2017 ARRA” s Report, consist of the following:

First, on October 27, 2017, the Government enabled civil registration for refugees in Ethiopia. Refugees at a country-wide level can now have their life events included within the national registry, free of charge, including births, deaths, marriage, and divorce. They also receive an official certificate acknowledging the event, which can be used for processes within Ethiopia and abroad, including family reunification, third-country resettlement, and upon repatriation. It is a realization of pledge nine made at the leaders’ summit and aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular 16.9. Though reasonable progress has been made in this area, it remains an arduous task and must be sustainable.

Secondly, Ethiopia continues to advance refugee access to education as a priority. It is the objective of the Government that every refugee child will receive the same treatment provided to nationals concerning access to primary education. Every recognized refugee or asylum seeker may also have access to secondary and tertiary education without distinction on any ground, within available resources, and subject to

the education policy of Ethiopia. However, it is challenging due to a shortage of resources.

Thirdly, it should also be mentioned that persons continue to cross the border into Ethiopia from locations affected by conflict and climate change, such as Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopia maintains an open-door asylum policy and will continue to do so. There is a need to do more to address some of the root causes, including food insecurity in the Horn of Africa region.

Fourth, regarding durable solutions, it is focused on keeping the pledge to expand access to resettlement in third countries and other alternative pathways. There are appreciable recent initiatives, such as facilitating the humanitarian corridor, through which more than 200 refugees have already left for Italy with the help of the diaspora and faith-based organizations. More significant opportunity is possible for the movement through family reunification programs. This area needs to be strengthened and remains a challenge as long as positive responses from receptive countries in the west determine its successes.

Fifth, the Government of Ethiopia also prioritizes safe and accessible reception conditions, ensuring that refugees can access asylum procedures wherever they cross into Ethiopia. The new refugee proclamation will double the days refugees must approach the nearest Government installation upon arrival. It also ensures that refugees have access to information needed to understand the asylum processes in a language appropriate to them.

Sixth, responding to the most vulnerable is also an essential part of the work to be achieved. Identifying those with the most specific needs can be challenging. Refugee communities can help and continue working with them to identify and ensure that assistance is provided to at-risk people. The Ethiopian Government, which has protection staff at each camp and within the urban areas that work closely with communities, must be strengthened in equipment to ensure an effective response.

Seventh, contingency planning is necessary for unexpected events, and mitigating unforeseen situations and this need to plan appropriately became a challenge.

Last but not least, and can be considered a serious challenge, is a financial shortage that hinders the proper treatment of the refugee population. In recent years, the budget allocated for emergency areas where refugee influx is steady and high has declined. Ethiopia is one of the countries that has been receiving refugees frequently, especially since 2013. The South Sudanese refugee influx has experienced underfunding, resulting in a shortage of service delivery followed by low quality and dissatisfaction.

Even though an estimated total of 327.8 million US\$ budget allocated for the Ethiopia refugee operation in 2018, “the total recorded contributions so far amounts only to some US\$ 68.3 million” (ARRA report, 2017), proving once again that the operation is seriously underfunded. The significant consequence of the shortage of budget and funding is illustrated in the low quality of services (per standards and accessibility). It means that the budget allocated for refugees in recent years is creating a massive gap in the quality of services rendered to refugees. It hurts the standards of services to be given to refugees. First, the amount of food distributed to the refugees in kind and amount tended to decrease in recent years. For example, “one refugee used to get 16 kg of wheat, and this amount has declined to 10 kg in the past three years.” (ARRA report, 2017).

Secondly, the problem has also been seen in delivering water for refugees and its standard. “A refugee was supposed to get 21 liters of water per day. Still, nowadays refugees are getting an average of 12 to 17 liters per day” (ARRA report, 2017). In addition to this, it is becoming a grave problem that most of the refugees, especially in newly established camps, don’t have permanent shelters in; and those refugees that are living in temporary shelters are vulnerable to environmental disasters and also face other problems such as gender-based violence and insecurity.

Thirdly, services are also not standardized in education, protection, and livelihoods. “One example could be the Nguenyiel refugee camp, the largest refugee camp in Ethiopia, in which the number of school-aged children exceeds 45,000. In contrast, those who get a chance to attend school are only around 20,000 (ARRA report, 2017).

Generally, the existing shortage of funding is now directly becoming a serious challenge in the Ethiopian refugee operation. These key challenges mainly resulting from underfunding include the inability to respond to complex emergencies, such as the frequency of general food ration cuts and the shortage of other primary and social services. It has also negatively affected availing sustainable livelihood and job opportunities, skills, different types of training, and recreational and social gathering facilities for the refugees. Funds, in turn, need to be increased, especially for the refugees, mainly from Eritrea and Somali youth and children.

Recommendations

The Ethiopian Government and donor agencies successfully attempted to implement the nine pledges of the New York Declaration of 2016. These attempts have to be springboard for further action and have to focus on the following areas specified in the draft Global Compact Refugees document (UNHCR, 2019):

• Resettlement

It is recommended that resettlement options be supported with specific targets and time frames in expanding the number of resettlement countries and available options. There must be a strategy that needs to be developed with wider participation of member states of the UN. Resettlement procedures must be predictable, transparent, and conducted speedily and must be conducted in close collaboration among relevant stakeholders; it must ensure the identification and referral of newly arrived refugees facing acute protection needs.

• Durable Solutions

It is convincing that refugees need to be provided education, skills training, jobs, and livelihood programs to be productive citizens upon their voluntary return or realization of a durable solution. However, refugees' self-reliance should neither increase the burden on host states nor negatively impact their development endeavors. Hence, its commitment of Ethiopia to providing education, health, jobs, and livelihood is not a short-term solution and, as such, needs to match concrete and actionable commitments and support of the international

community. Again, language training, recognition of skills and qualifications, and education and livelihood opportunities for unaccompanied and separated children are essential. Expanding this opportunity and improving basic services is also important, primarily by ensuring access to health, education, and shelter.

Contingency planning and an early warning system that aims to respond effectively to a significant movement of people undoubtedly require building national capacity to conduct sound risk analysis, monitoring, and close coordination with all stakeholders through information exchange and joint planning. It includes situational analysis of the movement of people and evolving political and security situations, as well as scenario-building exercises. It is mandatory to prepare contingency planning requirements that consider environmental impact assessment and mitigation plans to avoid adverse environmental impacts and ensure peaceful coexistence between refugees and host communities.

• **Registration and documentation**

Concerning registration and documentation, it is crucial to focus on digitalization and national capacity building. Establishing protocols should include not only sharing data but should be in line with data privacy principles. It is also necessary to upgrade the quality of data and install a joint registration system currently used and ensure the sustainability of the standard registration system in the three major areas of agreements between the ARRA and the UNHCR. It is crucial to support the Government in this respect and enhance the existing capacity.

• **Improving camp security**

It is necessary to provide continued material support for the border police to enhance their capacity to combat illegal activities on the border. Protecting refugees, there must be support, including giving vehicles and telecommunication equipment in the border area and other refugee receiving locations. Implementing physical security measures in refugee camps, such as establishing checkpoints, is necessary. Refugees will retain their freedom to leave and reenter the refugee camp in line with international human rights law.

It is also recommended to establish a community policing system in refugee camps. Refugee community members will be involved in a security watch scheme, informing the local police of illegal activities. It will strengthen refugees' relationships with the local community and the police. Enhancing separated restrooms for men and women is also important to limit unnecessary movement and exposure to crime doers. It must be noted that strengthening legal assistance through the increased presence of legal practitioners in refugee camps promotes legal aid to those in need.

• **Voluntary return to Eritrea**

There is an excellent opportunity of ensuring peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The prevalence of peace between these countries certainly enables the beginning of the voluntary return of Eritrean refugees to their homes. However, it must be conducted purely voluntarily and following non-refoulement procedures.

• **Building national capacity, solving underfunding**

It is highly recommended that the capacity of the ARRA and the steering committee be strengthened as it leads to the proper handling of refugees. The CRRF's early achievements cannot be permanent as long as there is a vast resource deficit. The international community must keep its pledge to plug the gap in resources. In this regard, training the refugee community and teachers in child protection and support areas is essential.

• **Strengthening the coordination of the CRRF steering community**

It is fortunate to have a steering committee to coordinate the leading role of the CRRF. The committee comprising the ARRA, the UNHCR, and big nation embassies residing in Addis Ababa has played a notable role till now. Further financing or cementing the early successes is needed to train them to keep their energetic participation and contribution.

• **Strengthening Regional cooperation**

Though not enough, IGAD has tried to play an active role in achieving the CRRF goals, i.e., the nine pledges Ethiopia keeps to date. Because refugees in Ethiopia come from IGAD member countries, the regional

organization's role must be strengthened in ensuring a consistent regional approach.

- **Engaging communities**

It is important to cement the relations of the local communities with the refugees. There must be assessments focused on the need of the refugee populations and involving them in decision-making in their livelihoods and ways to improve them. It is also important to engage the tribal leaders near the refugee camps to continue their support in improving the refugees' livelihood.

Conclusion

Ethiopia has shown an encouraging and constructive trend to apply and provide sustainable solutions for the economic and social integration of the refugees and displaced persons with the host community. Self-reliance and integration of the refugees were the two primary goals of the CRRF. These were required not for the benefit of only refugees, but Ethiopia also accepted the economic betterment of the country by working towards these. Gains are enormous, and Ethiopian Government's pledge is sustaining the momentum. But there are several impediments to this continuity. The local governments have been recognized as service providers in the refugee areas, but they are not effectively involved in planning and implementation for the sharing of resources. This is delaying the on-going processes. Ethnic and regional diversities are slackening the pace of progress. The recent unprecedented situations like Covid-19 and Ukraine-Russia war have put more pressure on already strained resources. The deficit funds need to be generated so as to provide satisfactory services. The positive constructive vision of Ethiopia and its realizable legal framework is generating hope for both the refugees and the hosts. Policies and frameworks are in place but implementation needs to be strengthened and reinforced for congenial accommodation of the hosts and the refugees.

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India-Nigeria Oil Partnership

Sandipani Dash

India's oil partnership in Africa remains a critical component of their resource linkage which has gained momentum under economic globalization. India, the 4th largest economy in the world, is also home to one-sixth of global population. The energy demands of a vast population and a growing industry can be quite challenging for policymakers, especially with the pace of growth in the economy (8.5% in 2010-11) and subsequent increase in purchasing power. The primary energy consumption of India, which is 4.4 per cent of global consumption in 2010, was hardly 1.55 per cent of global consumption in 1980, a not so distant past in the historical perspective.

Since fossil fuels are a depleting resource globally, nations and large energy companies are constantly searching for a reliable and long-lasting fuel source. With its vast hydrocarbon resources, Africa provides the much-needed comfort in the current situation. Africa is a relatively new phenomenon on the oil and gas world map. An oil-producing region with a large landmass and geological similarities to other regions or continents has attracted global companies. As a result of regional diversity and discoveries on a regular basis, more potential for oil has been discovered on this continent. In addition to these newer prospects, there is speculation that there may be more unexplored regions in Africa.

A minority share of the world's oil reserves, 9.5 percent, is held by Africa, which produces 12.2 percent of global oil quantities. It indicates an increasing reliance on African oil by the global economy. The rising economic growth of India is currently being sustained by oil resources, but resource-rich African countries require cost-effective and intermediate technology, as well as loans and investments at favorable, concessional terms, to transform their oil industries into a modern one. The economic complementarity and mutuality of interests have consequently created

immense scope for the India and African countries to build upon their historic friendships for undertaking a holistic partnership on the oil sector.

Among the African nations, Nigeria is the largest oil producer and tenth largest oil producer worldwide, having discovered oil in the 1950s. In terms of energy security, Nigeria is of great importance to India. Nigeria has been one of India's main sources of crude in recent years. Approximately 8-12 percent of India's crude oil requirements come from Nigeria. In addition to hydrocarbon trade, Indian participation in the upstream sector and refining in Nigeria has reached a critical point. Keeping this in perspective, the paper has explored the specificity and sustainability of oil partnership between India and Nigeria, and has sought to assess the synchronization between capacity building and oil production relation between the two countries.

India's Oil Sector: Over time, India's domestic oil fields have gained considerable experience. In order to extract oil from its several domestic fields located in a variety of terrains, it owes its techniques to the Russians who shared with it the necessary technology. (Digboi in the hilly Northeast region to the offshore Bombay High) (Dash, 2009). As reported by BP Statistical Review 2011, at 9.04 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe), Despite having a meagre 0.65 percent of total world reserves, India is ranked 19th for proven balance recoverable oil reserves. More than 50 percent of India's proven oil reserves are located in the western offshore Mumbai High and in the onshore northeast of the country. A significant quantity of undeveloped reserves is located offshore in the Bay of Bengal Krishna Godavari basin and onshore in Rajasthan. In India, the domestic production of 826,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) is only about 25 percent of the country's current consumption of 3,319,000 bopd, creating a huge import gap. In 2010, India imported about 75 percent of its crude oil requirements due to this increase in crude oil imports (Gas, 2011).

The import bill of the country contains a significant amount of crude oil as one of its major commodities. In 2010-11, crude oil and refined products accounted for more than 28 per cent of India's imports of principal commodities, according to the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, India. As a result, India's imports

of these commodities increased by about 20 percent from 86 billion dollars in 2009-10, to about 103 billion dollars in 2010-11. On the other hand, in terms of quantity, India imported 24 per cent less crude oil and refined products in 2010-11 than it did in 2009-10, i.e. 173.53 million tons in 2010-11 as opposed to 177.85 million tons in 2009-10. According to the Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell (PPAC), “during first six months of the current financial year (March – September 2011), India imported 84.13 million tons of crude oil and 7.92 million tons of refined products while during the same period India exported about 31.19 million tons of refined products” (Gas, 2011).

Additionally, to importing more crude oil, the Indian government has increased domestic exploration activity and secured equity oil overseas in order to increase reserves and production. A significant decline in hydrocarbon production also has upstream companies considering secondary and tertiary recovery methods. “In 2010-11, ONGC and OIL accounted for 74% of India’s crude oil production, the majority coming from state-owned enterprises. A contribution of over 6 MMT from Barmer, Rajasthan, and KG Basin contributed to an increase of 12.5% in crude oil production to 37.68 MMT in 2010-11 from 33.50 MMT in 2009-10” (Gas, 2011).

It is estimated that ONGC and OIL will contribute about 68 per cent of crude oil production in 2012, and the remaining 32 per cent will be produced by private companies and joint ventures. Oil production from NOCs is forecast to reach 72 per cent in the terminal year of the XII plan (2016-17), with the remaining 28 per cent coming from the private sector and joint ventures. (Gas, 2011).

There are 26 sedimentary basins in India, covering an area of 3.14 million square kilometers. These 26 basins that comprised this analysis can be divided into three categories: those that are prospective, those that can identify prospectivity, and those that have proven commercially productive. Only 22 percent of the 3.14 million square km area has been explored moderately to well. There have been exploration efforts in 44% of the area, and 34% remains poorly explored to completely unknown, although some exploration efforts have been initiated in these areas. It is estimated that approximately 1 million square kilometers of land are currently under active petroleum exploration licenses in 18

basins and that 35,601 square kilometers of land are under active mining leases. 259 of the 597 operating concessions are covered by Petroleum Exploration Licenses (PELs), and 338 are covered by Mining Leases (ML). Around 44% of India's entire sedimentary basin area is onshore, spanning an area of 1.39 million square kilometres, and the other 56%, or 1.75 million square kilometres, is offshore, including the deepwater offshore zone, which covers an area of 1.35 million square kilometres. (Gas, 2011).

The largest refining capacity is located in India at Jamnagar, which is owned by RIL and has a 60 MMtpa capacity. RIL controls 2 refineries and 31% of India's refining capacity. With 10 refineries around the nation with a combined capacity of 65.7 MMtpa and a 34% market share, IOCL is the country's largest refinery operator. With a total capacity of 30.5 MMtpa throughout its 4 refineries, BPCL contributes 15.8% of the nation's refining output. With 14.8 MMtpa of refining capacity, HPCL is the fourth-largest corporation by that measure. It owns two refineries and has a 7.7% share of the global refining capacity. ONGC operates two refineries with a combined capacity of 11.9 MMtpa through its subsidiary MRPL, which also contributes 6.2 percent. Essar Oil operates just one refinery with a 5.4% share of total refining capacity and has a 10.5 MMtpa capacity for refining. India is home to refineries with refining capacities ranging from 0.078 MMtpa to 33.0 MMtpa. The largest refinery is owned and operated by RIL at Jamnagar SEZ, while the smallest refinery is run by ONGC at Tatipaka (GAS, 2011).

According to the *World Economic Outlook*, "Asia's share of oil in the global total would continue to increase and touch 35 per cent by 2020. The increase would be evident mainly in China, India and Southeast Asian countries. In volumetric terms, this means that demand for energy in Asia, which was 19 million barrels per day in 1997, would grow to over 28 million barrels per day in 2010 and more than 37 million barrels per day in 2020" (IMF, 2003). As a result of the limited and declining oil production in the region, the incremental demand for oil will have to be met by imported oil as a result of the limited and declining oil production (Biswas, 2005).

There are many opportunities in the hydrocarbon sector due to the trend of cooperation and collaboration between state and international

companies. A significant change has been witnessed in the debate on energy security in the 1990s. Government resource policies have changed since the 1970s and 1980s, when oil shocks and fears of global shortages dictated energy security calculus. As a result of a perceived shortage of energy supply, the fear of conflict over energy competition is not the main cause of concern for States at the moment. Trade patterns are changing, oil production has shifted to West Asia, and therefore, the region depends more on open shipping lanes, and strategic relationships are shifting, which could contribute to conflict in the region. Some scholars argue that Asian countries will be incentivised to collaborate instead of compete if they are forced to rely more heavily on imported energy supplies (Biswas, 2005).

Among the major energy seeking powers of Asia, India is one of the most important. Although it has significant coal reserves, it has relatively few oil and gas reserves. Currently, the country has 5.9 billion barrels of oil reserves, which is only 0.5 percent of the total oil reserves in the world. In Assam and offshore Bombay, India has the majority of its oil reserves. A stagnant domestic crude production has led to India importing 70 percent of its oil from West Asia. In addition, the World Energy Outlook predicts that by 2020, India will be 91.6 percent reliant on oil imports. Thus, in order to enhance energy security in the country, India has undertaken a series of dramatic reforms in the hydrocarbon industry. A number of activities are undertaken by the private sector, both Indian and foreign, in the upstream and downstream sectors. During the early 1990s, the Government contemplated setting up a deregulated and market-driven oil and gas industry in India (Chandra, 2001).

India is also exploring possibilities to seek oil from Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa. Since 2003, it has been making major efforts to enhance its oil security through accelerated steps for increasing domestic production of oil and gas, and through investing in the oil fields. Recently, the Government of India empowered the State-owned ONGC to invest in overseas oil and natural gas exploration projects (Harshe, 2002).

India's Interest in African Oil: As India has expanded its energy sources across the world in recent years, African markets have appeared to be one of the major attractions for Indian oil companies. India

imports roughly one fourth of its crude oil from sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of this comes from Nigeria. India is also investing in equity oil in Africa. Sudan, Angola, Ghana, and Ivory Coast are the African countries where it has focused so far. In West Africa, there are also three countries of interest in the Gulf of Guinea region: Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Mauritania (Beri, 2007).

There are a number of reasons why India is interested in African oil. In the first place, the oil from Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea, is of high quality, with low sulphur content. The second is that most new discoveries are found offshore, away from potential conflict on shore. Third, unlike Saudi Arabia and many other Gulf countries, Africa's oil market is open to foreign participation. In addition, only Nigeria belongs to the OPEC, which sets a maximum level of production for its members. Aside from centuries long ties, India has also fought colonialism and apartheid together on the continent. Indian and African relations have been strong for many years. In the mid-19th century, Indians who reached African shores formed a bond between India and Africa. Moreover, both nations have experienced similar nation building challenges. As a result, India has a certain bond with African countries that is beneficial in forging energy ties (Beri, 2007).

The interdependence between India and African countries is, therefore, manifested in the crucial sector of energy. A growing demand for energy has prompted India to develop a comprehensive energy procurement plan through its energy diplomacy. Currently, India cannot meet these demands with its internal resources. Nigeria, Persian Gulf countries, and South-East Asian countries, especially Indonesia, will likely serve as India's primary energy suppliers in the short term. In the long run, Bangladesh, Qatar, and Turkmenistan are likely to become India's future energy suppliers, especially natural gas. For now, Egypt remains India's largest petroleum supplier (Harshe, 2002).

Due to Africa's hydrocarbon potential, Indian relations with this continent have taken on a whole new dimension and have the potential to be very significant. India is hydrocarbon deficit to the extent of 70 per cent; this deficit is expected to increase to 85 per cent by 2025. Hence, India's quest for energy security has made it necessary for the country to pursue a proactive oil diplomacy to diversify its hydrocarbon sources

as also to acquire hydrocarbon assets across the world through equity participation in developed fields and through exploration and production contracts and midstream and downstream joint ventures and investments (Harshe,2002).

These efforts have already met with some success in Africa in recent years. Nigeria is the second-largest supplier of crude oil to India, after Saudi Arabia, meeting about 12 per cent of her annual needs. India's first foray into Africa in equity participation was the acquisition of a 25 per cent stake in the GNOP in Sudan, which is today providing India with about three million tonnes of oil per year. This was followed by a contract to construct a products pipeline from a refinery in Khartoum up to Port Sudan. India's investment in Sudan's hydrocarbon sector cumulatively amounts to nearly \$2 billion. The other recent success for India has been in Libya where Indian companies, the Oil India Limited, Indian Oil Corporation (OIL-IOC) combine and ONGC, have between them won three blocks in the face of stiff international competition. The ONGC also acquired shares in some E&P blocks in Nigeria (Ahmad, 2005).

These early successes constitute the basis of a substantial long-term engagement of India with Africa across and even beyond the hydrocarbon value chain. India is well placed to pursue such engagement. India carries considerable goodwill across the continent for the role it played in the anti-colonial struggle as also for its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. The programme has developed the knowledge base of at least three generations of Africans. Beyond these strengths, the possibility of the success of Indian efforts is also enhanced by the fact that African countries are increasingly linking the award of upstream E&P contracts to participation by interested parties in the midstream and downstream sectors (pipelines and refineries) and, more importantly, in economic development project covering sectors such as railways, power projects, and the development of domestic natural resources and infrastructure. India, with its capabilities in the hydrocarbon sector and its national development experience over 50 years, is well equipped to meet these challenges (Ahmad, 2005).

India few years back hosted a composite delegation from Nigeria made up of the Ministers of power and steel, commerce and energy, the

Chairman of the Nigerian Railway and the Special Advisor to the President for Economic Development. The delegation, over three days, conveyed its interests in linking Nigeria's E&P contracts to downstream and economic development proposals, particularly in regards to power and railways. India has speedily responded to the Nigerian offer by setting up an inter-Ministerial task force to pursue E&P proposals in tandem with specific power and railways projects in Nigeria. The Angolan Government has also conveyed to India their interest in linking E&P proposals to economic development offers, particularly the revival of mines and the up gradation of road, railway and port systems which have suffered serious damage on account of the prolonged civil war (Ahmad, 2005).

An important area for an Indian role in meeting Africa's urgent requirements is in the development of human resources that would be required to explore and develop the continent's hydrocarbon potential. A pan-African initiative in this area that is already underway is Africa Array, a 20-year programme designed to strengthen geophysics education and research and build a training and research support system. India, with its 70-year experience in the hydrocarbon industry, and its numerous research and training institutions, can make a useful contribution this initiative (Ahmad, 2005).

Africa's substantial hydrocarbon reserves hold the promise of economic development and prosperity for the people of this continent who have for several decades suffered poverty, loss of dignity and exploitation. The challenges are to harness the resources generated by the energy reserves and invest them in all-round development of infrastructure, socio economic upliftment and the development of human resources. This empowerment would enable the continent to obtain the highest standards of achievement, which are warranted by its ancient civilisation, the wisdom of its leaders and the sincere commitment of its people to excel. The traditional links with the continent and the experience in the both developmental issues and hydrocarbon sector enable India to be an effective partner of African countries (Ahmad, 2005).

Nigeria's Oil Sector: A member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria has been producing oil in Africa for more than 40 years, and it is the tenth largest oil producer worldwide.

African oil was discovered in Nigeria in the 1950s. In 2010, the country was the fifth largest exporter of crude oil in the world, following Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, and Canada, according to the ENI World Oil and Gas Review 2011. US exports represent 37.4 percent of Nigeria's total exports, followed by India (10.5 percent), Brazil (7.8 percent), Spain (6.9 percent), and China (6.9%)(Gas, 2011).

A large portion of export revenues (total export revenue of US\$ 82.54 billion in 2010), 85 percent of government revenue, and approximately 40 percent of GDP are generated by oil, the country's most important resource. Nigeria's hydrocarbon sector is regulated by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. As a result of the government's close control over the hydrocarbon sector and the activities of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), established in 1977, the country's NOC remains closely controlled. The primary function of NNPC at that time was to regulate the Nigerian oil industry, and its secondary responsibilities included upstream and downstream activities. Aside from exploration, the Corporation has been given operational interests and powers in refining, petrochemicals, and product transportation and distribution. In 1988, the Nigerian government divided the NNPC into 12 subsidiary companies to improve management of the country's oil industry (Gas, 2011).

A majority of Nigeria's major oil and natural gas projects are funded by joint ventures (JVs), in which the NNPC owns 55-60 percent of the company. The largest JV is owned and operated by Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). The majority of foreign oil majors, including Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Conoco Phillips, Total, and Agip and Addax Petroleum, also operate as joint venture partners with the NNPC. Nigeria's offshore deepwater development program comprises the remaining JVs, which are primarily PSCs. China has made significant investments in recent years in all sectors, particularly hydrocarbons, through its NOCs and private companies (Gas, 2011).

To deal with the deregulation and privatization of NNPC, the Nigerian government established a new committee on oil and gas reform in April 2000. NNPC is set to sell seven subsidiaries, including the three refineries, Eleme Petrochemicals Ltd, the Nigerian Petroleum

Development Company, and Hyson Nigeria Ltd., a partially owned oil marketing firm (Gas, 2011).

According to the National Petroleum Reserves Report of January 2011, Nigeria held 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, which is the second largest oil reserve in Africa after Libya (3.4%). Nigeria's crude oil production averaged 2.436 million barrels per day in 2010, an increase of 16 percent from 2009 production of 2.098 million barrels per day. Nigeria accounted for over 23 percent of Africa's total oil output in 2010. The country's oil R/P ratio is approximately 42 years based on current production levels. In recent years, Nigeria achieved highest oil production at the levels of 2.518 million bpd in 2005 (Gas, 2011).

It is estimated that Nigeria consumes 0.64 barrels of oil per capita, almost half the average per capita consumption of Africa at 1.30 barrels. Nigeria's oil production and reserves are concentrated in the Niger River delta, the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Bonny, and the Gulf of Guinea. The main oil producing fields are Bonga, Gbaran/Ubie, Yoho, Agbami, Amenam, Akpo, Usan and Bolia. In addition to Forcados and Bonny (operated by Shell), Chevron operates Escravos and Pennington, Exxon Mobil operates Qua Iboe, and Agip operates Brass. Light and sweet crudes are Nigerian export blends, with APIs ranging from 29 to 36 degrees and sulphur levels between 0.05 and 0.2 percent. In terms of gasoline production, Nigeria's Bonny light blend and Forcados blend are among the best in the world (Gas, 2011).

There are many top multinational oil companies (IOCs) and national oil companies (NOCs) that have invested in the Nigerian oil sector, including Shell, Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total, ENI (Agip), Conoco Phillips, Statoil, Addax, Petrobras, Devon Energy, Nexen, SINOPEC, ONGC and CNOOC. As part of the project, Nigeria developed a "novel digital reservoir monitoring" technology to scan mature oil wells by identifying zones of bypassed hydrocarbons in an old oil well (Gas, 2011).

In Nigeria, NNPC owns three refineries, each with 450 thousand barrels per day of refining capacity. In addition to Warn and Kaduna refineries, Port Harcourt refineries have a nameplate capacity of 125,000 barrels per day (19,900 m³). It is operated by the Warri Refining and

Petrochemical Company (WRPC), a subsidiary of NNPC. Kaduna refinery has a capacity of 110,000 barrels per day (17,000 m³ per day). It is jointly managed with a petrochemical plant that produces 13,000 tonnes of polypropylene and 18,000 tonnes of carbon black per year. The Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Company (KRPC), a subsidiary of NNPC, operates the refinery. PHRC has a capacity of 210,000 barrels per day (33,000 m³ per day) for Port Harcourt I and II (Port Harcourt I 60,000 barrels per day, Port Harcourt II 150,000 barrels per day). As a result of operational inefficiency and lack of maintenance, all three refineries have been operating significantly under their respective installed capacities, forcing Nigeria to import 85 per cent of its petroleum products, which leaves them vulnerable to crude oil prices. According to ENI World Oil and Gas Review 2011, "Nigerian refinery utilization was merely 36 per cent in year 2010, a sharp decline from 55 per cent in year 2005, and well below the Africa's average current refining capacity utilization at 74 per cent" (Gas, 2011).

Several independently-owned refineries will be built in the Nigerian capital to increase refining capacity. A two-phase construction plan for a refinery in Lagos's Lekki free trade zone is being considered by Oando, a leading petroleum marketing company in Nigeria. Downstream sector hope has been raised by the just-concluded feasibility study for the proposed 240,000 bopd greenfield oil refinery. In the second phase, 360,000 barrels of oil per day would be produced (Gas, 2011).

The government is considering selling the oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC) of NNPC to privatize state entities. Nigeria's government has begun talking to many foreign prospective investors despite little interest from international companies in privatizing refineries. In July 2010, Nigeria signed a deal worth US\$8 billion to construct the first refinery by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC). An agreement between Chinese investors and NNPC in May 2011 stipulated the construction of three refineries and a petrochemical complex. Lekki (Lagos state), Brass (Bayelsa state) and Lokoja (Kogi state) will serve as refineries. Nigeria will save about US\$10bn annually on crude oil imports by building these three refineries. They are expected to be completed by 2015 (Gas, 2011).

New contracts have been signed by NNPC to swap crude oil imports for refined products. The new contracts cover half of Nigeria's products demand, and similar agreements are likely to be signed soon to fill the remainder. However, these contracts offer a temporary solution to make product supplies more stable and predictable, but the Nigerian fuel supply and distribution problem will only be resolved through massive investment in its downstream and transportation infrastructure. An exchange deal worth around US\$1.7 billion involves NNPC selling 60,000 barrels of crude to Trafigura in exchange for refined products of equivalent value. Approximately five or six standard gasoline cargoes will be delivered per month by Trafigura. (Gas, 2011).

NNPC has committed to providing Côte d'Ivoire's national refiner Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage (SIR) with 30,000 barrels per day of crude in exchange for refined products produced at the Abidjan refinery as part of the second swap deal. The deal is estimated to be worth around US\$850 million based on the assumption that Brent prices are approximately 80 dollars per barrel. The volume of product is estimated to be 100,000 tons per month (equivalent to two or three cargoes) (Gas, 2011).

Nigeria's Oil Diplomacy: Nigeria's oil diplomacy, according to Kayode Soremekun, "lies at the interface between the domestic and the external environments. Since oil became the dominant national revenue-earner in the wake of the quadrupling of global oil prices in the 1970s, it has remained a crucial element in defining national power and the robust regional and pan-Africanist thrust in the country's foreign policy" (Soremekun, 2011). Looking back to the 'golden age' of Nigerian diplomacy in the 1970s, when Nigeria took a leading role in West African integration, as well as providing material and moral support to liberation movements across the continent. During the period of time when oil power was abundant in southern Africa, its foreign policy was greatly enhanced by this (Mustapha, 2008). In a similar vein, Bassey Ate argued that, "This aspect of oil diplomacy was played out between Nigeria and Britain, when the former decided to nationalize the assets of British Petroleum (BP) in the context of Nigeria support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa. owing largely to oil revenues, Nigeria challenged the United States as regards African issues" (Ate, 1987). In order to understand the context of such African affairs,

it is necessary to understand Gowan's unrelenting resistance to the Nixon administration, General Murtala Mohammed's historic challenge to President Ford over Angola, as well as General Obasanjo's progressive partnership with Jimmy Carter regarding the liquidation of Ian Smith's settler-colonial regime in Zimbabwe (Soremekun K., 1984).

The decline in global oil prices caused by the worldwide economic recession of the 1990s, which was reflected in Nigeria as a full-fledged economic catastrophe, had a restricting effect on the country's 'active' foreign policy, demonstrating that Nigeria's internal and external fortunes are bound to oil. Domestic revenue declines and the implementation of a socially punitive Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) based on market reforms (Obi, 1993). Deepened oil politics as more people were excluded from the distribution of public commodities. This heightened competition for control of dwindling oil income. The collapse of the economy exacerbated the situation in the Niger Delta and contributed to the emergence of identity movements seeking restitution for decades of oil exploitation, impoverishment, and environmental degradation by the oil industry, paving the way for the internationalisation of the conflict in the 1990s and its current insurgent phase. Yet, given the shifting post-Cold War global landscape characterised by rising demand and a new scramble for Africa's oil, (Obi C., 2009). Nigeria, the continent's top producer, is on the verge of a resurgence of oil-fueled foreign policy in line with its regional and continental leadership ambitions.

The background of the Niger Delta securitization resides in the designation of the region's oil as critical to the energy security of the United States and Western nations, which are the primary importers and users of Nigeria's sweet crude. The challenges to Western interests in the volatile Delta have been exacerbated by the recent entry of Chinese and Indian state oil corporations seeking a foothold in the region to meet rising domestic demand and diversify their supply sources (Volman, 2006).

India-Nigeria Oil Partnership: To improve energy supply security and supplement domestic exploration activities, India's National Oil Companies (NOCs) are seeking offshore oil equity through the acquisition of E&P assets. ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), ONGC's abroad arm, has

developed a number of joint ventures with foreign corporations. As of March 31, 2011, OVL had a presence in 33 projects in 14 countries in Africa, Asia, South America, and the Middle East. In Africa, OVL, OIL, IOCL, BPRL, HPCL, Essar Energy, and Videocon Group are all actively engaged in E&P activities (Gas, 2011).

In Nigeria's "OPL – 279 & OPL – 285 blocks, OVL holds PI through its JV ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL), which is the operator of these two offshore blocks. Other partners are Total and EMO. In OPL-279, OMEL has (45.5 per cent), EMO (40 per cent), Total (14.5 percent). In OPL-285, OMEL has (64.33 per cent), EMO (10 percent), Total- (25.67 percent). In OPL – 205 (Onshore) blocks, OIL has signed SPA and SHA for acquiring 25 percent equity of Suntera Nigeria 205 Limited, which is a Nigerian company having 70 per cent interest in Exploration Block OPL 205. In OPL-226 block, Essar Energy has 100 per cent interest" (Gas, 2011).

Earlier in 2000, India signed a major oil deal with Nigeria. As per the deal, "Nigeria was to supply oil to India at the rate of 1, 20, 000 barrels a day on a sustained annual basis. The hydrocarbon deal between the two countries that entailed the annual supply of 6 million tones was seen by analysts as an important building block in India's quest to achieve energy security" (Harshe, 2002).

Thus, there is a subtle shift in India-Nigeria hydrocarbon resource partnership from commodity trade to equity linkage. Nigeria is highly important for Indian energy security matters. "In recent years Nigeria has been one of the main sources of crude for India. India imports around 8 per cent to 12 per cent of its crude requirements from Nigeria. Apart from trade in hydrocarbons, Indian presence in Nigeria's upstream sector has arrived at a critical threshold of participation in the upstream sector and refining. During 2005-07, Indian companies participated in Nigerian bid rounds and won 6 oil blocks: ONGC Mittal (OMEL) (3: OPL279, OPL285 & OPL297), Sterling (2: OPL2005 & OPL2006 – the crude has started flowing since 2nd half of 2011) and Essar (1: OPL226)" (Affairs, 2013). India-Nigeria oil sector partnership can be looked at the wider context of their relationships based on the multifaceted symmetry.

Political Symmetry: The commonalities in anti-colonial struggle against the British, vast multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and developing cultures have fostered bilateral affinity between India and Nigeria. “Both share common perspectives on international political, social and development issues and these have manifested in various meetings at UN, WTO, etc. Nigeria is strongly opposed to all forms of terrorism” (Affairs, 2013). India and Nigeria have common historicity and challenges in their tryst with resource security and resource utilization. While Indian Digboi oilfield, which has the oldest running oil well in the world, has witnessed the ethnic insurgency, oil rich Niger Delta is also subjected to similar armed movement. The Union Carbide has unleashed the accidental gas disaster in the Indian city of Bhopal in 1984, exposing more than 500,000 people to the toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and other chemicals. Similarly, the Royal Dutch Shell’s failure to clean up oil spills in the Niger Delta has caused huge suffering to locals and damage to the ecosystem.

Nigeria-India relations have traditionally been cordial and friendly, with no contentious issues. Even before Nigeria gained independence in 1960, India opened a diplomatic office there in 1958. Both countries have been in the vanguard of the global anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle, and have partnered in a variety of international fora. On his historic visit to Nigeria in September 1962, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Nigeria’s first Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa established mutual respect and admiration. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s historic state visit to Nigeria in October 2007 boosted bilateral ties.

The steady exchange of ministerial visits between India and Nigeria provides the political strength to their growing relationships. The major Nigerian visits to India during 2012 included Former President Olusegun Obasanjo, Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Minister of Works, Minister of S&T, Minister of Labour & Productivity, MOS of Defence Erelu Olusola Obada, Minister of Agriculture & Natural Resources, Governor of Borno state, Education Minister Ruqayyatu A. Rufai, Minister of Land & Housing Ama Peppele, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government (Affairs, 2013).

Economic Symmetry: India and Nigeria remained suppliers of raw materials and recipient of finished products under the colonial political economy. They retained their subservient commonality in the post-colonial international production linkage for a certain period of time. Nevertheless, India has over the years witnessed a substantial economic growth, a trend that becomes more visible after globalization. India has in reality acquired fair amount of experience in industrial production under its ‘command’ and the subsequent ‘demand’ economy regimes. India has become increasingly dependent on foreign resources due to its growing reliance on foreign resources brought about by economic globalisation. India’s quest for overseas resources coincides with the unfolding of new horizons of resources in Nigeria, especially its oil resource, thereby evoking renewed interest by external actors.

There is a strong likelihood that Indian oil companies will invest in downstream, midstream, and transmission infrastructure in African countries, including Nigeria, which is necessary, but less profitable. It is of utmost importance for Nigeria to invest in refining facilities, as it is forced to import petroleum products due to the lack of domestic technological and infrastructure facilities to process its petroleum resources. It should also be noted that the Indian government and companies do not carry any traces of ‘imperialist’ baggage compared to some of their Western counterparts (Mahajan, 2007).

Since Nigeria has become a major source of crude for India in recent years, Nigeria has become an important resource for our energy security concerns. India imports between 8 and 12 percent of its crude requirement from Nigeria, so Nigeria plays an important role in our energy security. Apart from trade in hydrocarbons, the Indian presence has reached a critical stage in Nigeria’s upstream sector where it is now participating in both the upstream and refining sectors. “India is currently Nigeria’s second largest trading partner. With a population of 168 million and considerable revenue from oil exports, Nigeria is the largest trading partner of India in Africa. Nigeria is also the largest market in Africa for Indian exports. A large number of Indian companies have footprints in Nigeria, which have made substantial investments in Nigeria. Bilateral annual trade turnover was over US\$ 17.3 billion in 2011-12 registering the growth of over 34 per cent” (Affairs, 2013).

“Over 100 Indian companies are estimated to have footprints in Nigeria. Prominent among them being Bharti Airtel, Indorama, Olam International, Tata, Bajaj Auto, Birla Group, Kirloskar, Mahindra, Ashok Leyland, NIIT, ApTech New India Assurance, Bhushan Steel, KEC, Skipper Nigeria, Dabur, Godrej and Primus Super-speciality Hospital. India has pole positions in Nigeria’s pharmaceuticals, steel and power transmission sectors. Nigeria-based ethnic Indians are economically very active in such areas as consumer manufacturing and retailing, construction and air-services. The Indian Products and Services Exhibition (IPASE) was held in Lagos twice in January 2011 and in March 2012 showcasing Indian products and services” (Affairs, 2013).

Apart from India’s growing trade and invest linkage with Nigeria, New Delhi undertakes development cooperation in its partnering country through its provision of Lines of Credit (LOCs) and capacity building programmes. India provides LOCs to enable people in Nigeria to access Indian goods and services on affordable terms. LOC worth US \$100 million was provided in 2012. “Capacity-building remains the core component of the India-Nigeria engagement. In February 2009, the inauguration of Pan African e-Network Project at TCIL, New Delhi by the then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, was attended by Prof. Dora Akunyili, Nigerian Minister of Information & Communication at the Learning Centre, University of Lagos. During 2009-10, Nigeria was able to utilize 85 out of 100 allotted fellowships under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)/SCAAP programme. The 130 seat ITEC quota for Nigeria for the year 2010-11 was fully utilized. Following IAFS-II, Nigeria’s ITEC quota for 2011-12 has been further increased to 190 and an overwhelming 177 slots were utilised. During first eight months of 2012-13, 188 slots were utilised” (Affairs, 2013).

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Poor Leadership and Underdevelopment in the African Subcontinent: An Evaluation of Selected Factors

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ABSTRACT

Africa is considered the poorest continent in the world, despite the fact that it is the richest in natural resources. Africa suffers from chronic maladministration and a lack of effective leadership. Governance and poor leadership are becoming the identities of the African subcontinent. Leadership issues in Africa are always viewed in the context of development. The lack of leadership is really a challenge in the 21st century, as the people of the African subcontinent must understand that honest leadership is very important for the socio-economic and political development of society. In this present paper, the study has been conducted based on the literature available on the reasons behind faulty leadership. Such faulty leadership is responsible for poverty and economic backwardness. In essence, the study is qualitatively oriented and mainly uses secondary data for analysis. This article primarily evaluated the factors responsible for poor leadership and the challenges related to it. The study also looked at the importance of democracy and attempted to find a link between healthy democracies, strong leadership, and African development crises.

Keywords: Poor Leadership, Underdevelopment, Africa, Democracy, Socio-political and Economic Crises.

Introduction

Responsibility for development largely depends on the nation's leaders. The role of a leader is often to unite a nation under a state constitution along with related laws, social unification, and most importantly, the value of social accountability. The leader's involvement in social affairs and work for people's interests determines the progress of any country

and its people. It's very clear from past historical incidents that the progress of any country depends on the vision of its leader and the support of its people. In this context, the most significant question arises: why do we need development? It shows the change involving the collective will and determination of the individual to improve the global situation, which presents the nation with a challenge for the social, economic, and political restructuring of its life. Therefore, the success of any country's progress depends on the degree of togetherness and equality among the social elements, as the instability resulting from improper socio-political and economic development of the society will certainly lead to a crisis situation in the country and for the people, which may end with nationwide conflict. A revolution against the government is the ultimate way to express the frustration and discontent of current leaders.

Public representation and activism are required in any revolution to express their dialogue and point of view in the general public's interest under the stout leadership of a visionary leader in the society and country. This can be an extreme movement to appeal to the government to take decisions in favor of people for development. Such mobilization may eventually lead to the dissolution of government. These are normally very common issues in Africa, where there are many cases of maladministration. These problems lead to underdevelopment in most African countries and make life difficult for the population. The continuation of this can be seen in many countries where people seem to be frustrated and eager to live a better life because they want to overthrow the government. Especially recently, there has been revolutionary mobilization in many countries, including several African countries, these kinds of activities certainly raise questions about leadership crises in Africa. This crisis leads to a problem for mankind as the country cannot develop in the lack of leadership. The effects of cultural and socio-political changes with no aim have no value in any developing society. Africa's situation is not an exception; there have been many civil wars in African countries because basic needs are scarce and people are suffering; at the same time, there were many government representatives who never participated in people's planning and were always focused on their own benefits, which eventually led to corruption; such a situation eventually leads to a social unrest. This

is often marked by a long period of frustration, which is unbearable for revolutionaries. This complete revolution represents what many scientists understand as a “massive change in government structures” (Cameron, 1970). Although this concept refers to concepts that imply a cyclical change in forms of government, in general, the revolution represents a fundamental departure from all previous historical models.

Any revolution is always considered a result of any social conflict due to lack of social facilities and social crises for common people and certainly challenges the government and political decisions; sometimes it replaces political agendas, which is very true. The issue of ineffectual leadership undoubtedly has an impact on the social and economic structure of society. If we consider political theories and social concepts, we can conclude that the revolution is caused by a failure of the society’s fundamental moral ethics, as well as a general lack of belief in the system. These are many social and political scholars, such as Milson (1997), who states that public activism gives freedom of expression and freedom to live free in society, as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Act 1948, that freedom is the core of any development and social autonomy, such autonomy is very important for humanity and raising awareness of human rights.

In fact, the revolution lays the foundation for social development and a rethinking of society’s structure. These types of public activism aim to achieve the highest human desire: happiness, because of violent conflicts such as the coup, wars of dominance and oligarchies are not called revolutions. Marx (1978), in his Communist Manifesto, continues to show the purpose and importance of the revolution. He pointed out that effective leaders are required to initiate and execute revisions as the basis for a conflict-centered class struggle plan to use society’s resources in constructive manners. It can also be considered that the ultimate goal of the conflict is to end social freedom and restrict people’s development. There are numerous examples, as we have seen in the Arab Spring in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon. A long period of political and social stiffness is a well-known feature of any revolutionary state; such stiffness, according to Britani (1997), is caused by the gradual destruction of social values and the social suppression of establishments, resulting in “a weakening of political power and

the government used all its power and force to suppress people and remain in power”.

In such situations, the role of the leader is critical, and Africa is always a focal point for social crises and civil wars, as it is well known that Africa is always lacking in effective leaders and its influence on power is beginning to wane. At the moment, more and more forces are gathering around the various forces of the opposition to the government. Furthermore, African independence arose as a result of many revolutions or liberation movements. African independence is the result of numerous good leaders with strong anti-capitalist views, but the problem arose when African society severely lacked such leaders in the current era. The crisis of African leadership is mainly due to the fact that most of the leaders are not visionaries and are not thinking about the interests of the people but rather their own narrow, selfish interests. Most researchers agree that the root causes of underdevelopment in Africa are poor leadership, a lack of their social commitment, and a *shortage* of basic skills. This article is intended to analyze the causes of mismanagement and its relation to poor leadership, which ultimately explains the underdevelopment of Africa after independence.

Theoretical Framework

The leadership crisis in Africa is mainly due to political setbacks and crises. The political leadership was always shown to be incapable of serving the people due to their self-interest and selfish behavior. Most of the researchers pointed out that in Africa the management of people’s facilities, planning, and social strategy is very poor and not at all up to the mark. Also, the knowledge of social management is not adequate. The present article presents a view on the reasons for the lack of leadership in Africa and poor management since independence. This article sought to comprehend the lack of political will and the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment and social backwardness. The development of Africa is always undermined as the country has never taken it seriously, and undoubtedly, this is also due to the lack of an honest approach by the political leaders. Many African leaders become wealthy and never consider social issues, putting overall economic development at risk. According to Cheeseman, Collord, and Reintiens (2018: 05), they mentioned in their papers that there were some political leaders who

took care of common people, never benefited economically, and always valued the benefit of others, but unfortunately none of them survived, such as T. Sankara, Julius Nyerere, and Nelson Mandela.

In fact, it's a great fact that in the African context, the leaders are considered great because they have a great influence on the people's lives, opinion formation and development. The leaders who were in power since independence didn't have any plans or defective plans to change the socio-economic status of Africa. Mostly African leaders and political advisers didn't move in the right direction. The leaders never represented the interests of the common people, but the point of consideration was very economic and self-centred. The facts remain that the African leadership was very clueless about the people's development. True leaders who worked very hard for independence were really thoughtful about people's progress and economic development. The research from many scholars evidently pointed out that the majority of the African leaders were clueless on the future development plans of Africa, and in a real sense, they were enjoying the position for self-benefits as there was no plan. Political corruption and the selfish nature of leaders are to blame for the blockage of African development and economies.

Research Methodology and Objectives of the Study

The nature of present research paper is qualitative and based on literature available on poor leadership in Africa. In this study, a secondary research method was chosen, which also known as computer-assisted research (Kothari, 2004). The advantage of the secondary research method is that information and information are easily accessible. Secondary search is faster because information is available. This study used research articles, and world forum report and report based on African poor governance. This study evaluated the factors responsible for the poor leadership in African Sub-continent.

The objective of this study is to understand and evaluate the reasons behind the poor leadership in African subcontinents and their relation to democratic values. The paper also has the objective of identifying challenges and underdevelopment in relation to ineffective leadership in Africa.

Crises of leadership in Africa

Leadership and governance have always been intertwined. The leaders are closely associated with public service and considered to represent the people's interests. The crisis of African leaders is not a new issue in Africa. There is an extreme lack of a quality representative who can motivate, influence, and control people's actions to get the desired goal for social interest (Idike 1996). Every individual in society and at the social level is influenced by leadership. This means that leaders have an impact on people and groups of communities because they are the primary representatives of issues affecting people in society. The primary responsibility of leaders is to form strong bonds with the people and represent them before the government in order to solve their problems to develop social structure. Leadership regulates the overall socio-economic expansion of a society and social agencies. Poor leadership leads to poor management of resources, which usually leads to malfunction. Therefore, people who try to bridge the gap between their ideas and the establishments can never succeed because of the lack of commitment and social will on the part of the leader, which give rise to social conflict and, as a result, increases and continues social crimes. This is actually a condition of Africa and the reason behind the underdevelopment of African society. It can be deliberated that this is due to the lack of quality governance in many African communities and countries. Because of corruption, the leaders have put the people in a bad economic situation and a sad state that they are forced to fight for their survival, disillusioned with the political activities of these selfish and visionary leaders. Many people seem to blame the colonizers' negative priorities for the problems of underdevelopment and mismanagement. Of course, colonialism had a great negative impact on Africans, making them increasingly inferior. In this context, it is also very important to state here that the West has plundered Africa's natural resources, used all local assets, but never tried to help them in any way as there were no effective leaders who could represent African needs. It became an advantage for western rulers who destroyed the system of African society. African leaders severely impoverish the African continent. It's also a fact that some leaders are very rich, have no attachments to local people, and have never taken initiatives to solve some of our economic problems, as

evidenced by the example of Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Zairé from Zaire.

These issues with African leaders and leadership make development impossible. Hence, Africa is still seen as underdeveloped and in crisis. The inappropriate actions of African leaders cause confusion and disorder among African nations. Most African countries were integrated into democratic governments after independence and subsequent military intervention. However, if power shifts from military to civilian rulers, these countries are threatened with a kind of civilian dictatorship or “democratization” (a situation in which civilian rulers are authoritarian), according to Agbai (1990). These civilian dictators are blind and powerful, and as they are away from the common people’s interests, their access is questionable. The people cannot choose their leaders; for this reason, these leaders, usurping power, intimidate the people and clearly demonstrate that they do not belong to the people. Such dictatorship and their erroneous calculations are primarily to blame for the damage done to Africa because they destroy the unity that would exist if these leaders adopted a social discourse that allows for people’s representation in the nation.

Discussion and Evaluation

Based on the available literature and the facts taken into consideration, in the modern era, African leaders do not represent the interests of ordinary people but rather the interests of the capitalist class, which has always dominated the system. The leadership mechanism has become a tool for looting the country. So, the people are using this leadership position for their benefit and making money out of it; there is no sense of social service or communal welfare. The ineffectual leadership issue in Africa is very common, but unfortunately, it is hampering the growth of society, especially on the economic front. In this article, the author has identified some indicators that are mainly responsible for the leadership crisis in African subcontinent. The following indicators are taken into consideration to find out the objective of this paper, indicators are mentioned below:

1. Lack of leadership quality and poor control of resources

The representation of leaders is very different in real-life situations. There is a severe lack of ethical values in the leadership's behavior. The leaders' image in the media and in public is very different, and their moral presentation lacks credibility; the leaders have looted African funds and the trust of the people. The lack of responsibility for society and accountability towards government were badly compromised, and leaders were mainly thinking about their pockets and financial benefits; in fact, there were no innovative and strategic plans for social upliftment. The leaders never planned properly to use their natural resources for economic benefits and development.

2. Poverty and job crisis in Africa

Africa's countries are rich in resources and natural wealth, but the situation of the continent's employment generations, particularly youth employment, is dire. Africa's average youth unemployment rate is 55.75%; this itself shows the inability of African leaders to support the development of the African economy. Skill development is insufficient, and there is a severe shortage of skilled workers. This itself shows the weakness in the education infrastructure and academic vision of the country. Many of the reports also indicated that the majority of the positions are held by older members of the society and that they won't contribute much. The labor market requires graduates to have many years of work experience if they have just graduated from university. African leaders don't want young people to succeed because they use them in their political battles. Poverty and a lack of jobs among Africa's youth force young people to put powerful and wealthy politicians in their pockets.

3. Lack of skill development and strategic management

The social structure of Africa is very traditional, and its thinking is very orthodox. The innovations of ideas is lacking because people still believe in the traditional way of living and have never stressed the development of social agencies, their relations, or the strategic planning of socio-economic and political progress. Traditional muscle struggles and tribal populations are still one way to dominate society and become

leaders. In this context, the World Forum has clearly pointed out that approximately 50 percent of the people in Africa accept that they need to grow and upgrade their skills to fill the gap in the labor market. The research also pointed out that the gap in skill development and poor skill development plans are mainly a big barrier for the counties' development, and these are certainly unable to attract foreign investment and many multinational companies (WEF;Sept2019).

4. Political Malfunctioning and lack of socio-political Vision

The lack of socio-political vision is well marked in African development. It's not true that they don't have a plan, but the problem is with the implementation and proper plan of execution, which directly have an adverse impact on the African economy. The political malfunction is equally responsible for this poor execution. The plans and visions are only used to manipulate the voters at the time of elections. There are many such examples where the leaders have given very attractive future plans but, on the ground, nothing has been implemented and all that remains is rhetoric. The World Economic Forum made it abundantly clear that Africa does not require charity, but rather good leadership capable of planning and executing. The case of Nigeria is well-known here, in which there are no leaders with a vision for developed nations because the leaders lack leadership skills and a vision for their country. Actually, this is a problem for most of the African countries and clearly shows that leadership culture exists on the continent, but unfortunately, such incompetent leaders are in political positions.

5. Ineffective plan for foreign investment in African subcontinent

The world is increasingly recognizing that private capital plays an important role in economic development. African countries set out to liberalize the investment environment but did not receive a lot of foreign direct investment. Actually, Asian leaders have been unable to develop a constructive and visionary FDI strategy, and commercial factors have not been effectively applied to increased economic wealth. Many studies have stated that in countries like Tanzania and Uganda, FDI has significant positive effects. The multinational companies wanted to establish their branches in these countries and were really keen to connect with the global market, but they have pointed out some objections

related to foreign investment, government policies, and the lack of a favorable environment to execute FDIs. Therefore, African countries, which no longer attract FDI, cannot fully benefit from the potential of foreign capital to promote economic development and integration.

The indicators mentioned above are mainly responsible for the African crisis; these problems need to be effectively dealt with by African leaders to make social progress possible, but for that, the leaders need to be committed, honest, and understand human values with an effective vision and strategic plan, which are seriously lacking. As a result, Africa is still considered underdeveloped and in a deep socio-political and economic crisis. The inappropriate actions of African leaders are sowing confusion and unrest in African countries. The crisis related to human development is mainly due to factors related to economic investment in Africa, a strategic plan for education and skill development, and most importantly, a democratic sense of social progress. African people must identify and appreciate the effective way to choose leaders in a democratic system.

Leadership Failure

Strong leadership needs dedication and an approach toward social development. It is basically a very active and stable process to activate changes in society and for the development of a country. Leadership is a necessity in a developed society, as it influences others to participate in the development process and achieve goals by guiding the establishment to make it more valuable. Leaders must have strong ethical values and strong beliefs to develop and improve positive public opinion, knowledge, and social skills for the quality development of society and social agencies. In fact, the basic conception of leadership has gone through many changes over the decades. The primary goal of leadership is to support primary relationships in society. Leadership was no longer associated with static abilities, natural characteristics, or human qualities in the twentieth century. The leader must have a good relationship with the followers, which mainly depends on the trust and credibility of the leader and the respect of the followers. But the understanding of the problem and the issues behind people's mobilization makes leadership influential. So leadership varies depending on the situation. Thus, leadership is the link between meeting needs

and combining situational requirements. Overall, people's participation was low. Some scholars also argue that leadership is one of the most important factors in the world because it determines the developmental level of any nation. True leadership must be mature, bold, and have a definite vision that supports and understands human and social psychology and changes people's emotions for the development of society.

Leadership failure is mainly due to the lack of skills or an inability to mobilize public support. Normally, the wrong selection of people for leadership positions certainly paralyzes the entire system. This is a case involving African countries. In African countries, most of the leaders are not serious and totally unqualified. Poor leadership paralyzes development in Africa. Poor leadership was on display in Zimbabwe, where an unskilled, person held the position of director. It means-

One with no vision cannot lead those who can see; the unaware cannot lead towards awareness; and the incompetent cannot lead the sensible. And those who are deaf cannot be identified by the value of sounds. As elsewhere in the world, merit is rewarded in current institutions, and leadership skills are a crucial factor in any transformation. Leaders must always spread not only trust, but also potential and vision for growth. This actually determines not only the value of mankind but also the future of the nation.

The failure of leadership and the lack of nationalism among African leaders led to a leadership crisis and, as a result, to the Africa as poor Subcontinent. The burden of failure of African leaders is so great that its consequences have led to underdevelopment, dictatorship, poverty and economic stagnation, insecurity, corruption and loss of reputation in the eyes of the international community. After evaluation of all mentioned factors, it's very clear that the leadership crisis is a real issue in Africa which needs attention.

Leadership Challenges in the 21st Century

For Africa, in the 21st century, it is important to create strong and sustainable management institutions that can support the holistic development of the continent. This is very important because in many African countries there are no consistent, reliable, and long-term

institutions capable of solving all their issues and challenges effectively. The challenge in Africa is to produce quality and visionary leaders and potential leaders. Most of the rulers in Africa never protest the interests of Africa, neither economically nor regionally. No security for people and commodities leads to an unstable country. Rulers in Africa never tried to strengthen their agencies. It was a clear case of strategic failure and leadership breakdown (Konneh, 1998). The powers never got balanced in Africa as there was a severe lack of unity and trust among the people. It can be seen from the arguments mentioned above that strong leadership and administrative factors have badly contributed to the overall expansion of the country. Such administrative collapse results in the growth of malfunctioning, administrative incompetence, and social backwardness (Iliffe, 1995; Goodwin, 1957). Present-day leaders of state and government in Africa should see this as a challenge and an opportunity to fight for sustainable development and the growth of social agencies that can be used to strengthen social capital.

To ensure that the country continues to function effectively and efficiently despite the current government's problems, it must create enormous value for the people and provide all support based on strategic and operational planning for improvement. Besides, there is no doubt that for the African subcontinent, maintaining leadership remains a huge challenge. Many potential leaders failed to establish a potential governance system and were unable to guarantee the proper functioning of their country long after their deaths, and certainly, the overall system couldn't manage to overcome such a breakdown. In Tanzania, for example, people and leaders commonly claim that we are still looking for the reason behind everything that Tanzania's first president, Mwalimu Julius, established and fought for but couldn't sustain and lost. This example clearly points out the incompetency of the Mwalimu administration, that they were not sufficiently capable to manage the effective governance that ensures the preservation and transfer of the good things, which is really required for socio-economic development of African sub continents. In this context, Mawere (2009) stated that many African political leaders were known for the fact that the African continent can produce quality leaders. He also pointed out that in the present era of the 21st century; it is time to correct the mistakes done

by previous generations in terms of understanding and presenting quality leaders.

In this paper, the researchers evaluated the factors and found that in the 21st century, the most important idea is to not only develop countries but also to develop the idea of democracy and people's participation in the decision-making process. A sense of political communication is also important for African citizens. Citizens must understand what democratic principles require for the best interests of their society. Citizens must consider the real culture of democracy and exercise it for responsible governance. The value of freedom of expression and the right to vote in decision-making, all of which are basic democratic values that everyone must accept and promote for the healthy development of human values in African society.

This research paper intends to argue that poor leadership is due to a lack of understanding of democracy and the power of decision-making. Effective leadership must value people, and for this, an effective democratic setup is required, as the people's rights and equality of social presentation are very crucial. This certainly means that leadership is a symptom and not a cause of development. Africa's prospects for democracy depend on the search for better leaders, and the leader must dedicate their work to the factors that can spread the ability to work together to ensure that the government serves the interests of the people. As a result, an effective leadership approach is critical to the spread or reduction of negative freedom, because democratic citizens cannot function without the ability to freely speak and act. Particularly, if the African subcontinent really wants to develop a strong leadership culture, leaders must consider constructive criticism. Only forward-looking and knowledge-based guidelines can identify and formulate objective alternatives to development policy. African leaders must avoid being suspicious of their opponents and brothers in the development arena.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that the African leadership is going through a very critical phase and that poor leadership can never support the development of African countries. In fact, the tradition of African

governance clearly shows that the notion of visionary leaders is badly lacking in the continent's administration. Today, Africa is known for poverty, job issues, social crises, civil wars, and so many other social challenges, but on the other hand, the continent is very rich and blessed with unlimited natural resources. The reason for being poor and underdeveloped is mainly the lack of vision and skills, and of course, the lack of decision-makers. In fact, the stimulus behind the African crisis is the poor leadership; if, in any country, the leaders are self-centered, dictatorial, and corrupt, the country cannot be saved from corruption and backwardness. Although it is true that some African leaders did their best to develop people and social agencies, as well as to motivate all social capital to understand the importance of ethics in social development, they did not serve for long. The present paper also studied the selected reason for the poor leadership and pointed out that corruption and a lack of democratic setup and understanding are also reasons for the poor leadership, which ultimately give rise to corruption that was never dealt with properly. This paper mentioned the significance of democracy as one of the major challenges in Africa. It is clear that in Africa, the leaders have no value for democracy, and it is evident in their development approach that leaders are not able to ensure a strong democracy.

The study also suggests the following recommendations:

1. The educational campaign for better understanding of democracy
2. Foreign investment needs to be encouraged, and government policies need to be restructured.
3. Creating focused, mobilized, and active civil society organizations to empower African leaders

The concluding remark of this research paper is that, poor leadership is responsible for the long sufferings of Africa and African society. Based on the evaluation of selected factors and considering the people's point of view, strong leadership is always considered a basis for strong socio-political and economic setups, but this is critically lacking on the African continent. To ensure quality and skill-based sustainable growth in African society, African policymakers must continue to work on leadership development.

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Civil Society in Egypt: A Critical Analysis

Manila Narzary & Dharitri Narzary Chakravartty

ABSTRACT

Egypt is constitutionally known as a Republic, however, in practice it is an authoritarian state. The President as elected head of the state has absolute power to take decisions with regards to administering and running the state. This extends to undermine the provisions created by the constitution for citizens' rights. As a result, there is little room for any public discourse and civil society activities. This article is an analysis of the civil society growth and prospect under successive regimes in post-colonial Egypt to argue that Egyptian society is largely shaped by the state centric political culture.

Keywords: Governance, Democracy, Civic Rights, Movements, Political Culture.

Introduction

Civil Society is generally understood as groups of like-minded people coming together to protect the citizens' rights as provisioned in the constitution, especially in a democratic system. Though the term civil society is identified with the emergence of modern nation states propagating the ideas of liberty, fraternity, equality, justice and freedom of expression that foregrounds the functioning of a democratic state system, the existence of such bodies or societies in a non-democratic or authoritarian system cannot be completely ruled out. It would also be wrong to assume that all civil societies are same and are guided by a uniform principle. However, there are certain common principles and rules that guide the founding of civil societies. Conceptually and historically, the idea of civil society refers to a disciplined or 'good or civilized' society that complements governance in a state system. In contemporary times, the meaning and significance of civil societies

have undergone layers of radical changes with associational groups networking for their interests, and seen mostly standing in opposition to or opposite of state to claim rights. Thus, the presence of a robust civil society is seen as a sign of healthy democracy.

This article is an analysis of civil society in Egypt as conceived, understood and practiced in the period since Egypt experienced modernity through Western colonialism. This experience was limited largely to the political dimension and socially impacted only a small section of the Egyptian society. The Egyptian example is for representative conceptual purpose based on qualitative analytical method to reiterate that civil society cannot function in a stateless condition and can be found even in politically hostile atmosphere under specific conditions. This is because civil society require a sense of a structured space and belonging to operate towards a common goal.

Civil Society and Social Dimension

In analyzing the Egyptian civil society, the aspect of ‘social dimension’ is imperative, as representative of peoples’ consciousness and aspirations, as well as for determining the success or failure of it. It is not possible to address the question of governance, even in a well-functioning democracy, in isolation without referring to autonomy, liberty and equality, and this is where the aspects of social dimension in a broader sense become relevant. The inter-relationship between democracy, governance and social dimension is always subject to the state. To understand the social dimension in the context of Egypt, it is necessary to take into account the aspects of Egyptian society, which is complex and has undergone complicated processes of change induced by the emergent nature of politics. Ordinarily, the nature of society determines the political culture and character of a state, whereas in Egypt since its earliest history, it has been the state centred political culture which contributed in a significant way to shape the character of Egyptian society. When one looks at the case of Egypt, a very basic question comes to mind: ‘why civil societies emerge?’ However, in engaging with this question, it also must not be taken for granted that civil societies always reflect and represent the issues and concerns of common citizens. This was particularly the case in Egypt where dominant sections of the society, which can also be considered as the ‘elites’ were behind the development

of organizations that presented themselves as civil society groups to claim stake over state power. In fact, the political turmoil that the country underwent was also due to the tremendous pressure the successive regimes faced from various non-political groups at different levels dominated by affluent class.

Most scholars agree that differing values and beliefs have contributory role to play in shaping the political culture of a society. Moreover, as pointed out by Powell and Strom (2015), the historical experiences and related social factors need to be taken into account while trying to understand the temporality of associational networks. While cultural elements like language, religion-belief system or ethnicity as markers of groups have their part to contribute in this process of associational networking, these are not the only cultural patterns that lead to the development of political cultures. Within such groups may also exist differing sets of ideologies that are more inclined towards creating a civic culture in a larger or universal sense. For civil society to become more wide reaching and influential, such a political culture becomes important and this is where one can see the differing trajectory of civil movements, even in countries like Egypt. Because, as reiterated by scholars like Powell, the 'civic' generally encapsulates the historical, traditional and cultural values of a society, as representative of its world view. Egypt is not a homogenous society and there are minority groups whose voices could not be heard either politically or socially, mainly because of the nature of state politics.

Development of Civil Society in Egypt

Though civil society emerged in Egypt earlier (in 1821) than many developing countries, it could not flourish and reach its full potential and underwent various phases of transition.

First Inception (1821-1881)

During the period when modernization project was fervently undertaken in the western world, it had bearings on the other societies including the Arab world. Egypt had relatively more advanced society than many other Arab countries which was instrumental in the inception of civil society in early 19th century. M A Faksh (1980) links the spread of

modern education since the first half of 19th century under Muhamad Ali's rule (1805-1849), consequent of Egypt's exposure to the West via French invasion alongside the rise of elite class, which created a condition for the working class to construct a middle class society of professionals. This section of the society were the ones who articulated their rights for which associations and organisations were formed. However, such initiatives to form associations had no confrontational history rather they worked in complementarity with the state functionaries. In fact, some of the founding members belonged to the status group having been part of state functionaries or connected to the ruling families with privileges and with enough exposure to the western world.

The Colonial Phase (1882-1922)

The colonial period in Egypt was short but like in many other parts of the colonised world including India and Africa, it helped to awaken the nationalist consciousness among the peoples which found expression in mass movements against the British colonial government. These mobilizations were political in nature but provided the ground for activism to protect the interest of the people and were voluntary in nature. As cited by Hassan (2011), these forums and associations in essence propagated the modern concept of activism which paved the way for more organized civil societies like the trade unions (1898), the cooperatives (1908), political parties (1907), chambers of commerce (1910), professional associations (1912) and the feminist movement (1919) in the case of Egypt.

The Liberal Phase (1922- 1952)

The first quarter of 20th century Egypt was the most liberal in its approach. This may be linked with the experience of freedom movement and the ideology associated with it that was prevalent during the period, including the adoption of a Constitution in 1923 guaranteeing many rights. Basic freedoms like the right to form associations and freedom of expression can be linked to the existing political atmosphere of the time. This constitution, however, faced resistance from the monarchical government of Egypt as it wanted to continue the control over the citizens. This saw civil society of the country coming together to defend their rights given by the newly adopted constitution. Civil society groups

and associations tried to mobilise the citizens against the ruling monarch by using popular media and came out with publications of newspapers and magazines. Hassan (2011) notes that this period saw publication of many daily newspapers, weekly and monthly magazines in Arabic and European languages to demand for transparency and accountability from the government, free elections and the right to form unions by the working class. This phase saw the first revolution in Egypt powerful enough to dethrone the monarch on July 23, 1952 and the Free Officers (by the name of which the revolution was started) ushered in a new period of development in Egypt.

The Nasser Phase (1952-1970)

The dethronement of the monarch led to the forming of a Presidential government under the leadership of a military officer, Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 with all powers of the state concentrated in his hands as the head of the state. He also brought the civil society organizations directly under the authority of the state. According to Hassan, his regime promulgated amendments number of times in the constitution by using his presidential power and making himself the supreme authority. Ironically, this period also saw the beginning of a regime that re-imposed many of the ruling principles having monarchical characteristics through these amendments. By superimposing the authority of the state, represented by himself, the role and function of the judiciary and legislature were undermined. He introduced regulations to control and restrict the civil society organizations and restricted working class movement by forming a centralized Federation of Trade Unions. The state interference and control over the civil society was imposed through the enactment of law in 1964 subject to which the administration was empowered to reject proposals for creation of civil society organizations as legal bodies, to dissolve or amalgamate. Thus, for the same actions by the civil society the judiciary became an important and mandatory recourse. Nasser's sudden death in 1970 was followed by certain policy changes in state rule but without much relief for the civil society in general.

Rethinking Civil Society Post Nasser

Post Nasser was a period of open-door policy that was initiated by

Muhammad Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and continued by Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). The entry of capitalist market economy as well as a more liberalized political outlook that was to help governance was envisioned by Sadat who recognized the importance of multi-party system. It was a way to respond to the rising demand for a change coming from various civil society groups, though it was very subjective and short lived. There was slow but steady development of civil society organizations during both regimes and were becoming wider in their activities despite the state control and restrictions. Large number of associations expanded considerably in the mid-1970s, but stagnated by middle of 1980s. It was at the time of economic liberalization that the number of registered associations and groups increased by 41 % in 1981, as noted by Al-Sayyid (1993). However, authorities viewed such expansion as politically risky and adopted a brutal policy to control them. According to Al-Sayyid

Egypt's voluntary associations may be classified as class-based associations, professional societies, social care and development organizations, traditional institutions, and political parties. The class-based associations are of two types: those that represent businessmen and those that limit membership to workers. The largest representative bodies of the first type are undoubtedly chambers of commerce and industry, which are divided into functional and provincial chapters grouped together under a General Federation of Chambers of Commerce in Egypt. This category includes also the Federation of Egyptian Industries, which groups managers of industrial firms in both the public and private sectors. (pp. 228-242)

There was wide spread fear and apprehension among the citizens in Egypt of the state apparatus and generally people did not want to interact with the law enforcement agencies like the police. Even for most routine kind of interaction with the police there was reluctance, unlike in other countries where police is an integral part of the larger society in matters related to law and order. People identified police with regimic brutality in Egypt. The basic right which also includes general safety of individuals in public spaces got undermined by the police in violation of the law. Though the constitution clearly lays down the guidelines vis-à-vis the fundamental rights of the citizens,

the state level interference in the everyday life of the people raise pertinent questions as to what it means to be a citizen or what should be the state mechanism to ensure the protection of such rights.

Proliferation and Activities of Civil Society in Egypt

It is interesting to note that Egypt has seen birth of some thirty thousand civil society organizations by the end of 2008 even though only a handful minority have been active in real. But the number of these organizations indicate the growing desperation of people for a change in their lives. Most of these organizations though may have originated with an objective to raise awareness about some specific societal issues, one cannot ignore the larger context in which they are located. Majority of the organizations have religious character with reform oriented agendas but these bodies too have interrelation with the existing socio-political and economic reality. Besides the more social and religious kind of organizations, there have been youth oriented groups and clubs, cooperatives, professional associations, trade and workers' unions to highlight the fact that people were aware of the importance of such organizations. Though there are many legally registered organizations, the numbers are misleading in terms of their real strength as pressure groups, especially when many organizations are present only in paper without any practical involvement.

As mentioned above, civil society in Egypt has a long history and its development goes back to early 19th century. Many of their early activities were related to major political events relevant for a modern nation and thus, set the tune for future organizations. As per the Egypt Human Development Report (2008), one of the earliest examples may be that of initiated during the time of Mohamed Ali Pasha, 1805-1854, for political, economic and social reforms demanding for modernization as a result Egypt's exposure to the developments taking place in the outside world. Civil society organizations always faced problems from the state. State never allowed those activities which make citizens aware about their rights and raise the issues of lack of governance.

The first formal civil society organization to be founded in Egypt was by a Greek Association, founded in 1821 to promote and serve the interest of the Greek minority in Egypt. Many of the philanthropic

groups and associations, mostly of religious nature, emerged as a counter to the growing evangelical missions of the West, which was significant contributor in the rise of nationalism in Egypt. For instance, the establishment of an Islamic hospital (Al Agouza) in 1878 and the establishment of a school (the Coptic Al Maseel Mashkoura) in 1881, which received financial support from the Wakf (the Muslim Board). The establishment of the Cairo University in 1908 was also a result of such initiatives under one of the Wakfs promoted by the royal family. This perhaps is one reason that led to the advocacy by some organizations for highlighting the issues and problems faced by Egyptian women in the larger society. The foundation of a women's social organization in 1909 by a feminist of early 20th century Egypt, Hoda Shaarawi, and later the foundation of the Union of Educated Egyptian Women in 1914 indicates the desire among the general people and particularly the civil society members to address the endemic political and social problems in Egypt.

Slowly people realized the importance of civil society organizations and became part of various civil society organizations. The objective of those people who involved with these organizations was for the welfare of the society. Many sections of the society were deprived from their basic rights. Egyptian women were very much neglected by the society as well as the government. Their participation in political system was almost non-existent. Egypt is a rigid patriarchal society and all the decisions are taken by the male members of the family and the society, and women have very limited or no role in it. In 1923 Shaarawi organization was founded to raise issues related to the women in Egypt. The early 20th century development of feminist movements across the world, including Syria and Lebanon, may be paralleled with what was happening in Egypt of that time as associations and syndicates were making appearance.

Compared to the later civil organizations of 21st century, the early associations were much more matured in their approach and organizational skill, which had set the ground for revolution in 1952. Under the monarchical constitution, even the middle class in Egypt participated in voluntary activities during this early phase. Many institutionalized bodies of women came out with various issues of

women and represented a variety of political and intellectual movements espousing ideologies like liberal, communist and Islamic ideologies, promoting the many faces of nationalism (Arab, Islamic, and a return to the roots of Ancient Egypt), with debates on the constituents of the Egyptian identity and citizenship, and made the citizens and state realize the importance of women's participation in politics and decision making for the welfare of the society. It may not have been the golden period of civil society organizations in Egypt but certainly in the history of civil society in Egypt, it was the most promising period with over a thousand organizations enabled by the new legislative framework under the civil law. According to the Egypt Human Development Report (2008), among the prominent organizations were the Muslim youth, Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Sisterhood, Muslim Women's Association, Syndicate of Physicians, Press Syndicate, and Syndicate of Engineers. The development of 1923 Constitution thus saw the phase of growth of the organizations in Egypt, allowing organizations to either reactivate or to be founded within a short span of time. Some of these organizations were, interestingly, funded and supported by several members of the urban and political elites.

Civil Society at Crossroads in Egypt

In Egypt the situation of civil society organizations changed after the 1952 military revolt with the imposition of the dominant political ideology that propounded socialism leading to centralization through bureaucratization of all state functionaries and sectors. Post revolution the state took precautions to repress dissidents by introducing a comprehensive policy to restrict the freedom enjoyed by these organizations. The already mentioned law of 1964 empowered the Ministry of Social Affairs to control the existing organizations and even to dissolve them. Due to the laws amended for restriction of civil society activities some of the smaller organizations disappeared or ceased to exist, decreasing the number of the ones functioning. Government ensured that some of the smaller ones were incorporated into the semi-government organizations to function as grass-root associations representing the welfare state. These newly incorporated organizations worked primarily in the health and education sector at the community level.

A new political atmosphere had developed during 1971 under the regime of Anwar Sadat that initially favoured some degree of political pluralism allowing formation of political parties by interested citizens. He tried to bring about a shift in the socio-political and economic environment by adopting a more liberal policies and promoting an open door policy in economy. This new idea of changing the situation in Egypt was important as it ushered in a new global order in the form of greater interaction between Egyptian and global economy with the technological use in communication. The open door policy adopted during the period of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) made foreign investment easier and acceptable as government accommodated these entities for Egypt's welfare. However, liberalization did not mean that Egypt became a free economy as all these transformations were tightly controlled and monitored by the state. There still was no scope for private individual companies to enter into any kind of agreement with foreign organizations. This was why the business associations had to collaborate with the government agencies and they entered into mutually beneficial nexus.

While Egypt was trying to overcome major economic hurdles by becoming a part of the global world during this period, many new policies introduced domestically had contradictory effects and trend. There was increasing pressure from the larger society for greater social and economic reform and freedom internally. The government tried to protect its perceived achievements as a result of liberalization policies from any likely opposition. This is the dilemma faced by most transitioning states. During 1990s when the economy of Egypt was drastically declining, the government realized the important role of the NGOs. To deal with the economic crisis many NGOs became active, reasserting themselves and several self-help organizations were introduced as noted by Hassan (2011). The self-help groups are seen as self-sustaining response to the emergent economic problems. These organizations are particularly important in addressing local and community level concerns, as seen in many developing countries of Africa, South Asia and South East Asia. As private initiatives these organizations are known for working in impoverished and backward areas and are very different from donor driven NGOs that work in partnership with local people. These small self-help type of organizations are much more effective and result oriented focusing on empowering

the local population. Though there are numerous non-government organizations working to empower the poor and ordinary citizens of Egypt, there are certain issues that remain particularly critical for NGOs to address. Among them are:

- Inadequate attention given to the marginalized sections of the society including children, women, cultural minorities and tribes.
- Issues of human rights violation, especially by the state like imprisonments, unexplained arrests, torture, and political persecutions.
- Issues of unemployment, poverty and economic crisis affecting the poor.

Some of the core areas of activity for NGOs in Egypt include fighting against corruption and reform. In their effort to reduce the level of corruption from the society and the system, there have been efforts to generate awareness about the ills of corruption at all levels. Some NGOs have tried to educate the citizens about the implications of corruption, inform and educate them how to fight against it by setting up information centres and building networks. Many of the social and economic policies failed to take off in Egypt due to systemic corruption as most government organs and functionaries are corrupt while the ruling elites and politicians have misused their power for personal gain. Some of the known organizations fighting against corruption are: Egyptians Against Corruption, the Egyptian Transparency Organization and the Egyptian organization for human rights.

Another pressing concern of the civil society organizations is the area of social and political reforms for which they have been urging the citizens to collectively monitor the developments in the state. They call for united fronts of all Egyptians to check corruption, tyranny and rule of law. Also, pressing for citizenship value by demanding promotion of cultural tolerance and secular values.

Civil society organizations are voluntary in nature and their function generally are localized but can have wider reach and influence depending on the nature of issues and subjects they engage with. Hawthorn (2004) thinks that civil society organizations generally are beyond family

affiliations including clan relations, but operate as independent entities separate from the market and the state. They are non-profit organizations and are driven by social cause which necessarily involves political activism. In principle, civil society organizations are expected to be secular and liberal in their ideology. Civil societies have the capacity to bring transformation without any support from the government and even contribute to create a welfare state if the conditions are right. It can help immensely in the process of democratization by becoming intermediary between the state and the larger society or by negotiating with the state. Generally, civil society members are aware, alert, educated and articulate with commitment and ability to mobilize public opinion, however, one also require certain leadership quality.

In the case of Egypt, the constraint has been the long emergency laws imposed by the state on political freedom to curtail any form of political opposition. The emergency laws were born as a result of government fear for oppositional forces undermining its authority and threatening its very existence. It was considered necessary to gain tight state control over these pluralistic associations and gradually transform them to state controlled institutions which is highlighted by Arafat (2009). The government closed down many professional associations that defied its dictates and continued to oppose, especially Mubarak's regime, barring them from participating in social or political activities. There has been systematic control to regulate the financing of the civil organizations and NGOs by foreign and domestic donors, strictly monitoring the financial flow especially from external sources. With the implementation of 1964 amendments in the law, then again in 2002 passing a law in parliament government persistently tried to control and restrict the activities of civil society organization. These new laws gave power to the state to not only disband NGOs but also seize their properties, documents and freeze other forms of assets to prevent them from engaging in activities considered anti-regime. The law permits an array of severe penalties to restrict NGO activities in Egypt and undermine civil society by using captive groups or government NGOs.

One drawback of the civil society in Egypt is that they do not have a clear agenda for democratization on the basis of which to mobilize the citizens. Unlike the Islamic organizations that use religious channels

to mobilize support, pro-democracy groups have largely failed to come up with common ideas and concepts to build network essential for mobilizing the people. Many NGOs have attacked the regime for its systematic abuse of human rights, however, they have not been able to use the issue of human rights violation effectively to gain public support, which could have helped them to consolidate their position. They have not used the most common issue of corruption to press for reform which concerns all Egyptians but again there has been a failure to capitalize on this by NGOs.

Limitation and Challenges of Civil Society in Egypt

The civil society in Egypt is encountered with some of the major hurdles that prevent them from growing into powerful social forces, which maybe understood from the following:

Financial Constraint

According to the Egypt Human Development Report compiled by UNDP in 2008, the earnings of more than fifteen thousand civil society organizations have been estimated to be LE (Egyptian Pound) 2 billion, which is considered to be a modest figure. The earnings came in the form of membership fees, donations, gifts and subsidies. Out of the thousands of NGO/CSOs, only a very few have been able to acquire foreign donation of substantial amount. With such limited funding and resources, the CSOs in Egypt find it extremely difficult to sustain their activities for very long.

The Political Environment

In 2000, for the first time Mubarak talked of civil society as a viable partner in the process of development. However, his government failed to translate this desire into reality and it remained a mere political discourse. The biggest difficulty lies in policy making, where civil society never had any influence and therefore, the government missed out on important inputs at the initial stages of planning that could have played an important role in conceiving an effective policy. At the execution level also the CSOs are largely excluded, limiting their role to consultancy alone and it is mainly the bureaucracy which decided

the execution plan. The state limited CSOs to mostly welfare activities like health and education and reserved its opinion in matters related to advocacy for democratic reforms.

The Religious Intervention

It is widely believed that civil society is secular in ideology, civil in behavior, legally recognized, and supportive of democratic values. Egypt saw rise in Islamist organizations and associations that have managed to use the common Islamic religious ideological channel to influence the people. It is estimated by various organizations including the UN that religious organizations constitute more than 35% of all the civil society organizations in Egypt. Though these Islamist organizations engage in welfare activities, their work and focus are biased and even discriminatory, with an objective to promote religious ideas.

The Emergency Law

Since the time Mubarak came to power, the state has taken total control of the society by imposing emergency laws. The government under him ensured that emergency laws are renewed every few years in order to bring the society under its subjugation, which is unthinkable in any democratic state. Ironically, the constitution has no provision to prevent the president from declaring emergency laws as the head of the state. This is primarily due to the absence of an independent judiciary. The regime under Mubarak used the 1992 anti-terror law along with other related military orders to constrain the citizens and restrict their freedom.

The emergency laws have been used to arbitrarily abuse human rights in the name of protecting national security. The permanent nature of the emergency laws have impacted the civilian lives negatively. Egypt has what is called the Association Law, which is a set of regulations that act as and pose administrative barriers for the NGOs putting unreasonable constrain on their operation and reduce their scope for success. It also facilitates arbitrary practice by the state agencies to restrict and control the NGOs. The Association Law of 2002 is one such amendment in the legal book which has tremendously affected the freedom and sustainability of the civil society organizations together

with other laws introduced with similar intentions like the Political Parties Law of 2005 and the Press Law of 2006.

Lack of internal democracy of civil society organizations

One of the major problems that most civil society organizations faced in Egypt included lack of internal democracy. Accountability and transparency have been missing in the functioning of many CSOs. Most leaders were authoritarian in their conduct and oversight mechanisms were a problem. They also failed to give fair representation to marginalized sections within the organization like women and minorities. It maybe argued that NGOs in Egypt like in most Arab countries, suffered from weak organizational structure, poor leadership, administrative inefficiency, failure to audit and regulate misuse of authority within as also highlighted by Hassan (2011).

Social and cultural environment

Civil society thrives where there is the culture of voluntarism and this was missing in Egypt largely. The collective sense of belonging to a society helps in developing affinity which is important for cultivating a generous self. Though this may be present among some older generation people, among the youth it is difficult to inculcate this sense of belonging, which reflects in the low participation by this section of the society in voluntary activities. According to the Egypt Human Development Report (2008)

“Data from the Ministry of Social Solidarity reveals a serious reduction of registered youth organizations. Another deficiency is a poor understanding of the value of collective work. Inter-group ventures are not in great evidence, nor are partnerships sufficiently exploited”. (p. 10)

Poor Networking

The UNDP 2008 report also reveals that the alliances formed between most human rights organizations in Egypt are informal in nature. There is no clear demarcation or guidelines followed while organizations decide to work together as was visible during the 2005 election where several organizations worked with more than one or two umbrella

organizations. This do have certain advantages as it demands for a good coordination between the allied organizations and in the process the members learn the skill of it. Though it was well executed during this election which was also noticed and praised by the media and the public, there is much needed to be achieved in the field of coordination while engaging with other more demanding and serious kind of activities that require good management of resources, including human resource. Moreover, according to the 2008 report, very few organizations in Egypt have global network links even with the Arab world.

Conclusion

The civil society organizations are private organizations and do not generally receive financial support for the activities they undertake. Though they work to fill in the gaps where the government is unable to act or provide public service, ideologically they differ from the central political ideology which run the government. Therefore, the funding for the NGOs and civil organizations have to raise their own funds through donations and gifts received from philanthropic individuals or organizations or through membership fees as already mentioned earlier. However, these associations face restriction in accessing local or foreign financing without government authorization for which the law has been amended. It is only with the approval of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (earlier called Ministry of Social Affairs) that anyone as an individual or as organization wishing to donate for respective NGOs from within Egypt or abroad can do so. This allows the government to scrutinize the activities undertaken by the NGOs but at the same time the entire process can become tedious or even lead to government employees interfering in the functioning of the NGOs.

As has been discussed previously, Egypt has witnessed various types of collective protest movements during Mubarak regime and these protests were spear headed by prominent civil society organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, women's associations and other liberal associations. The one movement directly connected to the establishment is the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya) at the end of December 2004, which though was not headed by any civil society it was for the first time a mass movement which can be seen as led by people. People of Egypt tolerated the arbitrary rule for many years and they were no more

willing to continue with the existing condition, and this was how the idea of Kefaya movement (Movement for Change) was born. This movement can be linked to the many restrictions imposed on the freedom of civil society that wished to work for Egypt. People wanted change and a movement of the masses like in the form of Kefaya, was never seen in the history of modern Egypt. In that it was a completely new phenomenon. The entire movement was targeted against the ruling family of the President, including his ministers and extended families. Thereafter, the successive movements emerged to highlight the non-performing nature of economy in the country, unemployment that was affecting the living condition of the citizens and the growing privatization.

These were some of the genuine demands of the people of Egypt which successive governments failed to fulfill. The prevailing condition was all the more difficult for the civil society to function as they faced number of regulations and policing. Following the 2011 revolution which led to the expansion of civil society activities, further efforts were made by the state to pass more stringent rules. The growing support these groups received from the masses forced the government to physically restrict and punish them. To quote Mikhail (2014), "In February 2012, several NGOs were raided and later, in highly contested cases, judges convicted forty-three local and international civil society workers to one, two, or five years in prison for operating in Egypt without a license as well as receiving foreign funds". Mikhail further states that though Article 75 of the Constitution mention about citizens' right to form groups, associations and NGOs recognized as legal bodies upon notification, with the state having no role to play in their dissolving and functioning, in practice the government denied the freedom to associate, a right that many NGOs have been struggling to acquire. Civil society in the Republic of Egypt thus remain under the shadow of the state to address even the basic concerns of the citizen.

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Siddis of Patthar Kuan (Ahmedabad): A Diasporic Connect From Africa

Manish Karmwar

Through the ages number of Africans were shipped to India on teeming dhows. They considered this country (India) as their own and rose to become rulers, generals, administrators, soldiers and architects. Their involvement in court politics strengthened their political and social position. There have been numerous instances where they have emerged as king-makers as well. In Janjira and Sachin kingdoms, they had ascended from king-makers to Emperors. African dispersal in India covers several states/provinces namely, Bengal, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Daman and Diu, Goa and Andhra Pradesh. In Gujarat, they are found in the districts of Surat, Ahmedabad, Amerili, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Rajkot, and Bhavnagar, Broach/Bharuch near Ratanpur and the former kingdom of Kutch/Katchch. They are usually settled in areas of their own but in Ahmedabad, Broach and Kutch they live in mixed areas as they do in parts of Andhra Pradesh. Siddis of Gujarat traces the roots of their saint and community ancestor, Gori Pir, who is usually described as an Abyssinian who came to Gujarat to trade in the 14th century. Oral histories and retentions of African languages, religions, music, and dance rekindle memories and myths about dying ancestral African homeland.

According to the recent census, the population of Siddis in India is approximately 60,000. The Siddis, Indians of African descent, are a small minority in Gujarat. Probably around ten to twelve thousand population lived in various parts of Gujarat 500 of which Siddis are in Ahmedabad. The African presence in India particularly in Ahmedabad and their cultural and social assimilation provide the primary framework for the present work. Understanding the history of migration traditions, rituals, educational practices and economic goals are the main objective of this work. The paper has also advocated the concept that Indian

culture has been endowed and enhanced by the African culture; and African Diaspora played a pivotal role in India. The paper has endeavoured to discuss the contemporary position of the Siddis at Patthar Kuan (Ahmedabad). The data has been collected from Ahmedabad city only. Observation and interviews are used for data collection. The paper is based on primary and secondary sources.

Numerous Africans occupied a significant role in various Indian reigns. The initial Habshi, of whom there is an ancient record, was possibly Jamal al-Din Yaqut, a noble courtier in the empire of Delhi, in the north of the sub-continent. Habshis established in the interior of northern India. Ibn Battuta recollected that at Alapur, the Governor was the Abyssinian Badr. A man whose courage was accepted as a proverb. Some of the Africans who rose to places of significant reputation were: Malik Ambar, Malik Sarwar, Mubarak Shah, Ibrahim Shah, Malik Andil, Malik Sandal, Yaqut Dabuli Habshi, Ikhlas Khan, Dilawar Khan, Khavass Khan, Ulugh Khan. Their role in the history of India is noteworthy. The Africans, who arrived in Hyderabad, Deccan, were recruited as Nizam's private bodyguards apart from playing their traditional role as bonded guards and servants. The SiddiRisala (African Regiment) was retained until 1948. Other Siddis were raised to the rank of Khanazahs (protéges) and grow into reliable counsellors of the Nizams (Karmwar, 2010).

Research Works

In October 2020, three research papers were published in the *Journal of South Asian History and Culture (TF)*. The paper enriches our understanding of Siddis in India (Gujarat). The First paper is about, Siddi voices and the Siddi Sayyid Mosque: narratives of space and belonging by Beheroze Shroff and Sonal Mehta. In this essay, they focus on the Siddis of Gujarat, and their oral narratives, to establish a genealogy, a counter-history, under which space is imagined as a way of belonging and claiming cultural citizenship. Babubhai Siddi's story of Siddi soldier, Siddi Sayyid, of the famous Siddi Sayyid Mosque in Ahmedabad, recounts the act of sacrifice by which the Hindu Goddess of Wealth, Lakshmi was detained forever, in the city of Ahmedabad. The second paper is written by Khatija Sana Khader on Trans local notions of belonging and authenticity: understanding race amongst the Siddis of

Gujarat and Hyderabad. Based on fieldwork among Siddis in Hyderabad and Gujarat, this article elaborates on the idea of how race is constructed in a non-western location. The meanings immanent in race as a category do not preclude understandings borrowed from western discourse. Another piece of work authored by B.B. Cohen from soldier to spectacle: Africans and the langar procession in Hyderabad. Bhatt (2018) explores the subject of the African presence in India. She focuses on cultural assimilation and the survival of the Siddis, who occupies a unique place in Indian history. Several issues regarding Africans in Asia, their role, prospect and future are discussed in uncovering the history of Africans in Asia edited by Shihan de Silva Jayasuriya (2008). Hawley (2008) touches on the long-lasting contact between these two areas, showing that the Indian Ocean world offers numerous instances of traditional movements that accept our understanding of globalization as a fresh spectacle. African Elites in India: HabshiAmarat (2006). Each part begins with a detailed account of African engagement in the political history of the region under study. Eaton's (1978) observation is special in this regard as he points out that African slaves were prized in India for their martial prowess. Their military ability was one of the main reasons for their upward mobility on the social scale. "Siddis and Scholars" (2004), which is a collection of essays, Edward A. Alpers provides a survey of the African presence in India by placing those experiences in the wider context of the African diaspora in the Indian Ocean world. Ali (1996) provides a historical overview of the African heritage in India from medieval to modern times. She focuses on African dispersal in the Deccan region covering modern Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, the Coromandel Coast and western coastal India. Chauhan (1995) brings to light an authentic account of the wonderful story of the African Diaspora in India from the earliest period till 1992. Banaji has worked on the topic "Relations between the Marathas and the Siddis of Janjira". Ivan Van Sertima and Runoko Rashidi (1998) argue that blacks were a formative civilizing influence on Asian societies.

Harris in *The African Presence in Asia: Consequences of the East African Slave Trade* has made an invaluable contribution to the ongoing discovery of Africa's central role in human history (1971). Harris (1982) central premise is that the global heritage of African people needs to

be understood as “an Extension of African history”. A comprehensive study of the Eastern slave trade is done by an eminent British scholar Ronald Segal (1996) a companion volume of his work “The Black Diaspora”, which describes the fascinating and horrifying story of the Islamic slave trade. Shihan De S. Jayasuriya and Richard Pankhurst (1964) edited book (2003) is a collection of scholarly work. Edward A. Alpers compares the African Diaspora in the Indian Ocean with that of the Atlantic Ocean. In perceptive and arresting analysis, Robin Cohen (1999) illuminates the changing meanings of Diaspora and the contemporary diasporic condition. This volume serves to introduce a major new series, *Global Diasporas*. Omar Khalidi’ (1989) article lists additional literature on the African presence in the zone from Arabia to the Indian subcontinent. Fitzroy A. Baptiste (1998) examines African-descended communities in contemporary India. Abdulaziz Y. Lodhi (1992) has worked on African settlements in India. His works are based on the dialectal sign of the Bantu backgrounds of the Siddis of India. He found that the Siddis of India are uneven societies of generally East African lineage. Gupta’s (1991) edited book is a collection of essays which in the editor’s own words attempts to present “historical profiles of some minorities on the coast.” Jayanti Patel attempted study of African settlements in Gujarat.

Journey From Africa to Gujarat: Port, Trade and Slaves

Pre-colonial Gujarat under Muslim domination was, at least in its coastal urban centres, rather cosmopolitan. The lively interaction between people from diverse social and cultural backgrounds involved in overseas trade not only entailed the violence of slavery but also resulted in a great heterogeneity of local populations all along the countries bordering the Indian Ocean.

Arab traders settled in India; Gujarati merchants settled in East Africa. After they arrived in India, many Siddi was employed by traders as domestic servants and thus remained in the heterogeneous urban milieu of Gujarat. Across the ocean, Gujaratis “virtually monopolised overseas trade in east Africa, collecting gold and ivory and slaves in exchange for their cloth” (Pearson, 1976).

Since the thirteenth century and after the rise of Muslim power, Gujarat’s

large and small ports; Surat, Bharuch, Cambay in the east, Mundra and Mandvi in the west (Kacch) - were increasingly engaged in overseas trading relationships with similar ports along the countries bordering the shores of the Indian Ocean. From the fourteenth century onwards, Arab and Portuguese sources make repeated mention of the slave-trade carried on by traders in Kilwa and the selling of black slaves to India and other places in Asia. The merchant town of Cambay was then the major port of the Sultanate of Delhi and one of the major ports as was Mundra in Kacch some centuries later through which African slaves reached Indian soil. In the fourteenth century, a regular market (nikka) for the selling of slaves was held in Cambay. In the mid- sixteenth century, after the Portuguese had conquered Goa, they maintained a regiment at Diu, a port on the shore of the peninsula of Saurashtra, consisting of 600 Africans as soldiers.

In the eighteenth century, Muscat became a flourishing centre of the slave trade, providing slaves to Arab societies along the coast of the Persian Gulf. From Muscat and, later, Zanzibar an estimated number of ten thousand slaves were annually dispersed to the Middle Eastern world. A small number of these slaves reached western India as well, through a port either in Sindh, Kacch or in South Gujarat (Basu,2001).

In the nineteenth century, the British campaign against the Arab-dominated slave trade met with resistance. Gujarati merchants settled on the Swahili coast and proved to be as averse to the abolishment of slavery as Arab traders. Almost 6,000 slaves owned Indians in East Africa. In the late 1860s, the slave trade was formally abolished by the British, although in Saurashtra and Kacch the selling of slaves continued till 1936. The British attempted to enforce their policy by controlling Arab and Gujarati slave ships (dhows) for the transport of slaves (Beachey, 1976).

Hence, the comparatively smaller number of African slaves reaching the west coast of India till the early 20th century were generally displaced individuals. In the Saurashtra region of Gujarat, the importation of slaves was acknowledged unlawful as late as 1936. Till then, Africans arrived in Gujarat individually or in low numbers. At this point, they were working at local royal courts or by rich traders like other domestic servants of low status. Relatively, noble Siddi fused themselves with

the elite class of Muslims of past rulers.

The second medium of African influence was also tied intimately to the history of Islamic expansion. One example of this convergence is found in the figure of Bava Gor. A series of shrines extending from sending to Gujarat is dedicated to him. Local traditions indicate that BavaGor was a Muslim Abyssinian who came with several family members perhaps by way of Arabia to this area in about the 14th century. BavaGor is associated with the introduction of Islam in western parts of India and its shrines are dedicated to his memory as a Muslim pir or Saint. The tomb of Bava Gor at Ratanpur makes this the most important dargah among all the shrines dedicated to his cult. It remains an important pilgrimage site to this day. Bava Gor is also said to have introduced the agate bead trade to this part of western India (Catlin & Alpers, 2004).

Gujarat Kingdom (1407-1572) and the Rise of Siddis

One prominent feature of the declining years of the Gujarat kingdom was the rise to power and influence of several nobles of ‘Habshi’ origin who played no insignificant part in the civil strife of the time. Among these, we may mention the Amirs who enjoyed the titles of Iktiyar-ul-Mulk, Jhujhar Khan, and Ulugh Khan. The term Habshis, though generally applied to Abyssinians, no doubt includes other Negroid races of the African continent. The race appears to have shown the same capacity, as did the Turks, to rise from slavery to the highest positions. The Habshi commanders who rose *to* fame in Gujarat in the 16th century were the prisoners or descendants of prisoners captured during the Muslim invasion of Abyssinia in 1527. Taken first to *Kamran*, they were subsequently brought to Gujarat in 1531 by Mustafa bin Bahram, when the latter received orders from Constantinople *to* proceed at once *to* India to help Bahadur against the Portuguese. In the disorders that began with the accession of Mahmud III, the more able members found scope for rising to favour and prominence. Their rivalry with the local nobility, and with the leaders of other foreign mercenaries, brought about a state of dissension which enabled Akbar to conquer Gujarat almost without a blow in 1572-73. At one time the Habshis in Ahmedabad are said to have numbered 5,000 persons (Commissariat,

1938).

The careers of three Habshi nobles who successively bore the high title of Ulugh Khan and who played a prominent part for twenty years during the declining period of the Sultanate. The first was Dilawar Khan who rose to notice under Mahmud III and was appointed in 1553 Captain of the Bodyguard and put in command of the Arab. He was killed in battle in the same year and his wazir YaqutSabit Khan Habshi received the title of Ulugh Khan and succeeded to his military commands. Yaqut commanded the Habshi force under Imad-ul-Mulk Arslan and obtained Imad's rank when the latter became chief minister to Ahmad III. He died in 1558, his funeral being attended by all the nobles as also by the Sultan, and he was buried at Sarkhej by the side of Bilal Jhujhar Khan, another famous Habshi noble of the day. The third to receive the title of Ulugh Khan was Yaqut's son Muhammad who as wazir to his father was known under the style of Khayrat Khan. He was the patron of Hajji-ad-Dabir, the famous author of the *Arabic History, of Gujarat*, who was in this nobleman's service from 1556 to 1573. Muhammad Ulugh Khan thus naturally plays a very important part in this author's detailed history of Gujarat over the years. He secured the same devotion as his father had enjoyed from the Habshi troops in Gujarat and was thus able to take an active part in the confused politics of the time. We find him alternately on the side of Itimad Khan and of Imad-ul-Mulk Arslan during this reign (Commissariat, 1938).

In 1561-62 it is reported that there were five thousand African slaves in Ahmadabad, the capital of the sultanate, and in 1500 in another major city, Baroda the Mughal emperor Akbar subjugated the kings of Central India and Rajasthan in the 1560s, Gujarat in 1572, Bengal in 1576, and Khandesh in 1601. At the time of the Mughal conquest of Gujarat, the twelve thousand horsemen in the sultan's army are said to have included seven hundred Habshis. A well-known painting of the surrender of Itimad Khan, governor of Ahmadabad and Surat for the last sultan of Gujarat shows Africans, presumably some of the slaves whom Itimad Khan handed over to Akbar; and Haji ul-Dabir's history of Gujarat claims that following the Mughal victory, the new masters incited the common people of Gujarat to kill the Habshis, who numbered

five thousand in Ahmadabad alone (Robbins and Mcleod 2006).

Population of Siddis in Gujarat

According to the 1981 census, the population of Siddi in India was 54,291. The Siddis, Indians of African descent, are a small minority in Gujarat. Probably around ten to twelve thousand population lived in Various parts of Gujarat in which according to the census 2011, 8,661 (4273 Male and 4388 Female) belong to Schedule Tribe (ST) in six districts of Saurashtra region (Chandramouli, 2011). The total population of Siddis in 1961 were 3645 (Census of India Vol. 5, 1961). This shows the substantial growth in population and social security through different governmental plans after 1956. The status of ST gives them various governmental benefits. For the Siddis living elsewhere in Gujarat, an important issue has been their wish to be recognized as ST like the Siddis of Saurashtra, if not as a 'Primitive' group too, and they have yet unsuccessful struggles to obtain this status. A good number of Siddis live in Ahmedabad, Surat and Baruch as well; in fact, there is a settlement of Siddis in Ahmedabad city itself. Siddis outside Saurashtra is classified as one of the OBC.

City of Ahmedabad

Cities appear and disappear only to reappear in the representations of Indian civilization. It was established in 1411 AD by a noble, Ahmed Shah, who had rebelled against his overlords in Delhi. The new rulers of Gujarat, keen on establishing their superiority in the material realm, had undertaken a frenzied program of building activities in their new capital of Ahmedabad. Their model was the impressive Hindu architecture of the previous centuries which they wanted to outshine. The result, after one and a half centuries, was the 'Sultanate Architecture' of Ahmedabad, considered a high point of world architectural heritage. This architecture along with the Jain, Swaminarayan and Hindu temples of the city is a veritable safari of monumental architecture which attracts lovers of beauty from across the world to the city. That it was the seat of a splendid court is testified by a French traveler, Tavernier. A treaty with the then rulers of western India, the Poona Peshwas, brought Ahmedabad under British rule in 1817. The British were keen on annexing Ahmedabad because of "the commanding influence which

the sovereignty over the city of Ahmedabad confers on its possessor in the estimation of the country at large.” At the time of the British arrival, the medieval economy of Ahmedabad had hung on three threads: gold, silk, and cotton. The British rule of law helped to flower the strength of the Ahmedabad Mahajan (trade guilds), and aided by the opium trade to China, by 1839 the town was “in a most flourishing condition and progressing rapidly.” Modern textile technology further oiled the Gujarati virtues in ‘reinventing’ Ahmedabad. Its booming business in textiles had given Ahmedabad the status of ‘Manchester of India’. Mahatma Gandhi staying on in the town for thirteen years after his return from South Africa and directed the historically unheard-of non-violent movement. Their successes in textiles turned the 19th-century Ahmedabad Mahajan into a fine institution-builders; they played important role in creating institutions like PRL, IIM, NID, ATIRA and CEPT during the middle of the 20th century. The buildings of these institutions attracted modern masters of world architecture like Louis Kahn and Le Corbusier to the city in the 1950s (ahmedabadcity.gov.in).

Siddis in Ahmedabad

Once 5000 to now 500 Siddis are the story of this city. Occupations and income-generating activities, such as driver, mechanic, security guard/watchman, computer trainer, computer engineer, musician, dancer, boxer, meat shop owner, shoe shop sales assistant, and street hawker. Patthar Kuwa, Kalunpur, Sarkhej, Gontipur, and Sardarnagar are the areas where we find siddis in Ahmedabad. Pattharkuwa is the largest amongst all, there is 30 cluster of households. Siddis in Ahmedabad are aware that Siddis have been in the city for a very long time: they say six or seven hundred years. They say that all the Siddis now in Patthar Kuwa have come from various other parts of Gujarat: ‘everyone staying here has come from outside’. Unlike Siddis of Saurashtra, who speak Gujarati as their mother tongue, Siddis in Patthar Kuwa say they speak Hindi in their homes. Apart from the Bava Gorchhilla, dargah of Siddi Sultan, who was army chief, the dargah of Siddi Bashir, Siddi and Saiyad Masjid, or Siddi Saiyad’s Darga, are important historical identities. Siddi Saiyad was responsible for building this mosque in Ahmedabad, which is world-famous for the unique artwork of its perforated window screens or jali of carved sandstone. One of these

jali screens is almost like a symbol of the city of Ahmedabad (Micklem, 2000).

In medieval Ahmedabad, there were 12 gates or entry points to the city built by Ahmed Shah and it was siddis who guarded the entrances to make certain that the goddess of wealth, Lakshmai, won't abandon the city. These gates are Tripolia gate, Delhi gate, Estodiagate, Kalupurgate, Sarangpurgate, Dariyapur gate etc. Recent research shows that the Siddis of Gujarat, and their oral narratives, to establish a genealogy, a counter-history, by which space is imagined as a way of belonging and claiming cultural citizenship.

Babubhai Siddi's story of Siddi solider, Siddi Sayyid, of the famous Siddi Sayyid Mosque in Ahmedabad, recounts the act of sacrifice by which the Hindu Goddess of Wealth, Lakshmi was detained forever, in the city of Ahmedabad. The tale functions as a moral fable about the syncretic harmony of Muslim and Hindu worship in India (Shroff, 2020).

Mosque Today

This mosque is today a globally conspicuous construction exclusively known for its antique perforated (jail) windows that are carved out of sandstone. However, the denizens of Gujarat sense a high degree of pride to have such a monument in their domain, but they have often overlooked the fact that an African built this milestone structure. And the iconic jail screens are symbolic of Ahmedabad city. It's overwhelmingly a grim situation that there are no traces of the craftsmen who constructed this art piece in the history of Ahmedabad. At Siddi Sayyad's dargah here perseveres reference of 'Abyssinian', though it's worth might have vanished on visitors' minds. The majority of them are oblivious that this historical name refers to a location that is somewhere lying in the contemporary country of Ethiopia. There lies a minutely painted sign at the Siddi Bashir Mosque which does not make a deserving indication of Siddi's legacy.

In conclusion, Siddis of Ahmedabad are few in numbers and perceived as entirely different individuals compared to the other Siddis population of different parts of Gujarat. Recently I visited and interviewed Siddis

communities of “Pattharkuva”. People of this community in this region feel that they are still not the part of mainstream society even after almost five hundred years of settlement in India. They want to get education and work, especially work for female. They are in demand of Scheduled caste status so that they can avail benefits of reservation. Siddis are the part of composite culture of Ahmedabad. As a researcher I feel that as Sultans of medieval India placed them in army, sports, and in other such areas, currently also they should be placed in such positions rather than being connected with the fields of music and dance.

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